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European Military Capabilities. History, Assessment, Practice and Perspectives

Abstract

The last decade was marked by the European growing ambition of an active role in the security sphere *inter alia* increasingly important role as an actor in crisis response missions. Taking into account conclusions coming from the last European Council session, the article analyses a progress that has been made in the development of European military capabilities essential to conducting independent full-scale out of area operations since the foundations of the ESDP. Attention will be given to the efforts undertaken to generate such capabilities at the EU level, their results and the challenges ahead. On the basis of these considerations the Author believes that ten years of the CSDP (former ESDP) have brought a few and above all only minor successes. As Zbigniew Brzezinski aptly pointed out: "Europe remains a junior geopolitical partner to the United States in the semi unified West".

Keywords: European military capabilities, CSDP, out of area capabilities, European Union

Introduction

The last decade was marked by the growing activity of the European Union (EU) in dealing with security threats. It began to play an increasingly important role as an actor in crisis response missions dealing with both regional and global security challenges. This includes a broad spectrum of tasks ranging from crisis management, through conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction (the so called state- or nation-building) to peacekeeping missions. Bound by the foundation and further development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after the *Treaty of Lisbon* (2009), the EU has obtained new instruments in this field. Simultaneously we ought to take into consideration declining US interest in European affairs (the so called *Pacific pivot*), which might probably be even more important. Washington needs to make an effort to seek the balance between political commitments, military presence and fiscal efficiency on account of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (the global financial crisis). The so-called transatlantic partnership is at a crossroads in the face of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Mounting pressures over defence budgets and an increasingly complex and uncertain security environment call for renewed efforts in European defence co-operation. Therefore, because of the highly irregular nature of the global environment, for the first time since the entry into force of

the *Treaty of Lisbon* (1 December 2009), the European Council¹ (19-20 December 2013) held a debate concerning defence.

This study is an attempt to assess the progress that has been made in the development of European military capabilities essential to conduct full-scale out of area missions. It seeks to give an overview of the efforts undertaken to generate military capabilities at the EU level, their results and the challenges that lie ahead. Additionally, it outlines a number of points that ought to be taken into consideration when thinking about this issue. The presentation begins by describing the most important steps towards EU independent military capacity. I make an effort to determine whether the EU member states possess relevant capabilities for conducting high-intensity out of area missions without significant American military support. The aim of this study is to shed light on the issue of European military capabilities, in particular its shortcomings and development. Then, I turn my attention to the military capabilities-driven division of labour works in Afghan and Libyan missions and on the basis of these considerations try to better present the complexity of the issue analysed during above mentioned European Council meeting.

1. European Military Capabilities – A Glance at History

After the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) European security architecture changed dramatically. Two Balkan crises in the early and late 90's exposed the European inability to gather essential forces and

¹ European Council meetings are called European Union Summits too.

carry out autonomous expeditionary missions. The first one – the Balkan war (1991-1995) revealed European weaknesses. It was the first but not the last bitter pill which demonstrated that European armed forces were ill-equipped for crisis management missions. The “hour of Europe” revealed the old continent’s inability to deal with its own problems. American troops played a key role in resolving the conflict while European units had only little impact on its final outcome. Similarly, the second – the conflict in Kosovo and further NATO Allied Force air operations in 1999 confirmed American predominance and drew attention to the disparities in power between old allies. In fact, the second armed conflict demonstrated that the military gap between the United States and its European allies even deepened².

² “European Military Capabilities”, 2007. *EU Briefings* May 2007, p. 1-3; D. Keohane, 2003. “Needs An Avant-Garde for Military Capabilities. Briefing Note Europe”, *New Ideas for a New Europe*. http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/briefing_militarydk-5642.pdf (Accessed January 19, 2013), p. 1; J. P. Weiskopf, “Out of Area – Out of Sight? What Role do Gender and Peace Policy Aspects Play in the European Security Policy?” <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/03701.pdf> (Accessed December 20, 2012), p. 12; S. Larrabee, 2012. “Unfinished Business in Europe.”, In *The Agenda for the EU-US Strategic Partnership*, ed. Álvaro de Vasconcelos. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 10-14; “*EU military Capabilities – some European Troops , but not yet a European Army.*” 2010. In *EU Crisis management: Institutions And Capabilities In The Making* eds. E. Greco, N. Pirozzi, S. Silvestri, Rome: *English Series 19*, Quaderni IAI, p. 12; J. Morel, A. Cameron. 2010. “The EU and Defence Capabilities: Charting the Course”. In *European Defence Capabilities No Adaptability without Co-operation*, ed. L. Simon., London: Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, p. 2; S. Bowman, 1996. “Bosnia: U.S. Military

1.1. First Steps towards Efficient European Military Capabilities

The above-mentioned European weakness led to the strengthening of bilateral French-British cooperation culminating in the *St. Malo Declaration* of December 1998 – a cornerstone for further cooperation in the area of security and defence at the EU level. Two strongest European forces/armies – the only European nuclear powers, called other EU members to establish “the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so”³. Next year at the European Council meeting in Cologne (3-4 June 1999), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was formally conceived. It was important, but merely the first step of the European Union on the road to playing a more important and independent role on the international stage in the field of security. To achieve this goal “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous

Operations December 16, 1996”, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/93-056.htm> (Accessed December 20, 2012).

³ “Common Security and Defence Policy. Development of European Military Capabilities”. 2011. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1222506/110106%20updated%20factsheet%20capacites%20militaires%20-%20version%208_en.pdf, (Accessed January 3, 2013), p. 2; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, 2010. “EU Military Capabilities – Some European Troops , but not yet a European Army” *In The Making* eds. E. Greco, N. Pirozzi, S. Silvestri, Rome: *English Series 19*, Quaderni IAI, p. 12; “Military Capabilities – A Step Forward in ESDP?”. 2012. http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_322_esr46-military-capabilities.pdf (Accessed December 22, 2012), p. 1.

action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, without prejudice to actions by NATO”⁴.

During the European Union Summit in Helsinki (December 2000), member states decided to set themselves a target of creating the European Rapid Reaction Force known as the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG). Immediately it should be noted that the purpose of the HHG was but a formation of a pool of national armed forces of up to 60,000 personnel (15 brigades) at the disposal of the EU, on a basis of voluntary involvement⁵. The units would be able to fully deploy within less than 60 days and remain in the theatre of operation for up to one year. These forces were supposed to undertake the so-called Petersberg tasks⁶ adopted in 1992⁷. Based on arrangements of the Washington NATO Summit (1999), a joint declaration was announced on 16 December 2002.

⁴ D. Braddon, 2010. “Operational, Structural and Procurement Expenditure in European Defence Budgets: Trends, Patterns and Reform.” In *European Defence...*, p. 15.

⁵ This would involve the need to ensure additional units (at least 60 thousands) together with the associated military equipment in order to ensure the regular troop rotations in theatre.

⁶They include: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.

⁷ *Common Security and Defence Policy. Development...*, *op.cit.*, p. 2; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *op.cit.*, p. 12-13; J. P. Weiskopf, *op.cit.*, p. 11-12; 2004. “EU as Military Actor—The Role of the European Defence Agency” http://www2.tku.edu.tw/~tiexm/conference_paper/session5/Fuchang.pdf (Accessed January 9, 2013), p. 8.

Next year an agreement was adopted on 11 March 2003, which became the cornerstone of official WEU⁸-NATO cooperation, known as the “Berlin Plus” formula. What is most important in this arrangement is the EU getting access to NATO planning capacity and the establishment of a list of its assets and capabilities available for use in EU-led missions⁹.

The next step on the road to greater independence of Europe in this field was an adoption of the European Security Strategy *Draft for a Global Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World* in June 2003. This document, recognizing the importance of new security challenges, was a symbolic step. In that strategy the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy – Javier Solana would rather concentrate on presenting security challenges and threats than analysing them. Another crucial shortcoming and probably

⁸ The acronym WEU stands for Western European Union.

⁹ “Berlin Plus Agreement”. 2009. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/berlinplus_en.pdf (Accessed December 29, 2012); “The EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreements.” 2009. Paris: European Security and Defence, p. 1-2, [http://www.shape.nato.int/resources/4/documents/14E_Fact_Sheet_Berlin_Plus\[1\].pdf](http://www.shape.nato.int/resources/4/documents/14E_Fact_Sheet_Berlin_Plus[1].pdf), accessed on: 9.01.2013; *European Military Capabilities...*, *op.cit.*, p. 3; J. Herz, 2009. “Military Capabilities – A Step Forward in ESDP?”, http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_322_esr46-military-capabilities.pdf (Accessed December 22, 2012), p. 1; J. Morel, A. Cameron, *op.cit.*, p. 2; J. P. Weiskopf, *op.cit.*, p. 10-15; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *op.cit.*, p. 12-13; E. Gross, 2009, “EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories” http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/Preventing_Conflict_Managing_Crisis/03.Gross.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2012), p. 38.

even more important one, is the lack of resources essential to implement the strategy¹⁰.

1.2. European Military Capabilities. Lessons Learned from Early Failures

Following the failure of the first, a new Headline Goal 2010 was approved at the meeting of the European Council in Brussels (17-18 June 2004). During the meeting EU member states announced that they want to “commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty”¹¹. The key element of the new HG 2010 was the presence of high-readiness forces based on the concept of Battlegroups. This shift from the HHG to the HG 2010 was a step forward. Its aim was the removal of the capability shortfalls of the previous initiative. While the HHG was focused on quantitative targets, the new HHG presented a more qualitative approach. The HG 2010 included the following scenarios of military actions: separation of parties by force; stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries; conflict prevention; evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance¹².

¹⁰ J. P. Weiskopf, *op.cit.*, p. 19; J. Morel, A. Cameron, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

¹¹ *Common Security and Defence Policy. Development...*, *op.cit.*, p. 2; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *op.cit.*, p. 12-14; J. P. Weiskopf, *op.cit.*, p. 12-16.

¹² J. Herz, *op.cit.*, p. 1; J. Morel, A. Cameron, *op.cit.*, p. 2; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *op.cit.*, p. 12-14; J. P. Weiskopf, *op.cit.*, p. 10; Fu-chang Chang, *op.cit.*, p. 8; “Headline Goal 2010 Approved by General Affairs and External Relations

The “Battlegroup Concept“, prepared on the basis of a common Franco-British proposal, had its origins in the experience of the Artemis Mission (2003) and was approved during the meeting of the Council of Ministers in 2004. Finally, in November that year European member states decided to establish 13 Battlegroups which were meant to acquire full operational capability by 2007. These highly trained battalion-sized units (up to 1,500 soldiers) which would be deployable within 15 days and sustainable in the field for up to 120 days will make up the core of EU high readiness forces and be able to undertake autonomous rapid response operations. This concept presented a significant improvement of existing European capabilities¹³.

Last but definitely not least, the *Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities* was adopted by the EU Council in 2008. This declaration outlined ambitious goals for the EU *inter alia*: the capacity to conduct two major simultaneous operations involving up to 10,000 troops for 2 years, two rapid response operations using EU Battlegroups, a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation for up to 90 days and one civilian mission involving up to 3,000 experts. Despite the EU taking steps in the right direction, one major important problem has not changed, the gap between European available and desired capabilities remained significant¹⁴.

Council on 17 May 2004 Endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004”. 2010. <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf> (Accessed December 20, 2012), p. 1.

¹³ Fu-chang Chang, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁴ C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *op.cit.*, p. 18-19; J. Herz, *op.cit.*, p. 2-3.

2. Current European Military Capabilities. Assessment

The idea of establishing a European Army had its origins in the European Defence Community – the idea was born in the early 50's and finally abandoned in 1954. After more than two decades since the end of the Cold War, the European military capacity for expeditionary missions has remained unsatisfactory¹⁵. Shortly after a quick and overwhelming victory in the *Iraqi Freedom* Operation, this military campaign was hailed as a model of modern combat intervention. Even then there were a few different opinions in this matter. Professor Boleslaw Balcerowicz rightly pointed out that it could be considered as such only in relation to operations involving the US military because of the shortcomings of European military capabilities. A similar position was represented *inter alia*: by Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algeri¹⁶.

We should not forget, that the EU as a whole takes the second place in the ranking of the largest defence spenders in the world. However, merely counting money spent on defence does not provide an accurate outlook of the range of the military capability gap. Qualitative comparisons are more important and confirm American undoubted dominance of the many cutting-edge dual-use military technologies, which are supported by a leading information technology sector and

¹⁵ B. Seibert. 2010. „The Quest for European Military Capabilities.” In *European Defence...*, p. 8.

¹⁶ B. Balcerowicz. 2006. *Siły zbrojne w państwie i stosunkach międzynarodowych*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, p. 138-139; Fu-chang Chang, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

governmental research and development programs. The crux of existing differences reflect the opinion of political science analysts from the European Union Center of North Carolina. They believe that “European forces are said to possess only 10% of US capabilities for 60% of the US budget”¹⁷. Simultaneously, they admit that “Europe’s defence industry maintains considerable capabilities and European armies are gradually acquiring many of the same types of high-tech equipment and munitions that are employed by the US”¹⁸. Nevertheless, this progress remains rather slow, particularly with regard to military equipment required for high intensity out of area missions. The effectiveness of the EU approach to security issues was undeniably compromised by the lack of a common position concerning foreign policy priorities among members. Actually, merely 10% of European soldiers are ready for rapid response missions overseas. Consequently, the EU will probably play second fiddle in the US-led out of area operations, concentrating on peace-support operations¹⁹.

¹⁷ *European Military Capabilities...*, *op.cit.*, p.1-2.

¹⁸ *European Military Capabilities...*, *op.cit.*, p.1-2.

¹⁹ *European Military Capabilities...*, p. 1-7; S. Coonen, 2006. “The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?”

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/06autumn/coonen.pdf> (Accessed December 22, 2012), p. 77.

2.1. Different Views or Ways of Response

A brief look at the strategy of the EU and the United States of America takes into consideration Robert Kagan's observation that the allies have different/ disjointed views of the world²⁰. This difference lies elsewhere, namely in the ways of response to these challenges. In spite of an existing military gap between the United States and Europe, the "old continent" possess a comparatively significant military capability and, what is more important, a will to use it. Since 2003 – a critical point for transatlantic partnership as well as intra-European relations (the split was so severe that some observers doubted the survival of the perennial alliance as a result of American preparations to war with Iraq), the EU had conducted 28 operations, both civilian (20) and military (8). All of which differed very much (greatly) from Operation *Allied Force*, Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, Operation *Enduring Freedom* or the *ISAF Mission* in Afghanistan. Generally speaking, lightly armed EU-forces consisted of EU-Member States units are able to conduct "low-intensity" Petersberg missions. On the basis of previous experiences, it is possible to point out existing European challenges. From the military point of view, European combat units are not developed well enough to lead full scale armed missions. In such operations they played only a secondary role. The majority of the most sophisticated and at the same time decisive weapons used in the latest wars were U.S. assets. The EU

²⁰ Cf. A. I. Zakharchenko, 2007. *The EU and U.S. Strategies against Terrorism and Proliferation of WMD: A Comparative Study*, Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies.

still does not possess military capabilities required for today's combat operations. In order to attain a larger global range, European forces will have to acquire sufficient capabilities at least in the following areas: strategic lift; aerial refuelling; C4SIR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Surveillance, Intelligence, and Reconnaissance Systems); ISTAR (*Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance*) and power projection (inter alia Stealth Aircrafts and Bombers, Strategic Lift and Air-to-Air Refuelling) and PGMs (Precision Guided Munitions). In addition to the above-mentioned shortcomings, there is another concern – an unprecedented fragmentation and intra-European duplication of weapon systems among European states which are not compatible (roughly 125 different types of weapon systems exist, in particular in the area of air-force there are at least 40 systems) with each other²¹.

As Jeffrey Bialos aptly pointed out: “American and European forces do not necessarily require the same types of capabilities to be interoperable, but at a minimum they must be able to communicate with each other via secure modes in order to exchange information”²². As a matter of fact, European military capabilities do not lag behind. An undeniable gap in military capabilities does not prevent interoperability

²¹ Fu-chang Chang, *op.cit.*, p. 9; S. Coonen, *op.cit.*, p. 70-79; E. Gross, *op.cit.*, p. 38; “EU Common Security and Defence Policy.” 2012. <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSEX/EX4.htm> (Accessed January 10, 2013); O. Croci, A. Verdun, 2006. “Security Challenges in the 21st century: EU, USA, and Canadian Approaches.” <http://canada-europe-dialogue.ca/events/Workshop-June12-2006/Croci-Verdun19-June2006.pdf> (Accessed December 29, 2012), p. 1.

²² S. Coonen, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

between allied forces. Moreover, the cost of demanding European investments in the C4ISR systems is not overburdening or even overwhelming. However, several important steps should be taken. Europeans ought to modernize their forces with aforementioned networks, develop new weapons systems, among them modern precision-strike munitions, WMD defence, mobility and logistic support assets. These existing disparities have constituted a *sui generis* division of labour wherein the USA plays the main role during “hot phases” of operations and conflicts, while in the meantime European forces become more visible in the stabilisation and reconstruction phase. Each “partner” will focus on those military missions which bring them a comparative advantage. Already during the Balkan crises the vast majority of combat units was provided by the American superpower. The EU had taken over command of the operation from NATO when the focus has shifted to the state-building tasks²³. In the public debate this qualified division of labour is described by the phrase: “Americans making dinner and the Europeans washing the dishes”²⁴. In this context it is worth recalling one more quite often quoted motto: “US combat, the UN feeds, the EU pays”²⁵.

²³ S. Coonen, *op.cit.*, p. 77-8; “Affordable Defense Capabilities for Future NATO Missions. A National Defense University Special Report”. 2010. http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/NATO_Affordable%20Defense%20Capabilities.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2012).

²⁴ S. Schmemmann, 2003. “Some Are Cooks, Some Are Dishwashers.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/30/books/some-are-cooks-some-are-dishwashers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> (Accessed December 30, 2012).

²⁵ Fu-chang Chang, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

2.2. CSDP. Main Achievements and Plans for the Future

More than ten years of the ESDP (renamed the CSDP after the Treaty of Lisbon) have brought a few and above all only minor successes which were overshadowed by a lot of unfulfilled promises. The main achievement is definitely the EU Battlegroups initiative, which significantly intensified military cooperation among EU states. Since 2007 two such units have always been on stand-by. Although the Battlegroups are presented as the most significant success of the CSDP, we ought to be aware of some important limitations. First of all, the EU has never deployed any Battlegroup so far. No one is able to assess the level of interoperability between European forces and their effectiveness in dealing with combat tasks. Second, the EU member states used to prefer creation of *ad hoc* coalitions in accordance with the Donald Rumsfeld principle: “missions define coalitions”. Unfortunately, in these cases military lessons learned from the field are few and seldom taken into account, because of the reluctance of state actors. Thirdly, the Battlegroups are capable to conduct only low-intensity small crisis management missions. If the EU has ambitions to conduct full scale operations, these battalion-sized units ought to be extended to include more troops and encompass diverse capabilities (military units exhibiting various levels of readiness)²⁶.

Being meticulous is essential to indicate that the EU is far from the capability hubris. On the contrary its member states are aware of

²⁶ D. Braddon, *op.cit.*, p. 25-26; J. Herz, *op.cit.*, p. 2-3; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *op.cit.*, p. 15-16.

their weakness. Concerning the existing military gap between Europe and the US numerous essential analyses have been conducted and several measures have been found in early 2000. Even a cursory analysis of European ambitious plans allows to draw at least two conclusions (see the table below). On the one hand, these armaments programmes were prepared on the solid foundation of European military shortcomings and desired strategic capabilities. On the other hand, they were just as ambitious as unrealistic in a given time frame²⁷.

Table 1. Selected European Armaments Programs

Program	Description	Number of Units	Deliveries	Current progress
A400 M	Transport aircraft	180-planned (in fact 160 ordered by EU members so far ²⁸)	2009-2010	Successfully completed the 300 hours of F&R (Function & Reliability) flight-testing in December 2012 ²⁹ .
Eurofighter	Combat aircraft	620-planned (almost 500 ordered by EU members so far)	2003-2015	First Eurofighter entered to service in August 2003 ³⁰ .
Tiger	Attack helicopter	180-planned	2003-2008	Significant delays in deliveries, program is still underway
NH-90	Transport	300-planned	From 2006	The total volume of orders

²⁷ *European Military Capabilities...*, *op.cit.*, p.5-6; "Strength in Numbers? Comparing EU Military Capabilities in 2009 with 1999". 2009. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 4.

²⁸ C. Gauntier, 2012. "A 400M Program Update 2012." <http://www.slideshare.net/robbinlaird/a400-m-program-update-2012> (Accessed January 10, 2013).

²⁹ "Airbus Military A400M Completes Critical Flight-Test Phase." 2013. http://www.airframer.com/news_story.html?release=19966 (Accessed January 10, 2013).

³⁰ "A History of the Programme.". 2013. <http://www.eurofighter.com/eurofighter-typhoon/programme/history.html> (Accessed January 10, 2013).

	helicopter			exceeded 570 machines, both NH90 TTH transport version (Tactical Transport Helicopter) and sea one NFH (NATO Frigate Helicopter) ³¹
Future Carrier	Aircraft carriers (United Kingdom/France)	3-planned	2012-2014	HMS Queen is to be launch in 2016 and HMS Prince of Wales in 2018 ³² , the future of second French aircraft carrier - PA2/CVF future in doubt ³³

Source: "European Military Capabilities", 2007. *EU Briefings* May 2007, p. 6

I recognize that both the EU as a whole as well as its members will not possess the capability essential for conducting successful major combat operations without significant US support. Given budgetary pressures, some countries will have to reallocate funds and other resources from defence to other sectors. On the other hand, it could be a strong incentive to strengthen European cooperation on a larger scale on the basis of the cooperation between the UK and France. Ambitions are always huge, here the I will confine myself to one issue which is the establishment of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) which is to achieve full operating capability in 2016³⁴.

³¹ „Portugalia zrezygnowała z NH90”. 2013. http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=8089 (Accessed January 10, 2013).

³² “Stepka pod Prince of Wales”. 2013. http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=6215&q=lotniskowce%20brytyjskie (Accessed January 10, 2013).

³³ “France’s PA2/CVF Carrier Project Stalled Until Whitepaper Verdict” 2013. <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/france-steaming-ahead-on-pa2cvf-carrier-project-01621/> (Accessed January 10, 2013).

³⁴ “Britain and France Will Share Aircraft Carrier to Combat Defence Cuts, Says Admiral.” 2011. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1394185/Britain-France->

3. European Military Capabilities in Practice . European Military Contribution to the Out of Area Operations in Afghanistan and Libya

The Libyan operation and the final stage of ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan were conducted in a completely new security environment. After years of unprecedented dominance, the current position of the US has significantly changed and now looks a lot more complicated. Washington's freedom of strategic action is constrained by its prolonged combat commitment to Afghanistan (2001-2014?), the trauma of the *Iraqi war* (2003-2011, somewhat reminiscent of the so-called "Vietnam syndrome"), never ending budgetary problems and last but not least the situation in the Middle East, especially the "New Deal" in the field of security and the rising tide of anti-Americanism in Gulf area³⁵.

3.1. "Afghan War"

Americans still bear the majority of the burden of the Afghan mission both in terms of the number of soldiers and military equipment in the Afghan theatre as well as expenditures. This does not mean that

share-aircraft-carrier-combat-defence-cuts-says-admiral.html (Accessed January 10, 2013); New Declaration Agreed at the UK-France Summit; Production for the United Kingdom." 2012. http://www.targetlock.org.uk/typhoon/production_uk.html (Accessed January 10, 2013); "Business Plan 2012-2015 Ministry of Defence 31 May 2012". 2012. <http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/MOD-2012-Business-Plan.pdf> (Accessed January 10, 2013).

³⁵ *Testimony of Admiral...*, *op.cit.* p. 82.

the EU members participating in the operation behave as “free riders”. Over the last few years the EU member states made significant contributions to US-led combat operation in Afghanistan. Europeans compose roughly 90% of the 40,000 non-US troops serving in Afghanistan. Three out of six regional commands and several of the 29 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are led by European allies³⁶.

However, merely counting troops does not provide an accurate outlook of the European contribution to the operation. US European Command (EUCOM) actively supported European allies during their preparations for troop deployment to Afghanistan. Americans provided them pre-deployment training programmes, including among others: C-IED (Counter-Improvised Explosive Device) procedures, counterinsurgency intelligence analysis tailored to the Afghan security environment, operations of MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) and HMMWVs (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles) and finally – battalion-level counterinsurgency exercises. This is not the end of US military allies with equipment essential for the ISAF Mission in Afghanistan *inter alia*: communications systems, night vision devices and above mentioned C-IED systems (i.e. robots). The main objectives of these activities were to provide links and increase the level of interoperability between the allied forces being deployed and US forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, EUCOM ensured essential logistical capability to dislocate European troops and equipment to and from Afghanistan. In

³⁶ *Testimony of Admiral...*, *op.cit.* p. 82.

spite of all European shortcomings, its contribution to the ISAF Mission, including troops, equipment and funding, is critical to meeting its current goal, which is the transition of security responsibility in Afghanistan by 2014³⁷.

Despite the fact that CSDP structures and instruments are not militarily involved in Afghanistan, the majority of EU member states are. In most cases their participation in the mission meant to incur significant efforts. At the very beginning their governments sometimes had to struggle to legitimize their decision to participate in this operation. During the mission they suffered from a lack of significant successes and a few losses, *inter alia* the need to extend the military presence of their troops and a quite significant number of casualties. Summing up, it has reduced both readiness and the willingness for future large-scale expeditionary missions³⁸.

3.2. *Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector*

The crucial role of Europe both in terms of basing, military infrastructure and force contributions was even better visible during the operations in Libya (*Odyssey Dawn* and *Unified Protector*). However, also in this case USA played an important role. Initially, Washington decided to take a seemingly secondary role in the intervention. American support for UN resolutions 1970 and 1973 was not unconditional and excluded an involvement of US ground troops. The

³⁷ *Testimony of Admiral...*, *op.cit.* p. 4-9, 89.

³⁸ C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

coalition agreed on US leadership without debate, because of the necessity of unity of the command (joint command) and essential capabilities to command and control (C2) as well as the significant logistical support of this air campaign³⁹.

The operations in Libya provide at least one important example of current European military capabilities to conduct out of area crisis response operations. The USA was forced to step in to refill European weapon stocks. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates chided the allies for having an insufficient inventory of weapons. Maybe it overshadowed real EU power a bit, but at the same time shed light on their huge deficits. The Libyan air campaign has brought additional important conclusions and lessons for the future. Gen. Stephane Abrial, the Commander of Allied Command Transformation had no doubt that European air forces “could not have performed to the same level of effectiveness without heavy contribution from the US”. Moreover, the Libyan case also highlighted European shortages in terms of C2, logistical support, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance equipment and assets essential to carry out combat as well as rescue tasks. Without US participation it would be difficult to ensure the same interoperability and coordination as has been seen during the Libyan operations.

³⁹ J. Tirpak, 2011. “Lessons from Libya.” Air Force Vol. 94, No. 12, p. 34-36, <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2011/December%202011/1211libya.pdf>, accessed on: 10.01.2013; *Testimony of Admiral...*, *op.cit.* p. 1, 10-11, 31, 84; E. Fojón, ‘2011. “Odyssey Dawn’ – Beyond Libya” <http://europeangeostrategy.ideasonneurope.eu/2011/03/30/odyssey-dawn-beyond-libya/> (Accessed January 10, 2013).

Conclusions of these short deliberations seem to be quite simple. European states have to develop their own military capabilities independently – without US involvement⁴⁰.

On the other hand, the Libya missions are another example of the weakness of transatlantic partnership not only on the line of US-Europe, but within the EU as well. The Iraqi crisis had proven that the transatlantic alliance is not an automatic mechanism. When it comes to Libya, while France and the United Kingdom were the founders of Security Council Resolution 1973, Germany abstained during voting and did not participate in the Libyan air-campaign. Moreover, we ought to remember about limited Italian contribution. The above mentioned examples highlight that the CSDP exist only in theory and the level of distrust as well as difference in foreign policy among allies remain meaningful⁴¹.

4. The European Council (19-20 December 2013) – Step Forward or *nihil novi*

Since the above mentioned *St. Malo Declaration* a few initiatives have been presented, but the CSDP played undoubtedly merely a secondary role in the European integration. It is lagging far behind EU's economic and trade dimensions⁴².

⁴⁰ E. Fojón, *op.cit.*; J. Tirpak, *op.cit.*, p. 34-38.

⁴¹ E. Fojón, *op.cit.*

⁴² Cf. P. Schellinck, 2013. "Conclusions of the European Council 19/20 December 2013." <http://www.european-news->

Antonio Missiroli from the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) thinks that the final conclusions coming from the last European Council meeting “can be considered a major step forward, also because it indicates a way forward, with explicit deadlines and responsibilities for reviewing, researching, and reporting”⁴³. It is worth noting that the first part of *Conclusions* of the European Summit is devoted to CSDP. Almost ten out of twenty six pages of the document are dedicated to the security dimension of EU’s integration⁴⁴. However, merely counting pages does not provide an accurate outlook of the importance attributed to the CSDP in the EU. Despite the hopes for a breakthrough text of the declaration it was not announced⁴⁵. In the document the EU leaders highlighted the importance of defence and recognized the CSDP as a tool, which enhances “the security of European citizens and contributes to peace and stability in our neighbourhood and in the broader world”⁴⁶. Moreover, it seems that they appropriately assessed the currently rapidly evolving European security environment. Due to restrictive austerity measures European countries are not able to develop desirable military capabilities. Another important issue is indicated in the document – the fragmentation of

agency.de/special_interest/conclusions_of_the_european_council_19_20_december_2013-57332/, (Accessed January 15, 2014).

⁴³ A. Missiroli, 2013. “European Defence – to be Continued.”, *EU ISS Alert No 44*, p. 1.

⁴⁴ European Council 19/20 December 2013. 2013. “*Conclusions* EUCO 217/13”, p. 1-10.

⁴⁵ A. Missiroli, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

⁴⁶ *European Council 19/20 December 2013...*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

European defence markets, which undermines its competitive strength on the global scale⁴⁷.

European leaders introduce a fairly optimistic assessment of progress in areas connected with the CSDP. They emphasize that nowadays EU contribution to the stabilization of the current security architecture *inter alia*: “7000 staff in 12 civilian missions and four military operations” and “EU unique ability to combine, in a consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and justice”⁴⁸. I only partially agree with the optimistic assessment and would like to emphasize once again that a gap between available and desired capabilities remained significant.

Regardless of the optimistic opinions on past achievements in the field of the CSDP, European leaders are aware of de facto their secondary role in the “old continent’s” security architecture. The only way to ensure stability and security in Europe is close EU collaboration with NATO, as described by the authors, “in a spirit of mutual reinforcement and complementarity its global (?)”⁴⁹. Moreover, they called for improvement and aptly pointed out priority actions connected with the CSDP. They have identified three main so called axes:

- increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP;
- enhancing the development of capabilities;

⁴⁷ *European Council 19/20 December 2013...*, *op. cit.*, p. 1-2.

⁴⁸ *European Council 19/20 December 2013...*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁴⁹ *European Council 19/20 December 2013...*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

- strengthening Europe's defence industry⁵⁰.

I share the pessimism of A. Missiroli who summarized the *Conclusions* of the last European Council in these words: "European Council meeting may disappoint those who expected either a big leap forward in terms of political ambition or a series of specific and quantified decisions to be implemented right away"⁵¹. It would be very difficult to recognize the final document as a revolution in EU military affairs. However, the last European Council meeting gives a few reasons for hope and optimism⁵².

Nevertheless, a great deal of truth remains in Frederick the Great's statement: "Diplomacy without military force is like music without instruments". Thus, European states have to develop military capabilities which allow them to perform a full catalogue of combat missions or tasks – from high-intensity, through nation- and state-building military operations to traditional peace-keeping tasks. In essence, European states are forced to cooperate more than they used to in the past⁵³.

I attempted to outline the crucial issue connected with a development of European military capabilities to conduct full-scale

⁵⁰ *European Council 19/20 December 2013...*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁵¹ A. Missiroli, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

⁵² A. Missiroli, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

⁵³ D. Braddon, *op.cit.*, p. 24; F. Burwell, D. Gompert, L. Lebl, J. Lodal, W. Slocombe, 2005. *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture*. Washington: Atlantic Council of the United States, p. 7-8.

combat missions. Conclusions coming from these considerations allow to draw several important findings. Firstly, apart from an adoption of specific institutional solutions more than ten years of the CSDP (former ESDP) have brought a few and above all only minor successes. As Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out: “Europe remains a junior geopolitical partner to the United States in the semi unified West”⁵⁴. Secondly, there is a fairly broad judgment that a significant military combat or even crisis management operation, especially one that must be sustained over time and at a substantial distance from home bases, will require US involvement through NATO. Thirdly, only limited military capabilities do not prevent EU from playing a significant role in meeting new security challenges. A Venusian Europe possess assets essential for peace-keeping and state-building tasks, which is complementary to American assets. Finally, the EU will be able to play the role of one of the most influential perhaps even number two or three on the globe in terms of military power. Prerequisite for an implementation of this optimistic scenario is a closer integration, especially in the field of security⁵⁵. The document analyzed above adopted on December 2013 by the European Council seems to be merely the first, but significant step of the EU on the road to becoming an important global military power.

⁵⁴ Z. Brzeziński, 2012. *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, New York: Perseus Distribution, p. 53.

⁵⁵ S. Coonen, *op.cit.*, p. 67-68; F. Burwell, D. Gompert, L. Lebl, J. Lodal, W. Slocombe, *op.cit.*, p. 7-8; A. I. Zakharchenko, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

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Beyond Utilitarianism? Beyond Democracy?
J. S. Mill on Representative Government

Abstract¹

Classical utilitarianism was one of the first comprehensive, modern doctrines which provided justification for the establishment of democracy. John Stuart Mill is usually considered to be an heir of this intellectual tradition, yet his mature political theory exhibits many significant diversions from the utilitarian orthodoxy. In this essay I undertake a venture of examining what is the upshot of these differences for political philosophy. I argue that J. S. Mill's account as exemplified in his late work *Considerations on Representative Government* cannot be squared with the classical utilitarian approach. This is because the former is almost exclusively preoccupied with the educational aspect of politics while in the latter, mainly due to its hedonism and consequentialist structure, these educational concerns are almost altogether absent. I also tackle a distinct yet related question in what sense, if any, the younger's Mill theory of government can be considered democratic?

Keywords: civic education, democracy, elitism, liberalism, J. S. Mill, participation, representative government, utilitarianism.

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**(All the quotes from the works of J. S. Mill used in this paper were taken from J. M. Robson (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 1-33, Toronto 1963-1991, thereafter referred to as CW)*

In this paper I will attempt to tackle two distinct, yet closely intertwined subjects. As these are rather complex issues I hope to be forgiven for not always being able to maintain the clarity of distinction between them. What I can do to avoid confusion is at least to sketch the outline of my task at the very beginning.

First of all, it seems that there is something troublesome, or perhaps even embarrassing, about J. S. Mill's attachment to the tradition of classical utilitarianism. Ever since his life-time critics hardly wasted any opportunity to point out to the elements in his thought which seem to be strikingly inconsistent with that tradition (or with what that tradition is usually thought to be).² But even more tellingly, the uneasiness of fitting the younger Mill into the utilitarian landscape has been consistently, though to some extent tacitly, confirmed by his sympathizers, especially in the second half of the XXth century. Many examples could be given, yet for the sake of brevity I hope it will suffice to note that one of the most distinguished contemporary Mill's scholars described him as: "perhaps a more consistent liberal than a utilitarian".³

² One does not need to look any further that James Fitzjames Stephen's *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* which was published in 1873, the year Mill died.

³ A. Ryan, *Popper and liberalism* in: A. Ryan, *The Making of Modern Liberalism*, Princeton 2012, p. 416. Arguably sir Isaiah Berlin was the first highly significant author who tried to deny Mill's utilitarian lineage in his seminal essay *J. S. Mill and the Ends of Life*. Among other scholars who are

There are many reasons, both philosophical and non-philosophical, for this suspiciousness arisen by utilitarian tradition.⁴ Nevertheless, I will not dwell on this subject. What I intend to do instead, is to trace some of the implications of the suggested tension in the field of political theory.

That utilitarianism fathered one of the first comprehensive defenses of democracy in modern times is a *cliché*. Some more or less broadly utilitarian arguments for democracy are still very much alive nowadays, though admittedly this position is perhaps less popular among philosophers than in commonsensical discourse and political practice. What is perhaps less of a *cliché* is to ask whether there is actually only one utilitarian theory of democracy? This brings us back to the question of utilitarian credentials of J. S. Mill. For there can be no doubt that his account of democratic government is significantly different from the one given by his utilitarian mentors. So it seems that there are only two possible solutions. We might assume that J. S. Mill's account exemplifies a distinct version of utilitarian argument for democracy, perhaps achieved by enlargement and/or refinement of the views of Bentham and James Mill. Then it would seem that we have at least two competing, distinct and comprehensive utilitarian arguments for democracy. On the other hand, we might as well argue that J. S. Mill was not consistently utilitarian and neither is his theory of democracy. But then it still remains to be determined precisely what kind of democracy is he arguing for? In fact we might even wonder whether it

sympathetic to Mill and showed similar intent to Berlin's one might also mention: J. Plamenatz and C. L. Ten.

⁴ Excellent overview of these issues can be found in J. Skorupski, *Introduction: The Fortunes of Liberal Naturalism* in J. Skorupski (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Mill*, Cambridge 1998, p. 16-30.

is democracy at all?! Anyone familiar with Mill's *Considerations on Representative Government* (for brevity sake thereafter referred to simply as *Representative Government*) knows that this is a perfectly legitimate question to ask. I presume that being classified as a representative of "democratic Platonism"⁵ is hardly a compliment nowadays, so democratic credentials of the younger Mill also deserve a closer scrutiny.

It is with these two questions that I will be mainly preoccupied here. Whether J. S. Mill's political theory transcends the limits of any conceivable form of consistently utilitarian view? And whether it can be consistently described as democratic?

I. The Classical Utilitarian Approach

Let me start with a brief summary of the classical utilitarian approach to democracy. The most instructive and concise, if at the same time also the most notorious, exemplification can be found in James Mill's essay *Government*. It was regarded by contemporary utilitarians as a textbook of political theory, and indeed most of its shortcomings are due to the textbook-like simplicity and bluntness of the crucial assumptions.⁶ The older Mill's reasoning starts from the premise of universal selfishness. He maintains that it is: "(...) a law of human nature, that a man, if able, will take from others anything they have and he

⁵ See D. E. Miller, *J. S. Mill: Moral, Social and Political Thought*, Cambridge 2010, p. 187.

⁶ R. Harrison, *Democracy*, London 1993, p. 94-95.

desires (...)"⁷. And what every man ultimately desires is either his pleasure or absence of pain. At the same time James Mill also takes for granted the main ideas of Ricardian political economy. Since we desire pleasure and want to avoid pain and the natural resources are limited we need labour and the goods that it can produce. But given the selfish nature of men it follows that everybody, if only given the opportunity, would try to enslave the others and make their labour subservient to satisfaction of his desires. Thus, in order to ensure the security of persons and property we need a government. But the problem remains, for people invested with political power will surely use it to their own advantage if unchecked. James Mill's answer is that only representative democracy can provide us with a solution. First of all, it makes government accountable to people through periodic elections. Hence it is in the interest of the rulers to satisfy the interests of the greatest number of voters unless they want to be thrown off the office. Secondly, the satisfaction of the interests of the greatest number is precisely what general interest consists in and, consequently, what should be the aim of the good government. From these two corollaries taken together it does seem to follow that representative democracy with universal suffrage is the only form of government consistent with the greatest happiness principle. Well, it does not, at least according to James Mill. He famously stated that since the interests of some are included in the interests of others there is no need to enfranchise women (whose interests are included in those of their fathers and husbands) and children (by which he meant people under 40). This argument from the

⁷ J. Mill, *Government* in T. Ball (ed.), *James Mill: Political Writings*, Cambridge 1992, p. 9.

“inclusion of interests” is obviously strikingly fallacious by James Mill’s own standards. After all, if anything follows from his psychological assumptions, it is that every individual might in normal circumstances be the best judge of his own interests, but certainly not that he should be freely allowed to decide for others about theirs. Thus Thomas Macaulay in his famous critique of Mill’s essay found it all too easy to wonder: “Is then the interest of the Turk the same with that of the girls who compose his harem? Is the interest of the Chinese the same with that woman whom he harnesses to his plough?”.⁸ Interestingly enough, at the same time the older Mill does not argue in favor of property qualifications. Many of his contemporaries feared that broadening of the suffrage would result in expropriation of the rich by the poor. However, Mill did not treat it as a real danger and for a very specific reason. As Ross Harrison pointed out, in general there were two ways of “not being too nervous” about democracy at the beginning of the XIXth century, virtue and deference.⁹ While the former was more consistently explored by Bentham, James Mill contented himself mainly with the latter. He believed that the poor would defer to the example of the middle class.¹⁰ After all, it is no accident that his essay ends with a small invocation of the virtues of the middle class, the one which is the most industrious, reasonable and far-sighted.¹¹ There is another contradiction in this argument. If the interests of the poor are included in those of the middle class there is no need to enfranchise the former. However, if they have

⁸ T. B. Macaulay, *Mill on Government* in T. Ball (ed.), *James Mill...*, p. 291.

⁹ R. Harrison, *Democracy*, *ibid.*, p. 102-104.

¹⁰ Originally Mill spoke of a “middle rank”. J. Mill, *Government*, *ibid.*, p. 41-42.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41-42.

their own, separate interests they indeed should be given the right to vote. But then there is no reason to suppose that they would and should accept so willingly the enlightened guidance of their betters. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind this brand of elitism advocated by James Mill, as it might be useful to compare it later with the one of his son.

Leaving aside the peculiarities of the older Mill's approach, his argument represents a clear, if crude, utilitarian case for democracy. According to classical utilitarianism, which is a consequentialist and teleological doctrine, there is no inherent moral value in democracy itself. It is valuable only insofar as it secures the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Consequently, there is nothing uniquely legitimate in democratic constitution of government itself. For a utilitarian the question whether particular government is lawful is a factual question, if it can secure habitual obedience of the vast majority of population then it certainly is.¹² Obviously, utilitarians like Bentham and James Mill believed that representative democracy in the end happens to be the only form of government which passes the test of general interest. However, this is an empirical assumption which might be proven false. For instance, the development of new technologies seriously puts into question the traditional utilitarian rationale for representative democracy which basically amounts to the claim that direct democracy is simply impracticable in large, modern and economy-oriented societies. Similarly, should we stumble upon a different form of political arrangement which happens to be cheaper and/or more effective than

¹² A. Ryan, *Mill and Rousseau: Utility and Rights* in A. Ryan, *The Making...*, *ibid.*, p. 353-355.

democracy (be it direct or indirect) there would be no reason for a convinced utilitarian to stick to the latter. It is just an instrument of general interest and like every instrument it can be substituted with a better one.

John Stuart Mill's Reaction

Much has been said about J. S. Mill's complicated relationship with his father and how it influenced his attitude towards the classical utilitarian school. It is enough here to mention that the son was familiar with Macaulay's devastating critique of his father's essay. It certainly left a lasting mark on his intellectual development and possibly contributed to the famous mental crisis of his youth. Initially traumatic loss of faith in orthodox Benthamism eventually helped Mill to emerge as an original and independent thinker. Mindful of the lessons of the past, he grew aware of the need to develop and refine classical utilitarian theory, also in the field of political theory. Thus J. S. Mill's own take on the subject, his seminal essay *Representative Government* should be read as a response both to his father's *Government* and to Macaulay's critique of the latter. Using his favourite approach of trying to marry the parts of truth existing in contrasting views Mill wanted to come up with an account of government that would not be so excessively deductive and abstract as his father's. In keeping with the main intellectual patterns of the XIXth century he aimed at more historical approach as well as the one which would adopt a more complex, less egoistic and mechanistic psychology. At the same time he did not want to wholly concede Macaulay's point about inductive method of science of politics.

Let me now proceed to the details of J. S. Mill's analysis. He agrees with his father that representative government is an "ideally best form of government"[CW, XIX, p. 398]. However, it does not mean that it is possible at every stage of history of a given society. In *On liberty* Mill famously stated that "Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement and the means justified by actually effecting that end" [CW, XVIII, p. 224] and he maintained this view in *Representative Government*. Both savage and slaves are not fit for political liberty, they might eventually become so, but first certain conditions, like basic respect for the rule of law and the habit of solving differences by discussion, must be met. The great mistake of classical utilitarianism was to think of representative democracy as if it was equally applicable and desirable in the case of modern, western societies and "for Bedouins or Malays" [CW, XIX, p. 394], while according to Mill the best that the latter could hope for was to find some "Akbar or Charlemagne"[CW, XVIII, p. 224]. Mill might not have been of a high opinion of Bedouins or Malays but nevertheless his whole argument presupposes that representative government has a privileged status, other political arrangements are acceptable only insofar as they prepare people for it. In this restricted sense representative government is precisely an ideal one. Why is it so according to J. S. Mill? He offers two sorts of reasons, or to be more precise, two criteria by which every mode of government should be judged. The first criterion might be labeled as effectiveness and there seems to be little trouble with fitting it into utilitarian theory. The younger Mill argues that there are certain limits of effectiveness in management of state affairs that a despotic regime cannot surpass. The

reasons he gives to justify this judgment are all quite sound and, moreover, in accord with classical utilitarianism. Generally speaking everybody is the best judge and guardian of their own interests. Because of that any exclusion from having a say in matters of government is likely to result in the interests of the excluded being either ignored or misconceived by even the most well-meaning elites.¹³ Yet, it is beyond doubt that the heart of J. S. Mill's argument for representative government lies in the second criterion he puts forward. Following D. E. Miller we might label it as education¹⁴, but it is education in a broad sense of the term, understood as a development and refinement of people's "moral, intellectual and active qualities" [CW, XIX, p. 390]. As Mill himself emphatically put it:

"The first element of good government, therefore being the *virtue and intelligence* of the human beings composing the community, *the most important point of excellence* which any form of government can possess is *to promote the virtue of intelligence of the people themselves*" [CW, XIX, p. 390, emphasis added]

¹³ J. S. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* in CW, Vol. XIX, p. 404-406.

¹⁴ D. E. Miller, *J. S. Mill...*, *ibid.*, p. 171-172. The distinction between what I call "effectiveness" and "education" criteria is also offered in slightly modified form by R. W. Krouse in the distinction between "two competing visions of the underlying nature and purpose of social and political life", between its "protective" and "educational" function. R. W. Krouse, *Two Concepts of Democratic Representation: James and John Stuart Mill*, "The Journal of Politics", Vol. 44, No. 2, p. 512-513.

Or to express the same thought in a slightly different manner, government should be judged primarily by “what it makes of citizens”, not only by “what it makes with them” [CW, XIX, p. 392].

One problem with Mill’s distinction between effectiveness and education is that he never seems to very seriously entertain an unpleasant thought that they might come into competition with each other. Since he assumes that representative government (at least in the long run) fares best in both dimensions, he can avoid discussing how much political liberty and education can be traded-off for how much effectiveness.¹⁵ However, I will not elaborate on this issue. Instead I will argue that the weight which he ascribes to the education of citizens, the “ethological” effects of government as he would have it, might be impossible to square with the traditional utilitarian account.

Perhaps one of the most astounding things about *Representative Government* from contemporary perspective is how many benefits Mill expects to be secured by active involvement of citizens in public life. On this point he actually has more in common with the tradition of republicanism than classical utilitarianism, or with many varieties of XIXth century liberalism for that matter. Indeed, civic participation has been one of the great themes of republican thought. J. S. Mill similarly emphasizes that without it the improvement of people’s characters, their virtue and intelligence, is impossible. It is after all no accident that he describes government in a truly Tocquevillian manner as a “school of public spirit”.¹⁶ In a fashion characteristic for his whole thought he links here the enhancement of intellectual qualities with moral development

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 171-172.

¹⁶ J. S. Mill, *Considerations...*, *ibid.*, p. 412.

so closely that they become almost inseparable. A mind devoted to public affairs has to show more activity and originality than the one which is deprived of this opportunity. And the moral improvement follows as well. Active citizenship prevents the rise of despotism, be it even a benevolent and a mild one, since people are much less likely to accept without any questioning the policies made for them by government. Nowhere is all of this more evident than in Mill's extended praise of active (or energetic) character type over a passive one. Obviously, according to him the former is best promoted by representative government, while the latter naturally dominates under despotic regimes.¹⁷ Furthermore, participation also helps an individual to realize that he is a member of a broader community and this membership comes with certain duties. It enlarges sympathies of a common man so that they gradually start to stretch beyond the boundaries of family or class. An active citizen develops feelings of affection and responsibility for his fellow countrymen. The fact that he is called upon not only to vote once in every few years, but also to take upon himself some public function (at least from time to time) is the best cure for excessive individualism. It allows to overcome a narrow selfishness of life concentrated on the pursuit of material wealth and sectional interests. "In despotism - says Mill - there is at most but one patriot, the despot himself" [CW, XIX, p. 401]. But things are quite different under free, that is representative, government.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 406-410.

Therefore, it should come as no surprise that participation occupies a central role in J. S. Mill's account of representative government. He maintains that:

“From these accumulated considerations it is evident, that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state, is one *in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state.*” [CW, XIX, p. 412, emphasis added]

But since the realities of living in modern nation-state societies do not favor direct involvement of citizens in the making of all collective decisions, the only solution is to elect representatives. In this regard Mill is in accord with the views of his utilitarian mentors. Yet, the differences are much more pronounced and significant. In the classical utilitarian theory the goal of representative government is to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Active citizenship can be valuable only insofar as it serves this goal. Indeed, it might be quite persuasively argued that too much public involvement from the citizens would be at the expense of economic prosperity.¹⁸ J. S. Mill's approach is substantially different. As we already know, participation is supposed to

¹⁸ J. Mill, *Government*, *ibid.*, p. 7.

lead to the education of the people, to the improvement of their character. However, this is not a purely instrumental relationship. It is rather that education (in Millian sense) at least partially consists in the civic participation itself, in the active exercise of one's intellectual, moral and practical capacities in public life. It might as well be put slightly differently. Classical utilitarians conceived of representative democracy as a set of political institutions which happens to best promote general interest. In the younger Mill's case the end of representative government is for the people to attain the virtues of self-dependence and self-government. And it would be strange indeed to claim that their active involvement in public matters is something entirely different from the self-dependence and self-government.

Let us now turn to the issue of J. S. Mill's strong concern for the fate of minorities in democracy. This was not an important problem for the older generation of utilitarians. If they noticed it at all, their general answer was pretty straightforward, as in the case of Bentham's criticism of the doctrine of natural rights. Sometimes the general interest requires that somebody has to lose in order to benefit the others. J. S. Mill disagreed. He feared that broadening of the suffrage will paradoxically leave many groups practically disenfranchised¹⁹, as their votes will be flooded by the votes of the working-class.²⁰ In particular he was afraid

¹⁹ It has to be said that Mill applied this argument against the background of the political realities of contemporary United Kingdom and United States with majoritarian electoral systems and few strong parties.

²⁰ Mill employs various terms to signify what we usually understand as working class. He speaks of: "labouring class", "labouring classes", "operative classes". But in general the main division he identifies within modern, western societies is between "labourers" and "employers of labour". This distinction is not a

that the enfranchisement of the masses will prevent the intellectual and moral elite²¹ from having a say in the matters of general interest. For him this kind of political arrangement did not deserve to be called anything else, but a *false democracy* - “a government of privilege in favour of the numerical majority, who alone possess practically any voice in the State”[CW, XIX, p. 448]. This brings us to the second question posited by this paper. So far I have been consciously trying to avoid speaking of J. S. Mill’s theory of democracy, opting instead for more neutral term “representative government”. But it is now high time we turned to the question of how democratic his representative government actually is?

J. S. Mill’s Elitism and Attitude Towards Democracy

Ross Harrison is to some extent right when he notes that if we move from Bentham and James Mill to J. S. Mill we notice a certain loss of confidence in democracy.²² Historical context is particularly important

purely economical one, but also based on the life-style and aspirations of social groups. On the one hand the category of labourers includes small employers of labour whose habits and tastes resemble those of working class, on the other highly-paid labourers and members of the professions belong to the same group as capitalists and possessors of inherited wealth. J.S. Mill, *Considerations...*, *ibid.*, p. 447.

²¹ Sometimes Mill does seem to suggest that these are in fact two distinct groups with no particular relation between them. But in fact education and moral excellence are so closely intertwined in Mill’s thought that these groups even if not identical are at least overlapping in a great degree. D. E. Miller, *J. S. Mill...*, *ibid.*, p. 177-178.

²² R. Harrison, *Democracy*, *ibid.*, p. 108. I write “to some extent” because I do not completely share Harrison’s interpretation on this point. I hope to give reasons to justify my opinion at the very end of this paper.

here. Unlike many of their contemporaries classical utilitarians did not fear that the enfranchisement of masses would result in the spoliation of the rich by the poor. They remained optimistic for various reasons. James Mill thought that the poor would defer to the example of the middle class. Bentham was convinced that people are rational enough to recognize more often than not what is really in their interest in the long run and therefore they would not violate the security of property. The younger Mill was not so confident about it. He feared that one of the great dangers of democratization is the introduction of class legislation based on the short-sighted interest of numerical majority. The other danger is general mediocrity and low level of intelligence among the representatives of the people. Hence, he introduces certain elements of elitism into his theory to prevent those evils. That is not to say that elitism was altogether absent from classical utilitarianism, as exemplified in the case of James Mill. But his son's elitism is different and at the same time somewhat more explicit.

These elitist elements are scattered throughout J. S. Mill's work.

He wants to leave room for expertise in democracy and thus he reserves for a parliament a purely deliberative and controlling function. The business of drafting legislation and administration is supposed to be reserved for trained specialists with parliamentary assemblies acting simply as watchdogs. He also excludes from voting not only illiterate, but also those who do not pay taxes and cannot support themselves.²³

²³ Mill concedes that all exclusions from the franchise are an evil in themselves, but some are justified by a greater good they are supposed to secure. It is also worth noting that all the exclusions which he proposes are temporary in their nature.

This makes his position on suffrage rather curious, because on the other hand he argues for the enfranchisement of women, which at the time was nothing short of being radical. But the most important and controversial moment comes when Mill disconnects the universality of suffrage (granted the abovementioned exclusions) from the equality of it. Everybody should be ultimately given a vote, but some should be given more votes than the others. The reasons why Mill thinks so are clear enough. He wants to give more political influence to the moral and intellectual elite than their numerical strength would suggest. It should be remembered that according to him this group consists of the most far-sighted and unselfish individuals. Since the questions of general interest admit of the right answer, Mill assumes that members of his elite are simply better qualified to make such judgments. "Some are wise and some otherwise" as he put it elsewhere.²⁴ Furthermore, he expects that if the wise win some seats in parliament they will be able to check the dangerous tendencies of democracy towards mediocrity and lack of competence. Due to their virtue and intelligence they will exercise a beneficial influence over parliamentary majority and balance competing class interests. The only problem is how to identify the elite and here Mill proposes a criterion of occupation as the most appropriate, though admittedly far from perfect, test.

J. S. Mill's elitism is a rare species, since it is completely honest and well-meaning. I do not think that by plural voting he was trying to bring back through the back door the domination of the rich. Moreover, he sincerely believed in the impartiality and far-sightedness of

²⁴ J. S. Mill, *Pledges* [2] in: *CW - Vol. 23 - Newspaper Writings 1831-1834*, p. 497.

intellectuals, though not to the extent that would convince him to give all the power into their hands. With that being said, his defense of plural voting is not only naive, but also rests on confused assumptions. It is one thing to argue that various minorities are entitled to proportional representation in parliament from the standpoint of equality, the “very root and foundation” [CW, XIX, p. 449] of democracy. It is quite another to claim that the most instructed know better and therefore their opinions on general interest should be given greater weight. One might be perfectly consistent in subscribing to any of these two propositions. But it is strikingly inconsistent to hold them both at the same time, even granted that the number of people with several votes would be very small. One of the deficiencies of Mill’s analysis is that he cannot quite make up his mind here. Torn between his democratic leanings and elitist tendencies his argument ends in a theoretical stalemate.

So J. S. Mill’s status as a wholehearted democrat is at least questionable. Obviously, there is no simple answer to the question phrased like: “Was Mill a democrat?”. A lot depends on what we understand by democracy. Clearly, Mill is not a democrat in a simple, majoritarian sense of the term.²⁵ His defense of plural voting is as strong a testimony to this as anyone might expect. Obviously the term democracy is sometimes used in a quite different and broader sense. Then it signifies not a strictly political attitude but a belief in lack of any

²⁵ D. E. Miller, *J. S. Mill...*, *ibid.*, p. 188. Compare also similar opinion of C. L. Ten: “He is certainly not a democrat if democrat is someone who believes that each person’s vote should have exactly the same value as everyone else’s.” C. L. Ten, *Democracy, Socialism, and the Working Class in: The Cambridge Companion...*, *ibid.*, p. 374.

qualitative differences between people. This is also certainly not Mill's position. He firmly believed that most of the differences between people result from the impact of contingent factors connected to the environment (both ecological and social) we happen to inhabit. Yet, it does not mean that there are no qualitative differences. Some people are and always will be intellectually and morally superior to others, for Mill that was an undisputed fact, however great the potential for development of virtually everybody in the future might be. But it does not put him among the defenders of the class or caste elitism. Everybody can rise to the ranks of Millian elite if only he represents a sufficient level of excellence. In our world the very idea of natural superiority of some will inevitably seem to many as unacceptable and priggish. However, it is perhaps worth remembering that our world is not Mill's world and he was far from being alone in holding such views at the time (just like the current enthusiasts of unrestricted egalitarianism are nowadays).

Nevertheless, someone who would like to save the democratic credentials of Mill is not perhaps in an entirely hopeless situation. First of all, there is a more minimalistic conception of democracy which identifies it with popular control over government. Mill certainly thought that under no circumstances the rulers should be allowed to avoid such control. He was also of the opinion that while not everybody is wise enough to directly participate in the making of the laws, everybody can at least tell whether he approves of the results of a given policy. This line of argument, perhaps a bit perplexingly in the light of what I have said so far, he shares with his utilitarian teachers. But this is not an end to the story. Alan Ryan remarked once that sir Karl Popper's liberalism

makes him “(...) more a constitutionalist than a democrat”.²⁶ With some risk I think that this judgment can be also extended to J. S. Mill. He is a constitutionalist in a sense of trying to safeguard individual liberties (within the limits of the law) against any interference, even if it is an interference from democratic majority. But constitutionalism thus understood can sit quite well with a certain kind of democratic regime. Obviously, this is not a conclusive argument, yet the one which receives quite a solid support from the study of recent history. To my mind what can be at the very least inferred from it is that so far the best, albeit imperfect, way to defend individual liberties has been to grant everyone a right to political participation.²⁷ And conversely, if the participation in political life is supposed to be meaningful, this goal is perhaps best promoted under conditions of respecting individual liberties.

Utility and Civilizing Democracy

I began this paper with setting myself two tasks. Firstly, to examine in what relation does J. S. Mill’s theory of representative government stand to the classical utilitarian account of it? Secondly, to elucidate what kind of democratic regime is he arguing for, if it is actually democratic at all? It is now high time I attempted to formulate some, however provisional, conclusions. In the classical utilitarian political theory there is no inherent value ascribed to democratic institutions, they are justified by the fact that they produce the most effective management of state affairs. This is achieved due to the

²⁶ A. Ryan, *Popper...*, *ibid.*, p. 419.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 418-419.

popular control over government exercised via elections. “The People, what interest have they in being governed badly?” as Bentham famously summed up the whole rationale.²⁸ J. S. Mill did not thoroughly refute this argument. Indeed, he thought that representative democracy is the most effective mode of government once people are actually mature enough to sustain it. But according to him democracy has a primarily educational role, in a sense of elevating the minds and ennobling the feelings of citizens. And education thus conceived is intimately connected with participation and virtues of active citizenship. This gives Mill an additional argument for the goodness of democracy which was not available to elder utilitarians, as well as allows him to value it not in an exclusively instrumental way. The only question to be asked is whether this is still an utilitarian argument? We might sympathize with the intention of developing people’s character, but does this necessarily make them happier, especially if happiness is conceived in hedonistic fashion? J. S. Mill sometimes seems to suggest something like this. It might be argued that highly developed individuals are able to pursue more varied and refined pleasures. All the more so if we are willing to accept Mill’s famous distinction between higher and lower pleasures. But Mill remains at the very least uncertain whether the ultimate goal is happiness or self-development for its own sake. It might be that it is better to be an “unsatisfied Socrates” than a “satisfied fool”, but is it really so because Socrates is happier in the ordinary sense? Therefore I claim that it is impossible to square Mill’s high praise of educational aspects of democracy with classical utilitarianism because of the self-

²⁸ Quoted after R. Harrison, *Democracy*, *ibid.*, p. 103.

professed hedonism of the latter. However, it remains an open question whether such reconciliation cannot be achieved if utilitarianism is conceived in a non-hedonistic fashion? And this is certainly the case with majority of the contemporary varieties of this doctrine (in fact I am convinced that Mill can be legitimately seen as a forerunner of these). In them utility is typically used as a vessel term which is supposed to denote whatever satisfies the actual desires of individuals or desires they would have under certain *ideal* conditions. If so, the desire for self-government might be established as one of the important ingredients of utility and consequently the inherent value of democratic participation can be at least to some extent vindicated. Yet, this solution is certainly not free from the problems either. First of all it should be noted that it makes the value of democratic self-government consequent upon it being *actually* desired²⁹ or being rationally desired. In either case, the typical relation between valuing something and desiring it seems to be inverted. Furthermore, even granted that democratic participation is conceived of as one of the ingredients of utility it is surely not the only one. Therefore any consistent consequentialist view must elaborate on the trade-offs between various, and sometimes competing, elements of utility. The fault of J. S. Mill's account was precisely that he did not give enough attention to these considerations. And it seems to me that contemporary utilitarians either make the same mistake or give us rather strong reasons to think that democratic participation in the present political realities indeed should not be placed very high on the list of utilitarian priorities. The whole issue is

²⁹ It should be noted that this might not be empirically confirmed in the case of many individuals even in democratic societies.

far too complex to be tackled here and thus no definite answer can be given, yet it seems to me at the very least reasonable to doubt whether contemporary utilitarian theory can accommodate much of the insight which we owe to the political works of the younger Mill.

With regards to the question of “How democratic J. S. Mill is?” it is clear that his elitist tendencies decidedly place him at odds with the most popular contemporary understanding of democracy. That is not to say that his elitism clearly dominates over more egalitarian elements of his thought. In fact his praise of civic participation acts as an important check against the conclusions which might be easily drawn from the conviction that some minds are intellectually and morally superior to others. I doubt whether Mill can deal with this tension in a satisfying way within the framework of his argument. Nevertheless, it is precisely this tension which is one of the most interesting features of his thought. Mill believed in the need to check and “civilize” democracy. This view does not enjoy particular popularity nowadays, for to assume that democracy needs to be civilized implies that it has not yet happened. But popularity is not always the best criterion in philosophy. In one of the most adequate descriptions of Mill’s attitude towards democracy I am familiar with John Skorupski claimed that he was both more enthusiastic about the potential of democracy to make people better and more pessimistic about its capacity to influence their character in a pernicious way than a vast majority of us currently is.³⁰ Whether it testifies more to Mill’s naiveté or to our cynicism is something I must leave to the readers to decide.

³⁰ J. Skorupski, *Why Read Mill Today?*, London 2006, p. 86.

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A Melting Pot in the United States of Europe?

The Modern Concept of Multiculturalism reviewed by Feliks

Koneczny and Oswald Spengler

Abstract

The matter of “cultural security” is an area often ignored by most analyses, concentrated instead on providing a broad explanation for the complex scheme of international security perceived in a broader systemic sense.

This article discusses one of the key hypotheses presented by Feliks Koneczny – the creator of a very persuasive theory on the synthesis of civilizations and multiculturalism; which seems profoundly up to date, while addressing the most lively issues of the modern European Union. Based on particular cases taken from world history, the Polish scholar attempts to illustrate, that it is nearly impossible to make multiculturalism work properly. Such a thesis must be submitted to thorough criticism with regard to other notable analysts operating within the same paradigm, such as for example Oswald Spengler. This dissertation presents a rather sceptical point of view upon the aforementioned issue and attempts to avoid arriving at a predefined simplified conclusion.

Keyword: Multiculturalism, Feliks Koneczny, Oswald Spengler, Historiosophy

Introduction

The complex matter of security concerning a specific entity observed on a global scale, has traditionally been viewed as the domain of cryptic calculations based on the paradigm of hard power. This rarely sparks serious opposition. It makes perfect sense to assess the level of security based on facts, numbers, statistics and diplomatic relations. This data seems to provide many sensible and by all means objective (or close) answers. It is not at all surprising that serious scholars prefer to prove their hypotheses by providing evidence that is as strictly “scientific” as possible, which may however turn out to be insufficient in order to obtain a coherent picture of reality. Without deeper and less „mathematical” insight one cannot expect to comprehend the full scheme of things. Sometimes the argument based on history, emotion or the subtle differences in the line of thought decides on how a group/nation/civilization will behave, whether it is vulnerable or not so, whether its values are susceptible to change and/or deterioration or whether they provide an example willingly followed abroad. The matter of “cultural security”, therefore seems like the perfect way to direct the reader’s attention to areas often ignored by the traditional approach.

1. Multiculturalism in its present (modern) shape.

The problem of European security does not look promising at all from the perspective adopted in this analysis. This could be illustrated by many internal problems derived from and associated with the doctrine of multiculturalism. It proved to be a failure, as opposed to for

example the success of the United States – the world’s largest melting pot. Germany and France not only failed to turn many of their immigrants into western Europeans but managed to transform moderate thinking groups and societies into radicals (this term obviously does not concern everyone but is used solely as an image meant to illustrate the nature of the process), who on a large scale feel nothing in common with the countries they were born in. It would seem useful to provide a certain explanation for this occurrence – one which does not in any way boast absolute certainty or mathematical proof. The sensitive area defining culture or civilization is based largely on subjective feeling, but primarily depends on the past. It is in the depths of history that one should attempt to find the answer to why European culture as we know it may, to a certain extent, be in the danger of disappearing.

It would be useful in this context to mention a scholar long forgotten by science. Not many are aware that most of Samuel Huntington’s views and theories were preceded by early 20-th century historiosophy. Amongst the myriad of minds concerned with this once popular area of study one may find such brilliant individuals as Karl Jaspers, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. One notable acquaintance of the latter was Felix Koneczny, author of “On The Plurality of Civilizations”, published in English with a preface by Toynbee¹. The Polish historiosopher, being a severe opponent of an omnipotent state, was virtually banished from all bookshelves in times of communism, only to cautiously return many decades later (during the 90’s). To those who ever heard of him (which is a rarity also in Poland)

¹ Koneczny F. [1935] 2002. *O wielości cywilizacyj* [On the Plurality of Civilizations]. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk.

the scholar is known for creating a complex theory based not only on rational arguments and pure logic but also on persuasive examples from world history. His concepts, even though from a different age, provide a sensible explanation on why Europe's cultural policy is failing today to such an enormous extent. They could prove helpful if one wishes to predict the shape that this continent will take as a possible effect of past mistakes. Before the above mentioned theory will be explained in regard to the issue of multiculturalism it seems necessary to provide some brief evidence on why it is currently believed by many that the West is so culturally vulnerable and why traditional European values seem to be under attack.

A wise place to begin would be by quoting the words of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. She appears to be quite confident that the attempt to create a multicultural society in Germany, where people would "live side by side happily" has "utterly failed". Most importantly the leader of CDU puts the majority of the blame for such a state of things on immigrants, noting that it is they who failed to integrate and lack initiative – not even wanting to learn the language of the country they inhabit². According to some polls conducted in 2010 as much as 30% of the population believed that the "country was overrun by foreigners"³. Even the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is sceptical. The world renowned think tank, known primarily for its leftist and "progressive"

² M. Weaver. 2010. "Angela Merkel: Multiculturalism has "utterly failed"". <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed>. (January 18, 2014).

³ O. Decker, M. Weissman, J. Kiess, E. Brahler. 2010. „Die Mitte in der Kreise: Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010“. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/07504-20120321.pdf>. (January 18, 2014).

views states that about one third of the German populace believes that new citizens came to the country only for social benefits⁴. The 16 million immigrants appear to be viewed by both left and right as completely unassimilated and often unfriendly towards with the culture of the state they live in. In this context Angela Merkel's statement must be presented in more detail:

“In the beginning of the 60's our government called the foreign workers to come to Germany and now they live in our country [...] We kidded ourselves a while, we said: 'They won't stay, someday they will be gone', but this isn't reality. [...] The approach to build a multicultural society and to live side by side and to enjoy each other has failed, utterly failed⁵”.

The Chancellor was followed sometime later by Horst Seehofer, the leader of CSU who simply remarked that “multiculti is dead”⁶. The most

⁴ For more *vide*: speeches from the conference on “European Approaches to Multiculturalism and Integration” organized by The Smith Institute and The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, London Office.

⁵ *Vide* for comments: D. Frum. 2010. “Germany's Merkel is Right-Multiculturalism Has Failed”. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-18/opinion/frum.merkel.multicultural_1_germany-s-merkel-chancellor-merkel-angela-merkel?_s=PM:OPINION. (January 18, 2014); J. Smee. 2010. “The World From Berlin: Merkel's Rhetoric in integration Debate is Inexcusable”. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-merkel-s-rhetoric-in-integration-debate-is-inexcusable-a-723702.html>. (January 18, 2014); for entire speech: A. Merkel, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKG76HF24_k.

⁶ H. Seehofer. 2010. “Multikulti ist tot”. <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/horst-seehofer-multikulti-ist-tot/3563806.html>. (January 18, 2014).

important, provocative and controversial voice in this debate was without a doubt that of Thilo Sarrazin. This figure, traditionally more associated with the left (member of the SPD) dedicated a whole book to proving a theory that Muslim immigration is a threat to the cultural identity and security of the *Bundesrepublik*. The former member of the German central bank wrote: “No immigrant group other than the Muslims is so strongly connected with claims on the welfare state and crime”⁷. Another interesting comment on the subject is that of Rene Cupercus, Senior Research fellow at the Wiardi Beckman Foundation a think tank of the Dutch Labour Party:

“When and why has the former Marxist, anti-religious, secular left become so respectful to religion, to Islam in particular, which in its core values and practices is not easily compatible (to put it mildly) with the anti-authoritarian cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the time when the world view of the left-liberals originated? Why did the cosmopolitan anti-patriotic left aggressively taboo and deny the idea of a national identity for European majority cultures (‘England or Holland does not exist’), but at the same time defend aggressively identity politics and ‘multi-cultures’ for non-western minorities?”

He goes on to say, that multiculturalism has produced the contrary effect to what was expected. Its fruits are no other than growing

⁷ “Merkel Says German Multicultural Society Has Failed”. 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451>. (January 18, 2014); For more on Thilo Sarrazin *vide*: 2010. *Deutschland schafft sich ab* [Germany Is Doing Away With Itself].

xenophobia, populist resentment and alienation⁸. The ideology behind immigration in Europe portrayed something different than for example in the United States, where many different nationalities and cultures live as “one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all”. The European model proved to be less successful. “You do not have to integrate”, should be rather interpreted as: “we do not want you here forever (reflected directly in Merkel's words)”. The rest of the population was told that they are the majority among others. The point is that such a situation already occurred in history and did not work. Pre-war Poland was a typical multicultural state, even more so than modern day Germany, France, the Netherlands or Britain. All societies lived relatively peacefully together, but they did not even try to integrate. Feliks Koneczny attempted to explain this situation historiosophically – many of his observations and hypotheses may prove useful as an argument in this debate⁹.

Rainer Baubock from the European University Institute in Italy provided quite a formidable theoretical argument against the concept of multiculturalism. While according to international law every nation has the right of self-determination and all minorities should be allowed to protect their culture against a particular majority “through pursuing their own projects of nation building”; it is difficult to oversee the fact

⁸ R. Cuperus. 2011. “Why the Left was Trapped Into Multiculturalism”. <http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/06/why-was-the-left-trapped-into-multiculturalism/>. (January 18, 2014).

⁹ For broader insight *vide*: Koneczny F. 2001. *Państwo i prawo w Cywilizacji Łacińskiej*. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk; Koneczny F. 1997. *Prawa Dziejowe* [On the Laws of History]. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk; Koneczny F. [1935] 2002. *O wielości cywilizacyj* [On The Plurality of Civilizations]. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk.

that this principle is virtually incompatible with the “basic Westphalian norm of territorial integrity of states”. There was an attempt to get around this obvious logical contradiction by defining “peoples” in a more narrow manner than “nations”¹⁰. This was a wonderful solution in theory, but requires very specific norms in order to be implemented in practice. Can norms solve such complexities as values that seem almost spiritual – those deriving from the concept of a nation, culture or civilization? Can a sheer formality put an end to a live entity that has been in existence for hundreds of years? Highly doubtful. It is impossible to regulate relations between cultures entirely, merely with the help of definitions and norms, simply because cultures are based on emotion, feeling and the soul to a much more significant extent than on written sheets of paper. If one wishes all people within a nation to live side by side in a state of peace, they simply must have more in common than just an identical system of law and bureaucracy. This was the American approach and Europe really should take example from that success story rather than attempt to write its own from scratch. The “multiculti” failure was foretold by scholars long before the contemporary implementation of the doctrine. It seems worthwhile to provide a short reminder of that criticism and divert the reader’s attention to the classical theory of the “synthesis of civilisations” and futility of “multiculturalism” presented by Feliks Koneczny.

2. A historiosophical analysis of the concept of multiculturalism.

¹⁰ R. Baubock. “What went wrong with liberal multiculturalism”. etn.sagepub.com/content/8/2/271.extract. p. 271-275 (January 18 2014).

It appears that not all types of multicultural entities and strategies should be perceived as identical. Some cultures bear more common traits than others and are thus prone to synthesis and/or the possibility of fruitful cooperation. Some of them are even members of the same civilization and creating a common ground between them resembles a natural process. American culture came into existence as the fruit of cooperation and common values shared by representatives of a myriad of nations – most of which were European. If another civilization would come into the picture the situation would become drastically different, simply because the primary reason for the birth of any social group is a single unifying purpose, without which the need for a mutually supportive society never comes into existence. And although some individuals fool themselves to think otherwise – not all groups of people think the same way and have identical needs, especially if they have lived apart for hundreds of years with little contact apart from an occasional war. The chances are that they will never get along very well nor will they even think according to the same pattern; even when an inquiry concerns the simplest of things. The primary characteristic for every social group is, therefore a common purpose – this purpose is not the fruit of a simplistic contract, it is the effect of a long process of historic and spiritual evolution. According to Oswald Spengler for example, the reason for the existence of a certain culture is not bound to the civilization itself; its purpose has to be an abstract ideal, simply because only something not yet in our possession provides the necessary motivation for movement, action and

the “feeling of longing”¹¹. Thus, the matter of purpose determines that a group forms (is created) not only as the fruit of biology but also due to a sort of higher calling. The specificity of each purpose predetermines the fact that a certain society is in fact a separate civilization. This simple theory suggests that mixing various cultural entities and thus attempting to create a sort of synthesis will always result in utter failure. The obvious reason for this is that various purposes show different paths to different places (various goals). How can a single group function in harmony if it is concentrated on separate and maybe even contradictory elements; if it wants (expects) different things from life? Such coexistence means nothing more than chaos and often leads to the decline of a certain or of all cultures concerned. The only way to merge two separate civilizations is by creating an alternative, much like it was done in the USA. Feliks Koneczny states that various civilizations are in a state of endless rivalry and a victory in war does not necessarily mean real victory in the field of culture – Rome and Greece are perfect examples. The reason for conflict lies in the mutual incompatibility of purposes and a popular feeling of certainty that “our goal makes the most sense”. This never ending rivalry is caused by the fact that societies naturally come into contact, they interact, live together or next to each other. As an effect some of them may cease to exist – and it is rarely the “better” (more developed, sublime) group that survives. Complexity is not at all attractive according to this hypothesis¹².

¹¹ Spengler O. [1959] 2001. *Zmierzch Zachodu* [Der Untergang Des Abendlandes]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo KR. p. 192-208.

¹² Koneczny F. *Prawa...* p. 237-260.

2.1 The issue of compatibility and synthesis of civilizations.

One of the most valuable elements of Koneczny's theory is probably the matter of compatibility (*współmierność*) and synthesis. Both terms are worth explaining in more detail. The scholar directs the reader's attention to cultures which at first glance seem to be almost analogous. When observed in more detail however, one may notice significant differences even amongst the closest (representing many features that are alike) and most similar civilizations. Even if genuinely subtle, in those differences lies the true character of any society. Rome and Greece are perfect illustrations of that thesis; the similarities between them without a doubt surpass any possible differences: their alphabets are fully phonetic; their religious systems were virtually identical etc. Interestingly enough, according to Koneczny both societies belong to entirely different civilizations. This is because the essence of every culture is based on "the common method of organizing a society". In the case of Greece in times of Hellenism, *ergo* the period after Alexander the Great its society can be characterized as oriental or Eastern. It resembles the original Hellenic civilization to a limited extent. The Roman model is personalistic, centred on the individual and on the classical rule of law. The attempt at synthesis was based on a common intellectual base. Unfortunately the basic line of thought turned out to be incompatible (*niewspółmierna*), which is the main reason for the splitting of the empire into two separate cultural entities. Both civilizations were without a doubt inspired by a similar set of abstract ideals, which derived from common sets of beliefs: first the classical, then Christianity. These, however can be interpreted in very different

ways and thus lead to the formation of various forms of practice, preferred ways of acting, dogma and moral duty. Orthodox and Catholic Christianity do not differ significantly (much less then for example Protestantism and Catholicism) in terms of the declared set of beliefs, but the practice of faith is entirely different. The dominating rule which requires one to follow in the footsteps of The Lord stays the same but the ways of realizing that rule vary significantly. Both religions value humility. In the West the mentioned trait is altruistic, centered on the individual and understood as helping others, actively combating injustice and evil, changing the world etc. This is precisely why we had schools, hospitals, poorhouses, universities and such – all established and ran by the clergy. In the East the world is also understood as imperfect, but the religious element simply implies that one has to accept imperfection and contemplate fate as God's will – similarly to Islam¹³. This is perfectly reflected in many works of art – for example architecture. Oswald Spengler sees the dome of an Orthodox Basilica as a sort of prelude or introduction to the quick spread of Islam in the former Eastern Roman Empire. The German historiosopher sees the Hagia Sophia as a perfect Mosque – built before the formal birth of Islam as a sort of prediction of the future. This example seems to illustrate how two almost identical societies – with common roots and similar beliefs can choose disjointing paths of development; the reason for which lies simply in the deep incompatibility of vision and purpose. A man of the West wished to experience objective beauty – paying special attention to both realism and symbolism in creating works of art.

¹³ *Ibidem.* p. 237.

The Easterner sought perfection by deep introverted thought and meditation. According to Koneczny “various societies look upon good and evil, the idea of beauty, perfection, usefulness and uselessness in a completely different manner. They can have various points of view concerning the above elements, not to mention that even their vision (ideal) of truth (purpose) is never compatible or analogous. A certain goal is only analogous (mutually corresponding/correlating) within societies belonging to one civilization”¹⁴. *Ergo*, it is futile to expect the possibility of creating a synthesis of civilizations, since different cultures are by their very nature incompatible (they have different goals, dreams, ideals, interpretations of dogma etc.) Koneczny backs this thesis up by quoting one of the conclusions of an annual meeting held by The Ethnological Society of Religion in 1929: “one cannot imagine a crime that at some time or place could not have been interpreted as an honourable deed¹⁵.” This statement seems just as persuasive today as over 80 years ago. How can one hope to create a common society when the group concerned lacks a common system of ethics, morality; its elements (nations, peoples) act differently, represent various mythologies, traditions and abstract ideals? One could obviously create a system of do's and don'ts a priori- it would however certainly prove to be seriously impaired by the lack of a historical (realistic) foundation. Such artificial constructions rarely prove to provide sufficient value. How can one substitute years of experience and evolution by a baseless projection. It is certainly better to trust in the wisdom of past

¹⁴ *Ibidem*. p. 238.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*. p. 239.

generations then the meditations and projects of madmen with visions of transforming the true fabric of society.

Because faith is such an important element in creating a civilization there are attempts to, in a way, establish a common ground in this matter in order to bring the people of the world closer together. This tendency is evident for example in the form of ecumenism in Christianity, which is without a doubt a noble and romantic cause. Such sentimental ideals usually do not bear the expected fruits however. Is it worth losing the truth in the name of common and united error? It is better to be divided by truth than united in error. Only people that are religiously indifferent could think of an endeavour to synthesize beliefs in the name of abstract compatibility at all costs. If one perceives his/her own culture or civilization seriously and believes in its mission or purpose how can one simply sacrifice it on the altar of uniformity? What is the point of unity without passion and belief¹⁶?

Another important element worth mentioning is the fact that victory in the field of rivalry is rarely possessed by the most aggressive or warlike civilization. Cultural expansion derives from the strength of ideals, beliefs, abstract ideas, myths and traditions. Let us consider the initial expansion of Islam. Christians, at first, were not being converted by sword, but primarily in the form of economic discrimination. The mission of expansion takes place in the mind and soul, because civilization is based on emotion, feeling and the heart – it lays in the world of abstraction, which precedes physical matter. The heart is always closed to the material world, but that world is bound to reflect

¹⁶ *Ibidem.* p. 240-260; Spengler O. *Zmierzch...* p. 25-60.

the dreams and ideals of the former¹⁷. Most prominent and long lasting civilizations are in fact, as Koneczny describes them, sacred/spiritual in nature. They are characterized not only by ideological thought or doctrine but primarily by certain traditional customs (actions) reflected for example in liturgy, celebrating holidays, not eating meat (or certain types of meat) etc. Every element of life is filled with duties and obligations deriving from a certain religious system. It would be virtually impossible to merge these rules in the case of, for example orthodox Judaism and Hinduism, whilst maintaining their true form, nature and world outlook. Attempting synthesis would in this case seem barbaric and ignorant, would surely never work and most certainly be an act of sacrificing what both societies view as truth in the name of unifying them in error¹⁸.

The Polish scholar presents numerous examples from history which are meant to prove that attempts at the synthesis of cultures belonging to different civilizations are determined to fail. The vision of uniting mankind by merging its beliefs and traditions is not a modern invention it has been around since ancient times. The most notable example, no doubt directed by noble intentions was that of Alexander the Great, who was certainly one of the first great synthesizers of societies. The Macedonian king urged his soldiers to marry Persian women of which he gave an example by entering the eternal union with an Iranian dancer. He made numerous analogies between the Greek and

¹⁷ *Ibidem.* p. 405-417; About the relationship between spirit and matter *vide*: Plato. *Fajdros i Uczta* in: *Dialogi* [Plato, Dialogues]; About the hierarchy of matter *vide*: Arystoteles, *Metafizyka* [Aristotle, Metaphysics].

¹⁸ Koneczny F. *Prawa...* p. 240.

Persian gods and dreamed of creating a common ideology encompassing his whole reign which was to be based on his individual persona. Alexander the Great believed it impossible to Hellenize the enormous and diverse East, which was no doubt a wise predicament. The problem, however was that he did not wish to accept the fact that people are by nature diverse and apparently could not understand that the existence of various cultures and states is a treasure of mankind instead of its burden. The king of Macedonia dreamed of unification and uniformity, which in turn ended up deeply changing the nature of his own civilization forever. The utopian vision of a single empire collapsed with ruthless consequence, what is worse is that even the Greeks themselves never again united (until the 19th century) – at least not in accordance with their traditional values and historical outlook. This is also proof that power politics and military conquest is not a sufficient method of successfully spreading certain values and beliefs¹⁹. The effect of such endeavours is usually contrary to expectations. Greeks (especially the elite) became increasingly “Eastern” (“oriental” if one prefers) – no one in their right mind would call Cleopatra (a Greek noble of the Ptolemaic dynasty) as an individual resembling Pericles, Demosthenes, Aristotle or Plato to a more significant extent than the Pharaohs of the Old Kingdom. The same can be said about distant Bactria. The only Greek element one could observe there would probably be the external design of money (coins), which in some manner resembles the traditional Hellenic model.

¹⁹ *Ibidem.* p. 250.

A very notable example of the madness of artificial “self-correction” carried out in order to look (seem) more friendly to a foreign culture could be perfectly portrayed by early Byzantine-Islamic relations. The empire wished to persuade the Muslims to convert to Christianity by incorporating some elements of their civilization. Images of God, the Saints and Angels- which were particularly revered by the Eastern Orthodox Church were banned and thus thousands of priceless works of art were barbarically destroyed. The fact that worshipping images is not allowed in Islam is in full accordance with the main principles of that religion. One can say that it is a fundamental logical outcome of the nature of that civilization. Allah is primarily characterized as all powerful and his will cannot be questioned or creatively reflected upon. The same cannot be said about Eastern Christianity, which is so strongly tied to the image as an important sacred element, that brings an individual closer to God – whose most important traits are centered on mercy and love. The Byzantine Greeks wished to solve the problem of an expanding Islam by cooperation, dialogue and compromise. They went ahead and decided to sacrifice one of the most important elements of their own world outlook only because they believed it would spark positive feeling towards them from their adversaries. The effect was contrary to their expectations: such an act can only be perceived as a display of weakness and decadence by young and dynamically expanding cultures. How can one motivate the destruction of something so dear? Could it be only because one does not have the will or strength to fight for what one believes in? Or perhaps that individual does not really believe in anything anymore? Every idealist thinks in the categories presented above and the only way

to gain his/her respect is to honourably fight (not necessarily in militaristic terms; by argument as well for example). An act that is hostile to something as dear as one's own civilization seems to be nothing more than the proof of its decadence and spoilage. It is a sign of its oncoming end²⁰. Thus it becomes almost obvious, that attempts at combining (by means of synthesis) entities as ancient and complex as civilizations does not reap the expected benefits.

In this context it would also be wise to mention a failed attempt of cultural synthesis, which concerns two protestant churches in Hohenzollern Prussia. Frederick I strove to centralize and unify the religious sphere which would give him the possibility to even further submit it to the dominance of the state. The theological dogma of Lutheran and Calvinist sects are fundamentally different. One cannot simply reconcile the two. This is precisely why they came into existence – Protestantism split into various groups for idealistic and philosophical reasons (The Anglican Church is probably the only exception), not practical ones. It is futile to hope to unite separate religious entities simply by administrative means. This depth of thought could not be achieved by the Prussian elites of that time (18th century). Their actions portrayed religion not as the foundation of civilization or culture but a means to an end – a sort of tool whose primary purpose was to further strengthen the formal institution of their state. In 1719, as an initiative of Frederick Wilhelm I, theologians from Tübingen put together 15 new articles of faith based on which both branches of Protestantism were supposed to be united. The king subsequently rejected the Calvinist idea

²⁰ *Ibidem.* p. 240.

of predestination and issued a directive for the newly unified church to stick to the Calvinist “Agenda” (means of administration). The only effect of this act was the growing indifference of the protestant religion towards matters of faith and could have been one of the many seeds of atheism and agnosticism in Europe. It would be useful to mention George Calixtus in this context. The 17th century theologian planned to create a synthesis of all protestant branches. This proved to be impossible and the fruit of his universalism was nothing more than a system of ethics without the proper motivation (roots). Thus one can observe that attempts at uniting cultures artificially usually lead to their significant decline²¹.

Civilizations differ in basically all forms of human existence. They even perceive science itself in a completely different manner. Both the scientific method and purpose of science vary drastically in the West and for example in China. According to Koneczny, in the former the main goal is learning the truth – no matter if mankind can reap its practical benefits. Within the latter culture one performs each action for the good of society, thus science has to be utilitarian and useful here and now²². It is difficult to leave this thesis without discussion. Practicality as the sole motive for invention is surely not a Chinese trait. Black powder, for example was put to religious/sacral use, it became an element of many festivities in honour of the emperor, which is no doubt a very abstract sphere. One can find many more examples of inventions that were meant to fulfill higher needs than just earthly and practical.

²¹ Koneczny F. *Prawa...* p. 244-245.

²² *Ibidem.* p. 246-248.

The creation of new cultures by synthesis is a futile task also because it is nearly impossible to even understand the motivation of another civilization without extensive knowledge about it (and even then it is difficult). A good example would be an illustration of the primary differences between Hinduism and western Christianity. The first is based upon religious acts (customs) – not ethics are important here but rituals. Even if someone would undertake the endeavour of collecting the meanings of all of them, the system would prove to be inconsistent and illogical. Christianity is mostly about reflecting upon a theologically (scientifically) organized dogma. The rituals are mostly introverted and in comparison to Hinduism there are very few of them. In Hinduism every day is a unique holiday which demands certain rituals (for example on the island of Bali). Each day is a cause for celebration and brings with it a certain mythical story, which often does not even contain a point (moral). The goal is to petrify certain ways of acting, gestures, mimicry and motivate life with tradition and myth. Hinduism brings one closer to the Deity with gestures. Christianity does the same with thought and ethics. It would seem wise to provide an example of Hindu myth as evidence of the hypotheses put forward above. While observing a play on a temple altar in Bali one could not help but wonder about the lack of its moral or philosophical value. The legend concerned a prince who failed to hunt down an animal. While looking for the pray he noticed an empty coconut shell and urinated inside it. On the next day a simple girl went into the forest, noticed what the prince left behind and drank it. She got pregnant, carried the baby for a year and gave birth to a frog. A certain princes fell in love with this (male) frog, who in turn asked Shiva to turn it into a human being. The

deity replied that the frog is in fact a prince and fulfilled his bidding. They lived happily ever after. One cannot help but address a question to Mahatma Gandhi, who stated that the Western mind is entirely materialistic and the Hindu is idealistic, what ideals the above legend contains? To be brief – it is just a meaningless story, with no abstract value, its strength is locked in the fact that it exists and is believed to be true – which is direct proof that Hinduism feeds primarily on tradition: classic forms of *sacrum*. How can one possibly hope to unify two societies as different from each other as the West and Hinduism? They think differently, have various motivations, believe in different things and have entirely disjoint purposes for existence according to their ways of thinking. To even consider synthesis is thus without a doubt entirely a waste of time, for the only way in which it could be successful is by destroying both societies and building something else in their place. Such barbarism should no doubt be avoided²³.

It would be worthwhile to also mention the subject of time itself. This too is perceived in an entirely different manner by various societies. The Hindu look upon time in an emanative and cyclic way. The energy of Brahma endlessly emanates from the deity but with each minute it becomes more and more unclean – polluted by actions that do not derive from it directly. This is the source of all suffering and the reason that the world is imperfect. Every once in a while evil energy starts to dominate over the good and the world collapses in on itself. The deity then builds a new world, thus beginning a fresh cycle. Every individual is trapped inside this cycle – this is known as reincarnation.

²³ Own observations and Koneczny F. *Prawa...* p. 247.

He/she can break free however by entering the state of Moksha and thus become “nothing”. This theory implies that existence is participation in something that lacks perfection and each Hindu should live in a state of conflict towards his/her being as well as the material world²⁴. The Latin civilization is based on creationism (not to be understood in its new meaning) a concept which leads one to believe that the world was created only once and does not undergo any significant change in terms of its nature and character. This formulated a bond of the individual and physical matter that he exists in, which in turn led to the evolution of modern empirical science²⁵.

When considering the concept of the synthesis of civilizations one cannot help but mention the Jewish people and their unique culture. Because of the complexities of history the Hebrew people can be found all over the world – always for the benefit of the place they inhabit. They do not wish to assimilate fully however and represent an elitist point of view upon their values and beliefs. They feel no particular need for spreading their outlook abroad either – it was meant solely for them. This is what makes the Jewish civilization strong and vital. No special longing for synthesis is typical for this culture – it is content with the respect it feels towards its ancestors and forefathers: “they stand on the shoulders of giants”, that is why they achieved so much. The belief in being the chosen people does not have to be abandoned just so other cultures feel better about themselves²⁶. This is

²⁴ Own observations; *Ibidem*. p. 52- 51; Koneczny F. *O wielości...* p. 289- 294.

²⁵ Koneczny F. *Prawa...* p. 47-72.

²⁶ *Ibidem*. p. 249.

no doubt an attitude that provokes respect from people of worth that remember their own heritage.

2.2 Multiculturalism and the theory of the crossroads.

Felines Koneczny also directs the reader's attention to the matter of multiculturalism and the theory of the crossroads. It is based on the predicament that cultures which exist at the crossroads of civilizations are predestined to be richer, more valuable culturally and stronger intellectually. He states that the lack of criticism in the many benefits flowing from that idea led to the birth of "one of the most absurd myths of modernity". Were it to make any sense, then Russia would prove to be the leader of the world. He meticulously identifies as many as seven cultures which can be found within the great country²⁷. Even if, sometimes it would be easy to disagree with the details, the Eastern giant was always, without a doubt a truly multicultural nation. Instead of making that trait the primary example set for humanity it was the source of a significant energy drain. Russia put so much effort during its long history in order to suppress internal nationality driven conflicts (Poland, Georgia, Ukraine, The Caucasus as a whole etc.). Much of its actions were driven by attempts to maintain unity instead of concentrating on more vital problems. This may be one of the reasons why the country is still quite backward. Civilizations simply have different goals, purposes and ideals, they cannot be merged or reconciled nor can they be conquered by sheer force. It is simplistically understood expansionism that made Russia what it is today.

²⁷ *Ibidem.* p. 35-36.

Finally it should be made clear that the matter of synthesis of civilizations was based purely on an *a priori* method of analysis. It was a premeditated romantic and sentimental ideal of creating a universal society in which everyone could live together in harmony. Such concepts are usually utopian in nature. How can you expect harmony from two groups of people who have conflicting goals? It is a child's wish that will probably never come true, for it is deemed impossible by philosophy and logic. Looking back at history one may easily notice that attempts at civilizational synthesis were always artificial and predestined to fail²⁸. A new civilization can come into existence as an effect of the emergence of a new purpose/ideal or it can undergo significant decline and be dominated by another culture. There is simply no alternative.

Multiculturalism is a somewhat different concept than the one described in detail above, when the main goal of analysis is the full explanation of certain occurrences which make it difficult for a given culture to realize its purpose or the mission it believes it is a set to fulfil. Synthesis means sacrificing some elements and truths of a given cultural order (system) and incorporating others in their place so that a new entity based on common methods of thinking, feeling and existence could be created – this group may otherwise be called a civilization. Multiculturalism is simply about incorporating foreign elements of existence into an entity (society) which are unable to correspond with the given order of life²⁹. These new methods of existence are unable to assist in achieving a certain cultures purpose if they were provoked into being by entirely different sentiments and beliefs. Incorporated elements

²⁸ *Ibidem.* p. 249.

²⁹ Koneczny F. *Prawa...* p. 260.

of a foreign origin can only disrupt a given culture from achieving a certain goal (or attempting to achieve it). They can tear the delicate fabric of a unique way of life, change the nature of a civilization and interrupt its sense of direction (movement, dynamism). The greatest risk of creating a multicultural environment artificially is that society will transform into an uncultured, chaotic mass without a certain unique purpose. Such a state would ensure its decline.

Oswald Spengler for example describes civilization as a living organism. It is difficult to fully agree with such Neo-Darwinist statements but society is surely something more than just a mechanism or group of people who agreed upon a „social contract”. It is also not merely founded on pure instinct, which transforms the actions of a group based on changes of the outside environment in accordance with a certain system. The German scholar presents the opposition between what “is alive” (as opposed to “dead” mechanical creations) and what is not. He believes that live entities are defined by their spiritual element and thus cannot be understood as machines put into movement by matter. In this case the term organism does not contain its typical meaning. Spengler uses it as a metaphor; if society is an organism then it contains an element of escaping the curbs of science and the possibility of empirical description – it is more complicated than a regular mechanism. It does not react in a given, predefined manner towards external change; its actions, in a way, cannot be predicted; they seem almost metaphysical³⁰. The metaphor of an organism was also used by scholasticism in the Middle Ages in order to describe purpose

³⁰ Spengler O. *Zmierzch...* p. 115-142.

in nature. This term is obviously very useful also when analysing the goal of every society, as long as it is understood purely as a metaphor³¹. The existence of a given entity has meaning only when it has a certain predefined goal that it strives to achieve; in other words it should act in accordance with the platonic „intention of existence”. Simply put: every element of a certain organism has to fulfil its purpose according to the goal of the whole. The head is responsible for leadership, the legs for walking etc. Their actions are brought into life automatically, simply because the mentioned body parts have been designed (by nature or God) to do so. The same could be said about a society, culture and civilization. It should be allowed to act based on instinct (which is the fruit of historical development), in accordance with its character and purpose. Its representatives should realize that when two legs move in an unsynchronized manner this may bring about the risk of tripping. Oswald Spengler is positive, however that each society is determined to grow and develop to a certain moment and is bound to deteriorate one day anyway. Every civilization must face decadence, nihilism and die of natural causes.³² Feliks Koneczny is sceptical towards such theories. His argument is based on the fact that many ancient civilizations still exist and did not disappear whilst some were short-lived and fell into a period of decadence and decline. *Ergo*, societies do not simply die of old age as people do but are able to carry their traditions with them almost endlessly – unless of course they lose their sense of purpose and meaning – this in effect leads them to a state of adaptation: they either

³¹ St. Thomas Aquinas [1265?] 2006. *O Królowaniu...* [De Regno...].Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej. p. 43-61.

³² Spengler O. *Zmierzch...* p. 205-224.

yield to another civilization or fall into a state of deep depression and cease to exist³³. According to Koneczny the primary reason for the fall of a society is the loss of its unique goals – this happens most often as an effect of multiculturalism, where a variety of unfamiliar ways of understanding reality are introduced. It is impossible to believe and/or acknowledge two contradicting truths/ points of view/ purposes of life etc. When the representatives of a society begin to do so it just stops being a society and becomes a group of different people united by one law and government – nothing more. This is also predetermined to be temporary. Every culture understands the concept of law differently; every civilization has different sets of rules based on various historical and/or religious traditions/predicaments rooted in thousands of years of practice. It is naive and sentimental to believe that many cultures can happily live in a “modern”, “liberal” state – this is possible only in the case of its inventors; no one else will understand it nor truly acknowledge its purpose.

When certain elements of a given organism are motivated by disjointed sets of hopes, purposes and truths, then the whole entity is unable to achieve the originally intended goal. When a society completely loses its predefined traits and thus the purpose for its existence it becomes pointless to even analyse it.

A civilization can lose its unique direction as an effect of the simplest events, which by themselves should not under any circumstance, be subject to criticism. In neighbouring societies cultural contact between them as well as mutual impact are inevitable and

³³ *Ibidem.* p. 115-142.

profound. Some “foreign cultural elements” are not a danger to the civilizational fabric of a society at all – inventions, simple customs and technical details can exist in full correlation with its purpose and goal³⁴. The adaptation of external elements has to, however be in full accordance with the „law of proportion”. Feliks Koneczny notices (at the beginning of the 20th century) that occurrences typical for frontiers and border areas can now be found virtually everywhere. “We can now observe that two members of the same family can now belong to two different civilizations, even ones hostile to each other. This is evidence of a growing instability of beliefs, views – even terms and ideas, as well as the growing uncertainty of purpose and the meaning of existence of individuals³⁵”. Not so long ago we could witness the disappearance of ancient and noble families of the past. Each owed its allegiance to one stable and continuous meaning for ages, which could be decrypted for example from their medieval coats of arms. They were loyal to the traditions of their ancestors. One could expect a certain predefined way of thinking and analysis from a given noble family for decades, even though they married representatives of the aristocracy from many different nations (but usually within one civilization). Today, the respect for tradition and duty has virtually disappeared and one can observe that individual views are no longer shaped by the family.

It looks as though Feliks Koneczny attempts to blame the decline of Western Civilization on different cultures. This is no doubt a serious mistake. Dadaism, turpism, surrealism, futurism etc. were not the fruits of foreign thought. The relativist point of view is uniquely Western, no

³⁴ *Ibidem.* p. 260.

³⁵ *Ibidem.* p. 260.

one else thought of it but us. Every civilization has a profound feeling of righteousness – it is absolutely sure that the direction which it chose over the centuries is the right one. There are certain implications based on which one may call a society a civilization. They are inspired by a belief in a certain purpose and meaning. The West seems to have lost its sense of direction. Instead of reflecting upon the matter of multiculturalism and the synthesis of cultures one should rather create a new category: anticivilization. This entity did not evolve as an effect of an energy drain caused by the influx of foreign cultures as Koneczny would like but as the fruit of The French Revolution. It is without a doubt that attempts at synthesis or creating a multinational state may have an effect on the feeling of purpose of a given society, but living next to someone of a strong sense of identity can also serve as an inspiration to revive our own sets of values. In practice a more diverse society can lead to stronger feelings of civilizational patriotism and self-definition. It often happens that a given culture can incorporate foreign elements and thus enrich its heritage. In the case of Hinduism for example there is no doubt that without its special characteristic, based on the ability to provide a unique way of understanding others and giving meaning to cultural values stemming from the outside, it would not last for such a long time. If not for the fact that each foreign truth could not be meticulously and quite accurately (with broad understanding) added to the system, that system would probably decompose. Its tolerance should not be understood in the modern meaning of the word, *ergo*; everyone has their own truth and we should respect that because we do not really know what truth is. The Hindu civilization says rather – every truth is in accordance with our truth; if it

is not, then we will make it so. Instead of attacking it tries to prove the futility of the classic form of conflict. It fights rather in the intellectual and mystic spheres. This special kind of tolerance makes the mentioned culture very resilient and powerful; it takes what it can, enriching its heritage without in any way destroying its foundations – everything is modified in accordance with its main set of beliefs. However, one should mention the fact that Hinduism never could really incorporate or tame Islam. The conclusion can be twofold therefore: the “law of history”, as Felix Koneczny calls it, concerning the futility of multiculturalism and the synthesis of civilizations is not entirely accurate. Sometimes multiculturalism provides the best results for a given culture, but it is very often the other way around as well. Historiosophy does not really give a certain answer, but provides a broader spectrum which enables an individual to really understand the meaning of such words as tolerance, diversity and multiculturalism; instead of just repeating them aimlessly as an element of fashionable modern propaganda³⁶.

3. Conclusion

There are numerous examples in history which prove that multiculturalism as well as its other form based on the synthesis of civilizations are ideals that are incredibly difficult to achieve in practice. If a given society really wishes to put them to life its elites should feel obliged and compelled to rely not only on empty words and goodwill but also on historical evidence and experience stemming from the past.

³⁶ *Ibidem.* p. 118-124; Koneczny F. *Prawa...* p. 261.

It is possible for different cultures to live together happily, whilst enriching their heritage, but in order to do that all of these cultures have to believe in a certain form of truth. If one of these societies is decadent and increasingly nihilist it is bound to be spiritually conquered by others. This is a conclusion, which cannot be ignored when attempting to bring such ideas to life – for with noble ideals it is always profoundly difficult to do so.

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Think Tanks in Poland: Policy Experts at the Crossroads

Abstract¹

Development of the think tank sector in post-communist states is, at times, regarded as a self-evident consequence of the processes of democratization. However, the specific “environment of obstacles and opportunities” makes it neither automatic, nor easy for think tanks of the region to join the policy game. In particular, it is not clear to what extent the think tanks in transition democracies can or should engage in strictly political disputes. The alleged shift from academic towards advocacy profiles that is said to characterize Western think tanks evokes numerous questions in post-communist settings.

The paper provides an analysis of the development of the think tank sector in Poland and the challenges it faces on its way towards “maturity”. It aims at getting some insights into perspectives of think tanks themselves. Building on a qualitative analysis of think tanks’ mission statements, survey data and interviews with think tank managers, it analyses how they construct their positions of policy experts at the crossroads between politics, science, business and the media.

Keywords: think tanks, policy analysis, boundary work, expertise

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Introduction

The processes of democratic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have made it clearer than ever that, as Hugo Heclo explains,

Politics find its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty – men collectively wondering what to do. [...] Governments not only ‘power’ (or whatever the verb form of that approach might be); they also puzzle. Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing.²

The necessity of knowing in order to decide – particularly in the context of transformation – makes it inevitable for “the world of politics” to seek expert advice. Even if modern experts do not rule, as the followers of the technocratic model of knowledge-politics relations would have it, they definitively have a say. According to Sheila Jasanoff,

Experts have become indispensable to the politics of nations, and indeed to transnational and global politics. Experts manage the ignorance and uncertainty that are endemic conditions of contemporary life and pose

² Hugh Heclo, *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance* (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn, 1974), 305. Cited after Richard Freeman, "Learning in Public Policy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*, ed. Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (2006: Oxford University Press), 372.

major challenges to the managerial pretensions and political legitimacy of democratically accountable governments. Faced with ever-changing arrays of issues and questions – based on shifting facts, untested technologies, incomplete understandings of social behavior and unforeseen environmental externalities – governments need the backing of experts to assure citizens that they are acting responsibly, in good faith, and with adequate knowledge and foresight. The weight of political legitimation rests therefore increasingly on the shoulders of experts, and yet they occupy at best a shadowy place in the evolving discourse of democratic theory.³

This “shadowy” position of experts may have to do with the fact that experts are not (or perhaps: no more) easy to classify along the knowledge-politics divide. The paradox is that expertise, which at times is expected to make politics less “political” (that is: more rational, evidence-based) is not as “apolitical” (that is: free of values or ideology) as it may seem.⁴ It would be hard to deny that knowledge has become

³ Sheila Jasanoff, “Judgement under Siege. The Three-Body Problem of Expert Legitimacy,” in *Democratization of Expertize? Exploring Novel Forms of Scientific Advice in Political Decision-Making*, ed. Sabine Maassen and Peter Weingart (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 221.

⁴ See: Michael Schudson, “The Trouble with Experts - and Why Democracies Need Them,” *Theory and Society* 35, no. 5-6 (2006); Stephen P. Turner, “Political Epistemology, Experts and the Aggregation of Knowledge,” *Spontaneous Generations* 1, no. 1 (2007).

more pluralistic than ever – the public fights of experts and counter-experts, the cacophony of expert opinions, and the questioning of unquestionable facts are proof of this development.

In Robert Hoppe's adversarial model of knowledge-politics relations, political expertise serves as ammunition. In this perspective, "[p]olitics is the non-violent power struggle between political parties and/or organized interest groups that, through processes of partisan mutual adjustment, leads to temporary compromises on the public interest". According to the model, "every interest involved will look for the type of scientific expertise that harnesses and legitimizes its pre-formed political stance". In the adversarial model, experts seem to be "guns for hire" and are ready to offer access to facts that suit the needs of their patrons, which is quite a disturbing picture. However, Hoppe remarks optimistically that "both empirically and normatively one may argue that scientific arguments as political ammunition improve the quality of political debate, at least if everybody has equal access to scientific expertise. To the extent that political controversies mobilize scientific expertise, they even contribute to knowledge use". The idea of "equal access" to knowledge is however easier to declare than to implement – "access to knowledge and expertise has itself become a source of conflict, as various groups realize its growing implications for political choice."⁵

⁵ Robert Hoppe, "Rethinking the Science-Policy Nexus: From Knowledge Utilization and Science Technology Studies to Types of Boundary Arrangements," *Poiesis Prax* 3(2005): 210.

Experts may also become active players on the political stage, playing not only on somebody else's, but also on their own behalf. According to David Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, they may adopt one of three attitudes: that of an objective technician, that of a client's advocate, or that of an issue advocate.⁶ This "engaged" side of expertise is well reflected in the dynamic development of think tanks (especially these with advocacy profiles). While referring to the ideals of scientific neutrality and objectivity, they lay out some interest-bound objectives. Think tanks are a modern way of combining "the apolitical" with "the political" for the sake of policy.

The period of transformation has given rise to the dynamic development of the think tank sector across most post-communist countries.⁷ Although think tanks have been operating on the expert scenes of CEE countries already for over 20 years, there is still more than just a grain of truth in Krastev's diagnosis that "[i]n post-communist societies, a think tank is something everybody hears about but nobody actually knows much about".⁸

The gap in research on think tanks leaves much space for various investigations. The principal aim of the present paper is to characterize Polish think tanks in terms of legal, geographical, financial and personal factors. Building on this foundation, we would also like to introduce some concerns about organizational identities of think tanks in Poland,

⁶ David Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice* (New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005).

⁷ According to a directory published by Freedom House (1997), soon after the transition over 100 of these institutions appeared in the CEE area.

⁸ Ivan Krastev, "Post-Communist Think Tanks. Making and Faking Influence," in *Banking on Knowledge: The Genesis of the Global Development Network*, ed. Diane Stone (London: Routledge, 2000), 142.

and also assess the ways they try to find balance between “the political” and “the scientific”.

The procedure of obtaining data we would further refer to has involved creating a database of over ninety Polish think tanks (on the base of information provided by mass media, international comparative studies, think tank and NGO's directories, analyses of expert networks etc.). Three analytical components involved qualitative analysis of mission statements of Polish think tanks published on their web sites, an Internet survey (with quantitative and qualitative elements) conducted in Spring 2011,⁹ as well as semi-structured interviews with 12 think tank representatives (conducted in March and April 2011).

Defining think tanks

It is quite difficult to draw the lines of demarcation around the concept of a think tank, as these organizations “vary considerably in size, resources, areas of expertise and in the quality and quantity of the publications they produce”.¹⁰ For this reason it is not easy to give an example of a “typical think tank”,¹¹ as “attempts to universally define the term think tank in a concise way are bound to fail due to substantial

⁹ The survey contained 23 questions. The answers from 27 institutions (out of over 80 which received invitations) have been obtained.

¹⁰ Donald E. Abelson and Christine M. Carberry, "Following Suit or Falling Behind? A Comparative Analysis of Think Tanks in Canada and the United States," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 3 (1998): 259.

¹¹ Donald E. Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes* (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 8.

differences between scientific, technocratic and partisan varieties.”¹²

Because of the history of the think tank phenomenon, the Anglo-American model of think tanks as “policy research organizations that are independent of government and universities” and “operate on a not-for-profit basis”¹³ usually serves as a kind of role model. As explained by Krastev, “it is the American environment of policymaking marked by fragmentation and the separation of executive and legislative power, the American distrust for federal bureaucracy, the weak American party system, the American philanthropic tradition, and finally, the American tax regime which made policy research institutes ... into autonomous and influential players. Anglo-Saxon culture, founded upon the power of rational argument, is the proper context for understanding the power of twentieth-century independent policy research institutes in America and Britain”.¹⁴ At the same time, the development of think tanks across the globe makes it clear that think tanks can, and do, operate under alternative conditions. According to Stone, “there are a host of legal, political and economic reasons peculiar to the history and institutional

¹² Dieter Plehwe and Bernhard Walpen, “Between Network and Complex Organization: The Making of Neoliberal Knowledge and Hegemony ” in *Neoliberal Hegemony. A Global Critique*, ed. Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen, and Gisela Neunhöffer, *Routledge/Ripe Studies in Global Political Economy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).

¹³ See James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver, “Think Tanks and Civil Societies in a Time of Change,” in *Think Tanks & Civil Societies. Catalysts for Ideas and Action*, ed. James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 4.

¹⁴ Ivan Krastev, “The Liberal Estate. Reflections on the Politics of Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe,” in *Think Tanks and Civil Societies. Catalysts for Ideas and Action*, ed. James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver (New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 274-75.

make-up of a nation as to why there is no one best model or trajectory for think tank development” and “[t]he notion that a think tank requires independence from the state in order to be ‘free-thinking’ is an Anglo-American norm that does not translate well into other political cultures”.¹⁵ Consequently, according to the so called “middle course definition” proposed by McGann and Weaver, think tanks can be characterized not by independence, but rather by “significant autonomy from government and from societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties”.¹⁶

For the purpose of our account of Polish public policy institutes, we propose to adopt a definition coined by Martin Thunert, who describes think tanks as “non-profit public and private organizations devoted to examining and analyzing policy-relevant issues and producing research outputs in terms of publications, reports, lectures and workshops, in most cases targeted to identifiable audiences with the hope of influencing decision-making and public opinion”.¹⁷

Theoretical concerns (at the margin)

¹⁵ Diane Stone, “Think Tanks and Policy Advice in Countries in Transition,” in *Asian Development Bank Institute Symposium: “How to Strengthen Policy-Oriented Research and Training in Viet Nam”* (Hanoi 2005), 3.

¹⁶ McGann and Weaver, “Think Tanks and Civil Societies in a Time of Change,” 5.

¹⁷ Martin Thunert, “Think Tanks in Germany,” in *Think Tanks Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas.*, ed. Diane Stone and Andrew Denham (2004), 71. Although most think tanks in Poland operate as non-governmental institutions, there are some important analytical institutes with ties to government (such as Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych or Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich) or universities (Ośrodek Analiz Politologicznych UW), which perhaps should not be excluded from the think tank category by virtue of the very functions they perform.

On a side note to the main track of the present article, let us briefly remark that it is always useful to refer to a broader context of expertise, as well as to the knowledge-politics relation, while analyzing think tanks. Experts are namely a kind of “inbetweeners”, who code and decode different forms of knowledge. They make use of two different language codes. The “downward code” is “limited by the low competences of lower circles in the field of formalized interpretation of the world”. The “upward code” is limited by “experts” strong dependency on vivid and imprecise popular language”.¹⁸ Expertise does not equal scientific knowledge. It can instead be understood as knowledge transmitted in advisory processes. It is usually issue-oriented and aims to solve particular problems. Although it is usually scientists who become experts, their role in advisory settings is associated with various difficulties. As remarked by Sheila Jasanoff, “the questions contemporary policy makers ask of science are rarely of a kind that can be answered by scientists from within the parameters of their home disciplines”.¹⁹ The issues that are interesting for politicians are not defined by scientists. Rather, they are the result of the complex and urgent nature of social problems.²⁰ They are “trans-scientific” – although they are questions about facts and can be answered in the language of science, science cannot actually give any answers, as they transcend it.²¹ Thus

¹⁸ Joanna Kurczewska, *Technokraci I Ich Świat Społeczny* (Warszawa Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 1997), 252.

¹⁹ Jasanoff, "Judgement under Siege. The Three-Body Problem of Expert Legitimacy," 211.

²⁰ Steven Yearley, *Making Sense of Science: Understanding the Social Study of Science* (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2005), 161.

²¹ Alwin M. Weinberg, "Science and Trans-Science," *Minerva* 10, no. 2 (1972): 209. After: Yearley, *Making Sense of Science: Understanding the Social Study of Science*, 162.

think tanks are mediating institutions able to cope with trans-scientific questions.

In our analysis of think tanks, we refer to the theoretical framework of boundary work, which allows us to capture the think tanks' dynamic position between the spheres of science and politics (but, also between the media and business). The concept of boundary work was developed by Thomas P. Gieryn, who analyzed the discursive construction of boundaries around science. Gieryn's "cultural cartography" addresses the issue of dynamism in defining (or *mapping out*) epistemic authority, reliable methods and credible facts.²² Being convinced that there are no fixed or given criteria of what is science and what is not,²³

²⁴ Gieryn was trying to track the processes of drawing boundaries and constructing authority of science by its practitioners.²⁵ He underlined that, considering some form of activity, science results in several practical consequences, such as gains in financial resources, prestige and legitimacy. For this reason, scientists are eager to take up activities

²² Thomas F. Gieryn, *Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line* (Chicago; London: Chicago University Press, 1999), 4. According to Gieryn, people having different beliefs constitute different „maps of science“. Each map justifies why science should be considered something special. See Nicola J. Marks, "Opening up Spaces for Reflexivity? Scientists' Discourses About Stem Cell Research and Public Engagement," (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2008).

²³ Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 34.

²⁴ Robert K. Merton, *The Sociology of Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).Rdz.13

²⁵ Marks, "Opening up Spaces for Reflexivity? Scientists' Discourses About Stem Cell Research and Public Engagement," 42.

aimed at enlarging material or symbolic resources, as well as securing their professional autonomy.²⁶

According to Gieryn,

“Boundary-work” describes an ideological style found in scientists’ attempts to create a public image for science by contrasting it favorably to non-scientific intellectual or technical activities. Alternative sets of characteristics available for ideological attribution to science reflect ambivalences or strains within the institution: science can be made to look empirical or theoretical, pure or applied. However, selection of one or another description depends on which characteristics best achieve the demarcation in a way that justifies scientists’ claims to authority or resources. Thus, “science” is no single thing: its boundaries are drawn and redrawn inflexible, historically changing and sometimes ambiguous ways.²⁷

Gieryn’s work has inspired many authors. Whereas his focus was on the ways science is differentiated from other spheres, that is to say, on

²⁶ Thomas F. Gieryn, “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists,” *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 6 (1983): 782.

²⁷ *Ibid.*: 781.

boundary conflicts, authors such as Robert Hoppe and David H. Guston pay more attention to the mechanisms of cooperation (in spite of and because of differences), and to boundary organizations that occupy the space “between” the spheres with clearly demarcated boundaries.

According to Hoppe, boundaries can be drawn in two complementary ways: by demarcation (which is aimed “to protect it from unwanted participants and interference, while trying to ascribe proper ways of behaviour for participants and non-participants”²⁸) and coordination (which “defines proper ways of interaction between these practices and makes such an interaction possible and conceivable”²⁹). Demarcation and coordination are “two sides of the same coin”.³⁰

Guston³¹ enriches the boundary work concept with the idea of “boundary organizations”. As he explains, “first, they provide the opportunity and sometimes the incentives for the creation and use of boundary objects and standardized packages; second, they involve the participation of actors from both sides of the boundary, as well as professionals who serve a mediating role; third, they exist at the frontier

²⁸ Séverine Van Bommel, “Understanding Experts and Expertise in Different Governance Contexts. The Case of Nature Conservation in the Drentsche Aa Area in the Netherlands,” (PhD-thesis, Wageningen University, 2008), 35.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Robert Hoppe, “From ‘Knowledge Use’ Towards ‘Boundary Work’. Sketch of an Emerging New Agenda for Inquiry into Science-Policy Interaction,” in *Knowledge Democracy: Consequences for Science, Politics, and Media*, ed. Roeland J. in ’t Veld (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 10.

³¹ David H. Guston, *Between Politics and Science: Assuring the Integrity and Productivity of Research* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); ———, “Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction,” *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 26, no. 4 (2001).

of the two relatively different social worlds of politics and science, but they have distinct lines of accountability to each^{32,33, 34}.

The concept of “boundary organization” provides interesting insights for the study of expertise, because it underlines the double dependence of experts (and expert organizations) on their principles. According to Guston, the boundary organization must reconcile stability with the demands of its principals in order to succeed.³⁵ Such a type of organization “draws its stability not from isolating itself from external political authority but precisely by being accountable and responsive to opposing, external authorities. Boundary organizations may use co-optation, the incorporation of representatives of external groups into their decision-making structure, as a bridging strategy [...], but they

³² Guston, "Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction," 400, 01.

³³ ———, *Between Politics and Science: Assuring the Integrity and Productivity of Research*, 400, 01.

³⁴ According to Hoppe, “In the quest for best practice, for simplicity’s sake, five conditions or attributes for boundary arrangements can be listed (...): - *Double participation* („people from both the policy/politics and the scientific world are represented and participate in the activities of the boundary organisation or arrangement”); *Dual accountability* („The leadership or management of boundary organisations and arrangements is accountable to representatives of science and politics, simultaneously”), *Boundary objects* („The creation and maintenance of a well-chosen set of boundary objects in generating a ‘world’ in which both scientists and policymakers feel at home and may successfully coordinate their activities”), *Co-production* („robust knowledge/power structures create social and cognitive order using negotiation, confrontation and mediation”), *Metagovernance and capacity building* („This is the cross-jurisdictional, cross-level and cross-scale orchestration of distributed knowledge production). Hoppe, "From 'Knowledge Use' Towards 'Boundary Work'. Sketch of an Emerging New Agenda for Inquiry into Science-Policy Interaction," 22, 23.

³⁵ Guston, "Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction," 401.

attempt to balance it precisely between scientific and political principal".³⁶

Although the above-mentioned theoretical concerns are not central to the present account of think tanks and research findings we want to present at this point, they are certainly useful and can provide much inspiration and guidance in analyzing think tanks within a broader framework of knowledge-politics interface.

Development of think tanks in Poland

Keeping theoretical concerns in mind, let us now turn to the task of sketching a picture of the think tank sector in Poland, in terms of its historical development and current shape.

In the late 1980s, think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe began to develop dynamically. However, some research institutes that could be considered think tanks (in the broader sense of the term) had existed long before the beginning of the process of transformation. Already in the interwar period in Poland, the scope of policy research was quite broad.³⁷

After World War II, policy analysis in all the communist countries of the CEE was monopolized by the government and the respective dominant ideology, although there were several levels of

³⁶ Ibid.: 402, 03.

³⁷ Among others, there were a few renowned institutes that specialized in matters concerning Eastern Europe, such as The Scientific Research Institute of Eastern Europe (Instytut Naukowo-Badawczy Europy Wschodniej) (1930-1939), or Eastern Institute (Instytut Wschodni) (1926-1939); See Marek Kornat, *Polska Szkoła Sowiologiczna 1930-1939* (Kraków: Arcana, 2003).

freedom in the “knowledge industry” at that time. According to Krastev (2000), it consisted of *Academia* (“Heaven”: maximum intellectual freedom), the *Ministerial World* (“Hell”: neither intellectual freedom nor political influence) and institutions affiliated to the *Nomenclature* (“Paradise”: guaranteed political influence, but not intellectual freedom). Policy research was usually conducted either at the government-controlled academies of sciences or at ministry-affiliated research institutes. Some of these units have stood the test of time and operate successfully to this day (for example The Western Institute, Instytut Zachodni).

Among numerous problems that plagued expertise under communism, the lack of broader *agora* for discussing alternative proposals with the wider public was a very important factor. Ideas were thus debated in more or less informal discussion circles, which influenced the climate of opinion among some groups of intellectuals, such as The Club of the Crooked Circle (Klub Krzywego Koła) or Experience and Future (Doświadczenie i przyszłość), although both their independence and influence are disputable.³⁸

When the Solidarity movement broke out, the intellectual ferment gained visibility. Numerous experts engaged in advisory activities for the Union and – for a short time – ideas circulated within enthusiastic segments of Polish society. For example, the so-called Center for Social and Professional Works (Ośrodek Prac Społeczno-Zawodowych) served as an advisory and consulting body of the Union. Its tasks included conducting research, preparing analysis and

³⁸ Andrzej Friszke, “Początki Klubu Krzywego Koła,” in *Zeszyty Historyczne* (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 2004).

prognoses. It produced recommendations on economic and social matters relevant to the leadership of the Union, as well as educational materials and drafts of documents or programs.³⁹ “The carnival of Solidarity” was followed by repression under martial law. However, these ideas persisted and intellectuals from the opposition went on with their conceptual work, paving the way for future reforms. Some of the expert circles that “grew out at the heart of the solidarity movement” went on to become institutionalized as the first independent think tanks in Poland.

An important advisory structure was formed on 18th December 1988 by 135 intellectuals and activists invited by Lech Wałęsa to the The Solidarity Citizens' Committee (*Komitet Obywatelski "Solidarność"*), originally named "Citizens' Committee with Lech Wałęsa" (*Komitet Obywatelski przy Lechu Wałęsie*). Issues covered by 15 specialized commissions that operated within the structure included: unions' pluralism (Tadeusz Mazowiecki), political reforms (Bronisław Geremek), law and justice (Adam Strzembosz), health (Zofia Kuratowska), science and education (Henryk Samsonowicz), culture and social communication (Andrzej Wajda), local government (Jerzy Regulski), and associations and social organizations (Klemens Szaniawski). The Committee formed an intellectual base for the “*Solidarność*” during the Round Table talks and parliamentary elections of 1989. Despite internal conflicts that marked the late period of its

³⁹ Grzegorz Majchrzak, "Ośrodek Prac Społeczno-Zawodowych," in *Encyklopedia Solidarności*, ed. Adam Borowski, et al. (2010).

activities, its role as a repository and generator of ideas for the emerging ruling elites was crucial.⁴⁰

The process of transformation opened the window of opportunity for alternative expert knowledge. Policy research institutions in Poland have entered the public scene as players aspiring both to play and to shape the game at the same time. In fact, they have kept this ambition until today.

Basic characteristics of think tanks in Poland

What does the think tank sector in Poland look like today? In light of my estimation, based upon the analysis of references from directories, books, articles, TV and the internet, as well as the databases of Polish NGOs and scientific institutes, there are over 80 active institutions that, as one can argue, can be labeled as think tanks.⁴¹ To sketch their institutional profile, we will consider the legal, financial and personal factors, as well as the fields of specialization and activities they take up.


Legal status

There is no distinctive legal mold for think tanks in Poland. In fact, as allowed by the broader definition, their legal forms are quite diversified (See: Chart 2).

⁴⁰ Jarosław Szarek, "Komitet Obywatelski Przy Przewodniczącym Nszz „S” Lechu Wałęsie," in *Encyklopedia Solidarności*, ed. Adam Borowski, et al. (2010).

⁴¹ According to Ziętara (and in line with James McGanns' think tank rankings), there are about 40 think tanks in Poland. Ziętara forecasts that their number should reach the level of about 60 in the next couple of years and thus stabilize.

Chart 2: The legal status of think tanks in Poland



Source: own research

85% of think tanks belong to the third sector: 61% as foundations (with such recognizable institutes as Adam Smith Center, CASE, The Gdańsk Institute for Market Economics, Institute of Public Affairs), and 24% as associations (including the Center for Political Thought, Global Development Research Group or the Institute of Geopolitics). The general legal framework for such activities is provided by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. In the 12th Article, it ensures “freedom for the creation and functioning of trade unions, socio-occupational organizations of farmers, societies, citizens’ movements,

other voluntary associations and foundations”.⁴² More specific regulations are provided by The Act of April 6th 1984 The Law of Foundations, and The Act of April 4th 1989 The Law of Associations. However, to decide which of these associations and foundations can indeed be considered think tanks is neither easy nor indisputable.

Another group of think tanks, about 7%, operates within academic structures, as more or less autonomous entities. Examples include Ośrodek Analiz Politologicznych of the University of Warsaw (2010), Centrum Badań nad Terroryzmem Collegium Civitas (2005), and Centrum Badawcze Transformacji, Integracji i Globalizacji TIGER at Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego.

About 6% of the institutions belong to the public sector. These organizations are set up by separate legal regulations and are subjected to various governmental bodies. Most notable examples include the Polish Institute of International Affairs (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, operating under the Act of 20 December 1996⁴³ and a statute⁴⁴). PISM is a state organizational unit with legal personality. The Center of Eastern Studies (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnic), which used to be a state budgetary unit created by the act of the Minister of Economic

⁴² <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm> THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND OF 2nd APRIL, 1997 As published in *Dziennik Ustaw* No. 78, item 483

⁴³ "Ustawa Z Dnia 20 Grudnia 1996 R. O Polskim Instytucie Spraw Międzynarodowych.," in *Dz.U. 1996 nr 156 poz. 777* (1996).

⁴⁴ *Rozporządzenie Prezesa Rady Ministrów Z Dnia 5 Października 2009 R. W Sprawie Nadania Statutu Polskiemu Instytutowi Spraw Międzynarodowych.*

Cooperation with Abroad of 31 December 1990,⁴⁵ has been reorganized under the Act of 15 July 2011 and turned into a state legal body subjected to the Prime Minister.⁴⁶

At the moment, there is just one party think tank in Poland, the Civic Institute (Instytut Obywatelski) – the expert division of the ruling party Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) (although several other parties declare (and used to declare in the past) their will or first attempts to create similar institutes). In 2010, the Civic Platform submitted a bill to the Parliament, which provided for the creation of political foundations. For the time being, political parties may spend up to 15% of budgetary subventions on their expert fund (The Act of 27 June 1997 The Law on Political Parties). However, as there is no obligation behind this possibility, a lot of money is invested in TV advertisements or billboards. According to the bill, parties would have to create foundations and spend 25% of subventions on expert works and seminars. Possibilities for self-promotion would be seriously limited. Although the majority of political parties declared their support for the idea of extending expert activities of the parties, the project has not been accepted by the Parliament, notably due to limiting party subventions as such. Nevertheless, discussions concerning the

⁴⁵ *Zarządzenie Nr 15 Ministra Współpracy Gospodarczej Z Zagranicą Z Dnia 31 Grudnia 1990 R. W Sprawie Powołania Ośrodka Studiów Wschodnich.*

⁴⁶ *Ustawa Z 15 Lipca 2011 R. O Ośrodku Studiów Wschodnich Im. Marka Karpią. See Rozporządzenie Prezesa Rady Ministrów Z Dnia 12 Października 2011 R. W Sprawie Nadania Statutu Ośrodkowi Studiów Wschodnich Im. Marka Karpią.*

possibilities of introducing the system of party foundations have been restarted in the Sejm of the 7th cadence.⁴⁷

Geography of expertise

The geographical distribution of think tanks in Poland is characterized by the prevalent dominance of Warsaw. 69% of organizations are located in the capital. There are also 8% in Kraków, and 4% both in Wrocław and Łódź. The concentration of analytical institutes around decision and media centers is a relatively general tendency. Although information technologies seem to reduce distance, they cannot change the fact that it is important “to be at hand” when new hot issues emerge unexpectedly. In addition, in the age of information overload, decision makers particularly value direct contact with experts.⁴⁸ The argument for developing regional think tanks results from the fact that many decisions that affect citizens to the largest extent are in fact taken at a local, municipal level. Moreover, creating expertise at some distance from capital cities sometimes allows for the consideration of alternative perspectives and the analysis of various subjects from different angles.⁴⁹

Financing

Another aspect that substantially influences the everyday of the think tank sector is its financial structure. The financial standing of think tanks in Poland is still taking form. For a long time, Western donors provided

⁴⁷ Marta Tumidalska, "Po Wraca Do Projektu O Przekazywaniu Części Subwencji Na Think-Tanki," *Polska Agencja Prasowa* 2012.

⁴⁸ See Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, "Doradztwo W Zakresie Polityki Zagranicznej W Rfn," in *Doradztwo w polityce zagranicznej RFN - inspiracje dla Polski*, ed. Anna Łabuszevska and Katarzyna Kazimierska (Warszawa: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2008).

⁴⁹ As underlined by one of the interviewed experts.

new policy research institutes with a substantial part of the necessary funds.⁵⁰ Foreign funding included that from private foundations (such as OSI, Olin Foundation, Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and Ford Foundation), foreign government agencies or entrepreneurial funds (for example USAID, British Know-How Fund), public foundations (K. Adenauer Stiftung, F. Ebert Stiftung, etc.), international organizations (e.g. World Bank, IMF, OECD), and EU funds (structural funds, framework programs for research and development)⁵¹. With gradual consolidation of democracy in the region, some of the original sources of financial assistance “started moving eastwards”⁵² and the EU's share of the funding of think tanks has thus increased remarkably.

Polish research institutions share financial problems that are typical for many think tanks across the world. They operate on a project basis and they usually have to search for funding to cover their core organizational costs. According to Schneider, “If they have limited funds their personnel (researchers) have to be affiliated to either academic institution (university, faculty, academy of sciences) or for-profit institution (consultancy, financial companies). Alternative arrangement means minimal staff with volunteers running a network of certified experts or limited staff on fundraising, project management, public

⁵⁰ Erik C. Johnson, “Central Europe’s Think Tanks: A Voice for Reform,” *Ideas into Action. Think tanks and Democracy*. 3(1996): 10.

⁵¹ Jiří Schneider, “Think-Tanks in Visegrad Countries. (from Policy Research to Advocacy),” (Budapest: Center for Policy Studies, Central European University 2002), 13.

⁵² Juliette Ebélé and Stephen Boucher, “Think Tanks in Central Europe. From the Soviet Legacy to the European Acquis,” in *Think Tanks in Central Europe and Eurasia: A Selective Directory. Third Edition* (Budapest: Freedomhouse, 2006), 18.

relations and information technology (web page) while researchers are hired on specific projects."⁵³

The need for patching up institutional budgets can (and often does) result in unsatisfactory financial transparency. Many think tanks still do not publish any information on their budget and donors. At the same time, it is increasingly suggested that think tanks' policies should not be considered in isolation from the broader framework of donor-recipient relations⁵⁴, especially with respect to foreign policy.

Although much investigation is needed to assess the sizes and structures of think tanks' budgets in Poland, our survey allows us to make a few working observations. First of all, the budgets differ in terms of size (for example for 2010 they ranged from 700 PLN to 8 435 000 PLN; only one organization had a budget near to the average of approximately 192 000 PLN). In comparison, the average budget of a NGO in Poland was 20 000 PLN, as it was for 2009.⁵⁵ Most financial resources reach think tanks through projects contracted by public administration and international organizations. The average volume of public resources equals 37%, although, if one excludes institutions financed solely from the public budget, it decreases to 12%.

⁵³ Schneider, "Think-Tanks in Visegrad Countries. (from Policy Research to Advocacy)," 14.

⁵⁴ See Zdzisław Krasnodębski, "Po Koronacji Obamy," *Rzeczpospolita*, 27.01. 2009; Jan Filip Staniłko, "Między Cynizmem a Wartościami," *Rzeczpospolita*, 24.04. 2010; Jacek Kloczkowski, "Czasy Grubej Przesady," *Rzeczpospolita*, 01.08.2007 2007.

⁵⁵ Jan Herbst and Jadwiga Przewłocka, "Podstawowe Fakty O Organizacjach Pozarządowych. Raport Z Badania 2008," (Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor, 2011), 64.

Insufficient diversification of financial resources, a subject often tackled in literature, is not a major problem for Polish think tanks. Most organizations have at least three alternative sources of financing their activities. The lack of stability seems to be much more important. Most think tanks do not have any financial reserves, which could enable them to operate independently of outside donations, and also to be self-sufficient when the flow of capital is blocked.⁵⁶

This constant quest for money results in paradoxes. As remarked by Krastev, “[s]ome of the most respected East European think tanks exist because of their donors, on behalf of their donors, and for the sake of their donors ... They are inventive in producing proposals, ingenious in producing accounting reports, and professionals in not producing trouble.”⁵⁷ Financial dependency, especially if some of the interests of potential donors are to be addressed in the research, may “turn think tanks into cheerleaders.”⁵⁸ It is indisputably a challenge to reconcile the high level of intellectual production with a time-consuming fight for financing.

Human resources

The task of recruiting experts has posed a considerable challenge for the emerging market of think tanks in virtually all CEE

⁵⁶ Piotr Zbieranek, *Polski Model Organizacji Typu Think Tank* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2011).

⁵⁷ Krastev, "The Liberal Estate. Reflections on the Politics of Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe," 274.

⁵⁸ Tomasz Teluk, "Jak Bruksela Kupuje Intelktualistów," *Najwyższy Czas*, 13. 03. 2010.

countries. Reflecting on the first generation of think tankers in post-communist countries, Johnson cites three main sources of experts: poorly paid researchers from various disciplines who “sought to escape the often stagnant and inflexible academic environment, driven by the hope of playing a more active role in shaping the new institutions and policies of post-communist Central Europe”; members of opposition groups; and “frustrated – or sometimes replaced – officials from government.”⁵⁹ It may be added that, in some cases, the backgrounds of some of the Polish think tankers combined all of the aforementioned characteristics.

The craft of “think tankery” was something to be mastered gradually. Initially, “university-educated researchers in the region often lacked practical training in policy relevant research and analysis [...] They tended to produce lengthy research reports, directed at identifying trends, rather than short, policy-oriented and problem-solving papers.”⁶⁰ Problems in form overlapped with deeper structural problems of a Polish social science still recovering from the torpor of communism. Additionally, the scarcity of financial resources has affected employment policy amongst think tanks and, as a consequence, the output of many institutes: “[r]elying on unpaid expert or unskilled volunteer staff, for example, may have impact on the quality of policy research and advice, but it may also indicate the ability to attract a broad community that is interested in and agrees with the work think tanks undertake or the ideals they promote.”⁶¹

⁵⁹ Johnson, “Central Europe’s Think Tanks: A Voice for Reform,” 10.

⁶⁰ Ebélé and Boucher, “Think Tanks in Central Europe. From the Soviet Legacy to the European Acquis,” 18.

⁶¹ Roland Kovats, “Think Tanks: A Cornerstone of Democracy,” (2000), 7.

Today, think tanks maintain relatively large network of specialists who occasionally participate in concrete projects. In terms of the average values obtained in our survey, one may observe that the base of experts who cooperate with Polish think tanks exceeds 11 (in case of permanent cooperation), and 36 (when occasional cooperation is included). The number who have full-time jobs at think tanks is much lower, as think tanks in Poland hire on average 13 experts and 3 administrative employees.⁶²

There are several factors that explain the dominance of these *ad hoc* forms of cooperation with experts. Primarily, there are some limitations of the spatial and financial nature. It is not possible to maintain a huge staff of experts in think tank offices (if they even have offices). In addition, working on a contract basis is in line with global trends observed on the labor market. Due to high labor costs, many employers avoid employing their staff in established posts. However, there is also one notable, think tank specific factor: to a large extent, their organizational brands rest upon the reputations of the experts they cooperate with. The expert pools of many think tanks include renowned professors, businessmen, (ex)politicians etc. People with such positions do agree to join program councils and to provide analyses from time to

⁶² There are big discrepancies behind these average values: 8 institution do not hire an employees, 9 hire less than 10 employees, 4 between 10 and 20 and 4 employ over 50 experts. In James McGann's research institutions hired between 6 and 1100 experts. See: James G. McGann, ed. *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the Us Academics, Advisors and Advocates* (Routledge,2007), 23. Similarly, in case of administrative staff, the values vary considerably: 10 organizations have no administrative employees, 14 between 1 and 10 and two biggest have 15 administrative workers.

time. Yet, they usually treat think tanks not as a main field of their activities, but as a sort of add-on (except for those situations when the revolving door phenomenon occurs and think tanks serve as an emergency exit after losing another post). At the same time, being a think tank employee is very attractive for younger analysts who are still working for their reputation.

Think tank experts in Poland have varying backgrounds. They usually have experience in science, but also in the third sector, public administration and business. The least common backgrounds include the national parliament and the media.

What criteria are considered to be the most important for taking up cooperation with experts? Answers given in the surveys have shown that a certain mixture of “scientific” and “practical” experiences is most desired (although, as explained by one of the interviewed experts, “it is hard to answer such questions directly, because we conduct over 50 projects a year and different projects require different qualifications”). The elements of this mixture include specific knowledge in a given field, scientific qualifications, practical experience in a given field, and publications. Among criteria labeled as the least important there are political beliefs, experience gained in parliament and local administration (governmental administration is slightly more valued). Additional criteria, suggested by one think tank, consisted of “capacities of analytical thinking and finding access to information”.

Placing political beliefs right at the bottom of the list of criteria considered in the process of recruiting experts provokes questions about translation of such declarations into reality. If think tanks wish to influence politics, then the political and ideological orientations of

experts may play an important role. At this point, it is important to differentiate between the political orientation of a think tank as an organization, and the political beliefs of individual experts who operate under its aegis. The first aspect will be discussed later – we are going to ask if, and to what extent, and to which extent can we talk about clear cut ideological and political profiles of Polish think tanks. As far as the second aspect is concerned, nobody officially asks experts about their political preferences. Many institutions declare in their codes of ethics or guidelines that all politically colored (at times generally all) statements are made by experts on their own, rather than on the think tank's behalf.⁶³ Some think tanks declare that they exclude experts from certain activities the moment they start performing some functions in the public administration or government. However, such preventive steps do not change a simple fact that experts do not exist in a political vacuum. Similar beliefs may attract each other beyond official channels and, over the course of time, take the form of epistemic communities.

The backgrounds of think tank experts, as well as the most important criteria of initiating cooperation with experts, show quite clearly that experts gain their symbolic capital outside the proper field of expertise. One may argue that only securing a high status in a different field (such as science, or public administration) makes it possible to speak authoritatively from expert positions. Another important characteristic of think tank experts, which was underlined both in the think tank's mission statements and in the interviews, can be labeled as “pro-activeness”. It has to do with taking the initiative to search for important

⁶³ For example see http://case.indigo.pl/strona--ID-o_case_kodeks,nlang-710.html

research subjects, attracting the attention of potential publics and the media.⁶⁴

Fields of specialization and activities

Another characteristic that seems to be important for drawing a fuller picture of Polish think tanks concerns the fields of specializations of these organizations. Most popular areas include foreign, economic and social policies (See Chart 2).

Chart 2: Most popular fields of specialization of Polish think tanks

European integration	65,4%
Civic society	57,7%
Foreign policy	53,8%
International relations	53,8%
Civic participation	50,0%
Economic policy	50,0%
Economics	46,2%
Social policy	42,3%

Source: own research

The least popular thematic fields include pathologies of social life and the natural environment (which is quite surprising when we think about how important ecological issues are in public debates and policies). The fact that legal and human rights issues are uncommon is also surprising. Few organizations take up “non-up-to-date” subjects, such as history and political philosophy.

⁶⁴ For example see www.inspro.org.pl

Most institutes operating on the Polish market of ideas have a broad or a very broad spectrum of interests. Just a few organizations specialize in narrow fields. Symptomatic is also a dose of flexibility and willingness to deal with new subjects that politicians, the media and donors are particularly interested in. This last group particularly influences the thematic profiles of think tanks (as admitted by several experts during the interviews). Another remarkable tendency is to take up innovative subjects. Think tanks willingly present themselves as pioneers who discover and popularize niche, but important subjects that otherwise would skip the attention of the media, politics and science.

A further feature of our characteristics is about the activities taken up by Polish think tanks. The spectrum is once again broad. Over 90% of organizations declare that they organize conferences, seminars and other events – both open to the general public, and behind closed doors by invitation only. Over 60% of organizations conduct their own research and publish academic research; almost 50% conduct practice-oriented research, and 56% propose solutions to practical problems. Interestingly, commenting on current events in the media has the same value. These results are interesting in the sense that they contrast with a rather popular image, according to which, conducting and popularizing research, combined with inventing policy solutions, is a key activity and sort of a trade mark of think tanks. In this sense, they confirm Diane Stone's remarks about the limited correspondence between the myths and reality.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Diane Stone, "Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes," *Public Administration* 85, no. 2 (2007).

In the light of our findings, an “average” (or rather “averaged”) think tank in Poland belongs to the third sector, its foundation has a legal status and its headquarters is in Warsaw. Its annual budget is approximately 192 000 PLN. It hires over a dozen experts and a few members of the administrative staff, although its network of *ad hoc* collaborators is much broader. Its main field of analysis includes international relations, and organizing conferences seems to be the most common form of popularizing its findings. However, if one looks beyond statistics, it becomes clearer that the microcosm of think tanks is certainly extremely diverse and – in spite of a few sharks – there is plenty of “expert plankton” which tries to fight for its own survival.

Balancing for identity

The basic picture of the Polish think tank sector presented above can be a good foundation for asking further questions – there are certainly many that can and should be asked. In the following section, we would like to address the issue of “political identity” of think tanks in Poland. Our study shows that unlike many other countries with established think tank traditions, where organizations with clear ideological and political profiles occupy most of the expert scene, the majority of the think tanks in Poland choose to rely on the image of “neutrality”. In the following paragraphs, we are going to ask how think tanks shape and view their own activity “between the world of politics and independent analysis” and will try to interpret their strategies within the framework of the concept of boundary work.

Think tanks can be conceptualized as boundary organizations that draw from different cultural repertoires in order to gain recognition

in the public sphere and to realize their organizational goals. Basic points of reference for think tanks are provided by science and politics. Both on their websites and in the answers to our survey, Polish think tanks have declared that their most important values are scientific integrity, research independence, objectivism and the ability to be apolitical. On the other hand, they have been promoting certain political beliefs and representing social groups. It is quite surprising that the ambition to influence politics has been classified as quite low ,⁶⁶

⁶⁶ The attempt to deepen the issue of influence in the interviews has shown that Polish think tanks – as some interviewed experts put it – “have aspirations but not illusions”, “are aware of their limitations” and “are not driven by ambition of exercising influence but by an intellectual passion”. Some think tanks try to influence legislative and decision processes (for example via preparing and assessing bills, monitoring), however most agree that “cooperation with the public administration is difficult”. Although think tanks in Poland have made important achievements in the field of policy, in the course of the interviews they usually mention just that politicians build on their ideas or cite their formulations (often without referring to the source) from time to time. Most interviewed experts associated influence with being present in the media (“more visibility=better promotion”). In case of important and topical subjects, “the interest may be big” and “there is a chance of influencing the shape of public debate”. At the same time, “it is difficult to initiate a broader discussion”. It is much easier to start a debate among experts. “Improving content-related level of discussion also seems to be achievable”. Zbieranek reaches similar conclusions: “The sector is trying to influence the public opinion in the first line, in the second particular bodies of opinion – scientists, politicians and civil servants. These groups, or, in other words, social actors think tanks concentrate their activities on, create the multidimensional nature of their influence. Firstly, through the sphere of the media the sector shapes the public opinion. Secondly, it tries to reach scientists and create together the scientific and intellectual climate. Finally, it is interested in group that participate in shaping public policies, that is politicians and civil servants”. Zbieranek, *Polski Model Organizacji Typu Think Tank*, 169, 71.

although it is often regarded as symptomatic of think tanks.⁶⁷ Political influence is a complex category that allows for different interpretations. With regard to think tanks, Stone differentiates their three aspects – politically-bureaucratic, social and organizational.⁶⁸

While “bridging” science and politics (in fact, this is one of the most popular images in the mythology of think tanks⁶⁹), think tanks need to look for their own identity. To a large extent, science is a reference point for them. If we analyze the way they do it in terms of boundary work, we may observe that the mechanisms of coordination (dominating in the survey answers), co-exist with a clear demarcation (that also dominates in the interviews).

Ideals (that is: integrity, research independence, as well as being objective and apolitical) and organizational goals (providing the public debate with data, information and knowledge) of Polish think tanks, as well as and most valued experiences and characteristics of their experts, can be considered to be a clear reference to the language and cultural repertoire of science.⁷⁰

Demarcation can be observed at two levels. First of all, interviewed experts underline that think tanks offer a “different” kind of knowledge – expertise that touches upon burning issues, recommends solutions and is implementable. Its language is said to be accessible not

⁶⁷ Donald E. Abelson, *A Capitol Idea. Think Tanks & U.S. Foreign Policy* (Montreal, Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), xv, xvi.

⁶⁸ See Stone, "Think Tanks and Policy Advice in Countries in Transition," 16.

⁶⁹ See —, "Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes."

⁷⁰ Por. Thomas Medvetz, "Think Tanks as an Emergent Field," (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2008).

only to peer-experts, but also to politicians, journalists and the general (though interested) public. Think tanks exceed disciplinary boundaries, cherish all forms of interdisciplinary and are flexible about methodologies and sources they consult.⁷¹

The second aspect of demarcation contrasts the ideal of scientific disinterestedness and neutrality with the think tanks' engagement and commitment to (at times political or ideological) values they want to pursue. Of course, there are different kinds of think tanks: advocacy and academic modes vary with respect to the degree of engagement. The literature on think tanks informs us of a tendency towards ideologization of think tanks' activities. More advocacy tanks have been created during the last few decades.⁷² However, think tanks in Poland – at least in their official presentations – stick to the academic model and heavily draw from the cultural repertoire of science. Only a few organizations openly declare that they represent some ideological or political position. The survey confirms this observation. Only a few think tanks declared themselves to be “liberal” or “social democratic”, or talked about ideas that inspire their activities (at the same time stipulating that they do not influence research outcomes). Most organizations claimed to be “neutral”, “independent”, “apolitical”, or not to have any political or ideological orientation at all.

⁷¹ Such an image seems to fit much of the mode 2 model of knowledge. See Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott, and Michael Gibbons, “Mode 2’ Revisited: The New Production of Knowledge,” *Minerva* 41(2003).

⁷² See R. Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 22, no. 2 (1989).

Another perspective has been revealed in the interviews when experts said that “ideological identification is important” and that “there is no contradiction between vision and knowledge”. It has also been confirmed that think tanks often gather experts with similar convictions (although the channels of selection are rather informal) and form an intellectual base of some political circles. In addition, several experts suggested that “neutrality” and “independence” (declared so important in the mission statements and survey answers) is in fact just a “façade” (of course only in the case of others). On the one hand, interviewed experts underline that “it is possible to declare one’s beliefs in a think tank”, which is “a healthy situation for the audience”. On the other hand, it is “good to hang out banners, but not to wave with them too excessively”. Generally (to use the words of some interviewed experts), Polish think tanks often “pretend that there is no politics”, “experts screen themselves off from politics and just a few make a creative use of the fact of operating in the political reality”, which can be described as a “childhood illness of being apolitical”.

Such diagnosis inspires questions about possible reasons behind it. One can argue that the “neutral” attitude of most Polish think tanks reflects the ambition to create an image of institutions that are reliable due to their intellectual independence. Referring to American think tanks, Andrew Rich considered credibility to be the main capital of these organizations. According to Rich, in the USA, financial independence plays the most important role. Even think tanks with clear ideological or political profiles try to prove their independence from interest groups or

from the state.⁷³ In Poland, the efforts to gain the image of an independent and credible organization do not concentrate on the sphere of budgets, but instead on political affiliations.

Independence in regards to think tanks is indeed complex and contextual. Stone and Ulrich differentiate among its several aspects: legal (independence from state institutions), financial (manifested in diversification of financing sources), and scientific (the freedom to choose research subjects and to conduct research honestly).⁷⁴ Magued Osman and Nesreen El Molla understand independence as “the right of institution to function according to its own normative and organizational principles without external interference”. They argue that “[f]or a think tank, this refers to the degree of self-regulation with respect to matters such as methods of conducting research, recruitment of policy for staff, internal workflow and the management of resources; whether generated from public or private sources.”⁷⁵ They also differentiate amongst several factors of institutional and intellectual nature. Institutional independence is affected by funding modality, a clarified mission statement, internal management autonomy, an enlarged circle of beneficiaries, regulated links with a donor/ international organizations, accountability and external auditing. Furthermore, intellectual

⁷³ Andrew Rich, *Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 12.

⁷⁴ Diane Stone and Heidi Ullrich, "Policy Research Institutes and Think Tanks in Western: Development Trends and Perspectives," *Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute* 24(2003): 7, 8.

⁷⁵ Magued Osman and Nesreen El Molla, "The Politics of Independence. Can Government Think Tanks Act Independently? ," in *International Conference on the Role of Think Tanks in Developing Countries: Challenges and Solutions* (Cairo 2009), 7.

independence consists of setting own agendas, academic excellence and quality assurance, “advisory firewall”, openness and publicity for the image of the building and prestige.⁷⁶

A specific aspect of organizational autonomy is underlined by Enrique Mendizabal, in whose opinion think tanks should be able to decide their political affiliations, ideological stance and supporting parties or persons accordingly to their will.⁷⁷ Mendizabal thinks that in the states where the think tank sector is not well-developed and rooted, such forms of independence may well encounter resistance, although:

*The idea of independence as non-affiliation is damaging for think tanks in developing countries. It leads them to think that the only way of achieving it is to let the research speak for itself avoid any close relationships with political or economic powers, and this can, in some cases, stop them from exploring new ways of fulfilling their missions. Striking the right balance will not be easy -and in some contexts may be well beyond the capacity of the think tank itself- but not trying is not a sign of independence; on the contrary, it suggests that the think tank has its hands tied to one single path.*⁷⁸

Conclusions

⁷⁶ Ibid., 7-13.

⁷⁷ Enrique Mendizabal, "Independence, Dependency, Autonomy... Is It All About the Money?," in *On think tanks* (2011).

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Over the last twenty years, the think tank sector in Poland has been developing and self-strengthening. Various obstacles of financial, cultural or organizational nature do not change the fact that think tanks have become (to be considered) an important voice in public debate and policy making. With this process of transformation, think tanks in Poland have faced “the formidable task of teaching government [as well as the media, academics and business, one might add] who they are and how they can help”.⁷⁹ However, at the same time, they had to – and still have to – answer these questions themselves and for themselves.

While constructing their identity as an organization, the spheres of science and politics serve as the main reference points for think tanks – not only in Poland. They constitute both a backup or reservoir, and a target. Therefore, constant “boundary work”, and the act of balancing between “the scientific” and “the political” takes place. Although each

⁷⁹ Johnson, “Central Europe’s Think Tanks: A Voice for Reform,” 10. However, one could argue that the task was even more challenging and consisted of convincing both politicians and public opinion of the importance of expertise in general. In fact, consulting external expert sources is still regarded as a kind of extravagance or wastefulness in Poland. For example, some time ago the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came under fire for commissioning several think tanks to prepare policy analyses. The fact that diverse institutes were asked to draft parallel proposals evoked surprise amongst TV journalists. The Ministry’s speaker had to explain that diversifying the knowledge base for political decisions may be indeed useful. At the same time, members of state analytic institutions complain about the lack of interest on the part of politicians. Government has no habit of ordering studies or listening to external experts. Although there are sins committed both on the supply and demand side of policy advice in Poland, most of the blame is attributed to politicians and their know-it-all attitude. See Wojciech Lorenz and Tatiana Serwetnyk, “Czy Politycy Zaczną Doceniać Ekspertów,” *Rzeczpospolita*, 26.01. 2008; Wawrzyniec Smoczyński, “Raport O Think Tankach. Myślą I Rządzą,” *Polityka* 2009.

specific organization tries to find its own balance, most think tanks in Poland choose the warning coloration of science-based “neutrality” and therefore avoid any ideological and political declarations.

Although in the collective characteristics of Polish think tanks the “scientific” element seems to dominate the “political” element, the latter is important in terms of gaining influence on politics, but also on policy. As Stone and Ulrich explained it, “Think tanks or policy institutes need to have some kind of engagement with government if they are to succeed in influencing policy. However, their desire to preserve intellectual autonomy means that most institutes try to strike a delicate balance between dependence on government and total isolation from it.”⁸⁰ It is beyond any discussion that the task of “influencing the influentials [...] without being influenced by them”⁸¹ requires a lot of effort. For this reason, think tanks’ independence may be understood as actually keeping an appropriate distance. Too narrow political ties may result in political bias of the research and the loss of autonomy. An excessive distance, on the other hand, may make even the best policy research useless and unused.⁸²

Think tanks are thus doomed to be “politically apolitical”. As Adam Bodnar and Jacek Kucharczyk, two top Polish think tankers put it: “We understand being apolitical as an indispensable distance from political parties and independence from the government. It does not

⁸⁰ Stone and Ullrich, “Policy Research Institutes and Think Tanks in Western: Development Trends and Perspectives,” 7.

⁸¹ Osman and Molla, “The Politics of Independence. Can Government Think Tanks Act Independently?,” 10.

⁸² Eric C. Johnson, “How Think Tanks Improve Public Policy,” *Economic Reform Today* 3(1996): 35.

mean that we dissociate ourselves from the influence on the politics of the public authorities. But we try to do so from independent and expert positions that result from the values – political values as well – related to the mission of our organizations.”⁸³

Due to the fact that think tanks are hybrid organizations⁸⁴ operating at the intersection of various spheres that they are supposed to bridge, their independence needs to be regarded as “managing distance”. On the one hand, “[s]trong connections might limit the intellectual independence of researchers by politicizing their research priorities”, while on the other hand, “too much distance between a think tank and government may result in research irrelevant to policymaking.”⁸⁵ To a large degree, the same can be said to apply to the links with the media or with business.

⁸³ Adam Bodnar and Jacek Kucharczyk, "Romantycznie I Rozważnie," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 19. 01. 2010.

⁸⁴ See Medvetz, "Think Tanks as an Emergent Field."

⁸⁵ Johnson, "How Think Tanks Improve Public Policy," 35.

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The position and role of the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – selected issues

Abstract

The subject of this article is the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. The author discusses about the position and role of the HR, paying attention to the potential conflicts associated with his competences. The last part of this article is about the role of HR as a representative of the European Union on the international stage. It will be presented Catherine Ashton activity in this area, as a HR.

Keywords: High Representative, European Union external relations, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, Treaty of Lisbon

Introduction

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the High Representative, HR) created by the Treaty of Lisbon¹ is a body of the European Union (EU) responsible for carrying out the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy. The responsibilities of the HR were previously held by two separate posts of the European Union: the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner for External Relations. The Treaty of Lisbon puts all of the powers related to common foreign and security and defence policy into one person's hands. The aim was to improve the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of the EU's external action². This holistic approach cannot be efficiently implemented without changes in the EU's machinery and its institutional structures. Personal connection of the High Representative with the Commissioner for External Relations and the European External Action Service (EEAS) made by the Treaty of Lisbon would allow the integration of the security, political, social and

¹ Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007.

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http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0009_en.htm (accessed November 15, 2013). See also: <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ashton> (accessed November 15, 2013); *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era*, ed. Paul James Cardwell, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, p. 6; Beata Przybylska-Maszner, *Spory kompetencyjne wokół urzędu Wysokiego Przedstawiciela Unii Europejskiej do Spraw Zagranicznych i Polityki Bezpieczeństwa*, „Studia Europejskie“, no. 2, 2012, p. 33.

economic dimensions in all foreign policies, from their creation to the implementation and evaluation³.

The post discussed in this article was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam as the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and was occupied by Javier Solana for ten years. It was much more limited in scope than the present one created by the Treaty of Lisbon⁴. There is no doubt that the High Representative with a stronger mandate would increase the EU's diplomatic capacity and strengthen the leadership in the EU's foreign policy. Although the new powers attributed by the Lisbon Treaty to the HR have enhanced the chances of this institution to contributing to this vision, the appointment of Catherine Ashton from the United Kingdom seems to leave space for and the burden of developing this vision in the hands of national leaders. During the first months in office, Ashton has been criticized for failing to boost EU visibility on the world stage on major policy dossiers and for missing key meetings with national ministries. However, political commentators have recognized her strong determination in establishing the EEAS. Thus, whether really she can be regarded as a "name and face" on European Union policy abroad?

Competences and responsibilities of the High Representative

According to the article 18 paragraph 1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the High Representative is appointed for a five-

³ Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth, Bastian Giegerich, *Europe: a Time for Strategy*, „Egmont Paper“, no. 27, 2009, p. 11.

⁴ See: *The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Assessing Europe's Role in the World*, ed. Federiga Bindi, Washington: Brookings Institution Press Washington, D.C., 2010, p. 34-35; Beata Przybylska-Maszner, *Spory kompetencyjne...*, p. 37-40.

year term by the European Council which elects him by a qualified majority voting with an agreement of the President of the European Commission. His choice must be approved by the European Parliament. Term of office of this posts may be terminated in the same way. In accordance with the Article 5 of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions⁵ annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, the term of office of the High Representative is linked to the term of the European Commission.

Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the European Council has appointed Catherine Ashton as the High Representative. Ashton largely unknown to the general public even in the United Kingdom had been previously the European Commissioner for Trade and otherwise had no foreign affairs experience⁶. She was also criticized because of the lack of charisma, experience in diplomacy⁷, language skills and no command of other foreign languages but only English⁸. Even so, Ashton unexpectedly came to the top of the list of the candidates for the HR when she was nominated unanimously

⁵ Protocol on Transitional Provisions, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 159.

⁶ Her appointment to this position was a big surprise, because in the political couloirs and European writings appeared the names of people known from previous political achievements, such as Joschka Fischer or Tony Blair. About controversies related to the appointment Ashton for the position of HR see: Beata Przybylska-Maszner, *Spory kompetencyjne...*, p. 40-44.

⁷ Before being appointed to the post of HR, Ashton was EU Commissioner for Trade (for one year) and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the UK Department for Education and Skills. Unlike Javier Solana, she has little experience in foreign policy and virtually no personal contacts with world's leaders.

⁸ The Telegraph wrote that her appointment was "the most ridiculous appointment in the history of the European Union". See: Johannes Langer, Ashton, *From Zero to Hero*, <http://johanneslanger.com/2013/12/07/ashton-from-zero-to-hero> (accessed November 15, 2013).

by the centre-left leaders who claimed the post⁹. Thus, her appointment can be understood as the unwillingness of the Member States to underpin the strengthened position of the HR by a strong personality.

With respect to the competencies of the HR, as mentioned above, his main role is to conduct the foreign policy of the EU¹⁰. He combine the previous posts of the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations. This “double hat” and “double role” of the High Representative “in some way mirrors the unity of the supranational (Commission) and the intergovernmental (Council) logic of the Union, it combines in one person the European and the Member States’ lines of interest”¹¹.

Drawing on his role as Vice-President of the European Commission, the High Representative ensures the consistency and coordination of the European Union’s external action. He also chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and conducts the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Then, with the support of the European External Action Service, he is responsible for managing, implementing, and representing CFSP decisions. The HR participates actively in the common foreign and

⁹ Andrew Rettman, *Little-known British peer emerges as top candidate for EU foreign minister*, EUobserver, <http://euobserver.com/institutional/29022> (accessed November 15, 2013); Honor Mahony, *EU chooses unknowns for new top jobs*, EUobserver, <http://euobserver.com/political/29024> (accessed November 15, 2013).

¹⁰ See: Iwona Miedzińska, *Wysoki Przedstawiciel Unii do spraw Zagranicznych i Polityki Bezpieczeństwa*, in: *Teoretyczno-metodologiczny wymiar badań nad instytucjami Unii Europejskiej*, ed. Konstanty Adam Wojtaszczyk, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2013, p. 242-243, 254-259.

¹¹ Ingolf Pernice, *The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action*, „Columbia Journal of European Law“, vol. 15 (3), 2009, p. 399.

security and defence policy¹². First of all, he contributes to the development of that policy by submitting proposals to the Council and the European Council¹³. Then (as a representative of the Council) he implements the decisions which has been adopted by the European Council and the Council¹⁴. Secondly, he also has a duty to represent the EU in the international relations. He conducts the political dialogue with third countries and is responsible for expressing the EU's positions, representing the EU in the international organisations (such as the United Nations) and at international conferences¹⁵.

Replacing the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner for External Relations, the HR has also shared their respective responsibilities¹⁶:

within the Council he is responsible for ensuring the consistency and continuity in executing the tasks related to the EU foreign policy. For this reason he chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and building consensus between the 28 Member States and their national priorities, often through monthly meetings of EU foreign ministers;

within the Commission he holds the responsibilities for external relations. Otherwise, he is responsible for ensuring coordination

¹² However, in September 2012, the Daily Telegraph criticised her European Commission attendance record reporting that Baroness Ashton had been completely absent at 21 out of 32 weekly meetings held so far that year.

¹³ Article 18 of the TEU.

¹⁴ Article 27 paragraph 1 of the TEU.

¹⁵ Article 27 paragraph 2 of the TEU.

¹⁶

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0009_en.htm (accessed November 15, 2013).

between the external policy and the other Commission's policies in relation to different EU's services and institutions.

The High Representative regularly has to consult the European Parliament on the main issues related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. He also has to inform the European Parliament about the advancement of these policies. His duties include taking account of the Parliament's opinions. In the matter of conducting peace-keeping missions, conflict prevention and strengthening international security the HR ensures coordination of the civilian and military aspects. According to the article 30 paragraph 2 of the TEU, in cases requiring a rapid decision he has the right to convene (within 48 hours) an extraordinary meeting of the Council as his own initiative or at the request of a Member State. With a very urgent need it may occur faster. Together with the Council, he shall ensure respect for the principles of loyalty and mutual solidarity with the EU Member States in the field of the external relations¹⁷.

However, the High Representative of the Union does not have the monopoly on the EU's external representation. The Treaty of Lisbon also gives the responsibility for the representation of the EU beyond to the President of the European Council but at a separate level and without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative. However, the text does not specify how the work is to be divided between the two allowing practical experience to determine their respective roles. While there has been some criticism of the vague division of powers between the EU's top players, Ukrainian ambassador to the EU Andriy Veselovsky praised the framework and clarified it in his own terms: "The President of the European Commission speaks as the EU's

¹⁷ Article 12 paragraph 3 of the TEU.

government while the President of the European Council is a strategist'. The High Representative specialises in bilateral relations while the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy deals in technical matters such as the free trade agreement with Ukraine. The President of the European Parliament meanwhile articulates the EU's values"¹⁸.

Potential conflicts could occur between the High Representative, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, because the provisions of Treaty of Lisbon are ambiguous with respect to the delimitation of their responsibilities. Institutional tensions could be expected firstly between the coordinating function of the High Representative and Members of the Commission with responsibilities for external policies, and secondly, between the HR and the President of the European Council, which may concern the particular function of the EU's external representation¹⁹. Despite possible conflicts, the Treaty of Lisbon provides a strong institutional basis for a more effective European foreign policy, among others through the creation of the EEAS.

According to the article 27 paragraph 2 of the TEU, the High Representative is assisted in the performance of his duties by the European External Action Service, which cooperates with the diplomatic

¹⁸ Andrew Rettman, *Ukraine gives positive appraisal of new-model EU*, EUobserver, <http://euobserver.com/institutional/29680> (accessed November 15, 2013).

¹⁹ For example these institutional conflicts could occur during the civilian and military crisis management missions, in which the EU is engaged all over the world. See: Julia Schmidt, *The High Representative, the President and the Commission—Competing Players in the EU's External Relations: The Case of Crisis Management*, in: *EU External Relations Law and Policy*, p. 161-180.

services of the Member States. This Service has its legal basis in the Article 27 paragraph 3 of the TEU, but its functioning and organisation are established by a decision of the Council acting on a proposal from the HR. The Council approved the guidelines on the role and functioning of the EEAS in October 2009²⁰, in accordance in which the EEAS is under the authority of the HR. The HR relies on the Service for the preparation of proposals relating to the external policy of the EU and for the implementation of decisions adopted by the Council in this area of integration²¹. The European External Action Service may also be placed at the disposal of the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the other Commissioners for the issues connected with the EU external policy. However, the EEAS is unique and independent from the other EU institutions, formed by merger of the external relation departments of the Council and the European Commission and it also has its own budget.

As mentioned above, there are multiple actors representing the EU abroad: the Presidency in office, the High Representative, the Commission president, and the commissioner charged with external relations, who often present conflicting views. The Treaty of Lisbon would clearly help streamline representation by reducing the number of actors, though it still remains to be seen how many of the new actors work in practice. However, The Treaty of Lisbon bring two main benefits to EU foreign policy: the creation of an EU diplomatic service

²⁰ Presidency report to the European Council on the European External Action Service, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu> (accessed November 15, 2013).

²¹ See: Chiara Cellarino, *The new European External Action Service and the Lisbon call for coherence of European External Action: issues of accountability and scope*, „The Columbia Journal of European Law“, no. 22, 2011.

and the attribution of a “legal personality” to the EU²². This allow the EU to enter into binding treaties, which should clarify and streamline the EU’s ability to make external agreement.

The High Representative on the international stage

Generally, it is widely known about unfortunate start of Ashton’s office, her lack of charisma, experience in diplomacy, lack of orientation in the Eastern Policy, her lack of coordination (for example during providing aid after the earthquake Haiti) and the lack of the determined reaction to social protests in Tunisia, Libya or Egypt²³. She was criticised for not visiting Haiti, after the earthquake of January 2010, and for not having promptly issued declarations enhancing the visibility of her role and of EU foreign policy after the emergence of the Middle East spring. However, it should be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon improves the preconditions for a higher degree of coherence in European external relations and strengthens the EU as an international actor, even if the success of the European foreign policy, still depends to a great extent on the Member States’ ability and willingness to cooperate.

Following the 2010 Haiti earthquake, Ashton chaired a meeting of the foreign relations, development and environment Directorates-General and experts from the Council and the Situation Centre (the EU intelligence-gathering agency). They all agreed on several matters: to

²² *The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Assessing...*, p. 344.

²³ See: Iwona Miedzińska, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, in: *Traktat z Lizbony – wybrane zagadnienia*, ed. Maria Magdalena Kenig-Witkowska, Robert Grzeszczak, Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Absolwentów Wydziału Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2012, p. 171-172.

give an immediate aid of €3 million, to look for further financial assistance, to send personnel to assess the situation and to coordinate pledges from Member States. Ashton also chaired a further meeting of Member States ambassadors and acted as a general coordinator (e.g. contacts from the UN went *via* Ashton). Although she refused to describe it as the first act of the external action service, Ashton did emphasise that it was the first time when such a good coordination between all the various EU foreign policy actors had ever been accomplished²⁴.

However, the majority of the aid relief was dealt bilaterally between Haiti and the individual Member States²⁵ and Ashton was criticised afterwards for being one of the very few foreign representatives not to travel to Haiti personally²⁶. Despite EU ministers steps such as agreeing to deploy European gendarmes to keep peace on the island, criticism was levied at Ashton for failing to improve the EU's international profile during the crisis. Ashton replied stating that "There's been a recognition from the people of Haiti, the United States, the United Nations and others of the extremely important role the EU has played. On the main issue, we should ask, have we tried to save lives, to support the people of Haiti? Yes we have"²⁷.

²⁴ Spain, which held the rotating Council presidency that would have taken charge before the Treaty of Lisbon, took a back seat though assisted, for example by offering use of the Spanish base in Panama.

²⁵ Andrew Rettman, *EU foreign relations chief tests new powers in earthquake response*, EUobserver, <http://euobserver.com/foreign/29266> (accessed November 11, 2012).

²⁶ Honor Mahony, *Ashton under fire for not going to Haiti*, EUobserver, <http://euobserver.com/news/29299> (accessed November 11, 2012).

²⁷ Andrew Rettman, *EU to send gendarmerie force to Haiti*, Euobserver, <http://euobserver.com/foreign/29336> (accessed November 11, 2012).

Criticism continued to mount, including complaints that Ashton skipped a defence meeting in order to attend the inauguration of Ukraine's Prime Minister²⁸, alleged bias towards British officials, that she has no language skills and risked a UK-French feud over creating an EU military planning headquarters²⁹. Notwithstanding, she has been defended by some, including Commissioner Günther Oettinger on the ground that she has had to take on a job that combines three previous jobs and is working on establishing the EEAS so she is unable to take on everything at once, nor please everyone³⁰. Despite early Spanish assistance during 2010, Ashton did find herself competing with the Spanish foreign minister on who was going to be speaking for the EU³¹ and the need to find consensus between the Member States and institutions pushed back the expected operational date of the EEAS from spring 2010 to December 2010³². In contrast to the Spanish position, in

²⁸ Martin Banks, *Criticism of Ashton is 'unfair'*, theParliament.com, <http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/newsarticle/new-commissioner-defends-ashton-amid-unfair-criticism> (accessed November 11, 2012).

²⁹ Ian Traynor, *Ashton defends start in EU foreign policy role*, The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/10/lady-ashton-military-headquarters-brussels> (accessed November 11, 2012).

³⁰ Martin Banks, *Criticism of Ashton is 'unfair'*, theParliament.com, <http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/newsarticle/new-commissioner-defends-ashton-amid-unfair-criticism> (accessed November 11, 2012).

³¹ Andrew Rettman, *Poland to showcase its EU credentials in Brussels extravaganza*, EUobserver, <http://euobserver.com/institutional/30236> (accessed November 11, 2012).

³² Honor Mahony, *Negotiators rush to get EU diplomatic service ready*, EUobserver, <http://euobserver.com/news/30238> (accessed November 11, 2012).

2011 Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski said he would act as Ashton's "loyal deputy"³³.

Secretary General Pierre Vimont joined those defending Ashton from criticism and praised her work during the opening of the EEAS office in Benghazi, Libya, as making the EEAS very popular in Libya. He has also supported her over Syria and asked her to stand for a second term. Polish Minister for Europe Mikolaj Dougielewicz also stated that the criticism against Ashton was "a lot of hot air" and that "she has an impossible job to do and she is doing it well. At the end of her time in office, people will be more positive about what she has done. She will leave a real legacy"³⁴. However, former European Commission adviser Dr Fraser Cameron argued that "the criticism one hears of Ashton is pretty strong and it will be difficult to overcome the bad press she has. It represents a problem for the EEAS, when it comes to public diplomacy, and reflects the system we have for choosing leaders. Too often, the EEAS is waiting until the last member state signs up to the position; they could set out a view much earlier. When you look at places like Egypt - Cathy has been five times, but people are still not quite sure what the EEAS does or who speaks for Europe. The glass is less than half full. I think the criticism of Ashton is down to style and morale in the EEAS is not as good as it should be"³⁵.

³³ Andrew Rettman, *Polish minister pledges loyalty to EU's Ashton*, EUobserver, <http://euobserver.com/pl2011/32580> (accessed November 11, 2012).

³⁴ Dean Carroll, *Catherine Ashton for a second term at the EEAS?*, Public Service Europe, <http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/311/catherine-ashton-for-a-second-term-at-the-eeas> (accessed November 11, 2012).

³⁵ Dean Carroll, *Catherine Ashton for a second term...* (accessed November 11, 2012).

In spite of that, starting from the second half of 2010 the criticism of Ashton died down, however UE is still a great absent in the world's most important matters. Baroness Ashton tends to be only an arranger of the EU Member States relations³⁶. This is due to the fact that the High Representative is responsible for only co-ordinating the EU's foreign policy and building consensus between Member States. The HR's specific powers are largely undefined and are likely to be shaped by Catherine Ashton and the next people holding this post in the coming years. Moreover, actual decisions on CFSP are still made by Member States in the European Council. There was an agreement here that involved the EU in peacekeeping in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Congo in 2003, as well as observer missions in Gaza (2004) and Indonesia (2005). In April 2007, EU foreign ministers agreed to implement sanctions against Iran following its refusal to halt uranium enrichment. In 2008, sanctions were imposed against Zimbabwe following a violent and undemocratic Presidential election, and the EU launched its first maritime operation to prevent piracy off the coast of Somalia. The European Council also issues 'common strategies' on issues about which Members States agree, many as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). These include strategies on promoting democracy and peace in Russia, the eastern Mediterranean and the Ukraine. The EU has diplomatic missions in several important countries, under the authority of the High Representative.

³⁶ She has used this deadline in pronouncement from 12 January 2011 during meeting with the socialist in European Parliament, saying about possible EU's operation on international scene.

However, the criticism of Ashton has stopped, 2013 was a year of changed perceptions on Ashton and her leadership skills, thanks to successes to reach deals between Kosovo and Serbia and most recently her firm pursuit of a deal to curb Iran's nuclear program has won her a lot of good press and history's verdict seems to change about her. Ashton herself has shown the skill to patiently broker this important deal that was considered by many as simply impossible. Her ability to stay on the sidelines has proven an asset in the negotiation room. In May 2012, Ashton was honoured with the BusinessMed Blue Award, which was presented to her in recognition of her efforts in promoting peace and economic development in the Mediterranean region³⁷. Another success Ashton was that she has formally launched the EEAS on 1 December 2010 at a low key event where she outlined the relations with the United States and China, climate change, poverty eradication, crisis management and counter-terrorism as her key priorities³⁸. Her determination in start-up of the EEAS seems to confirm Ashton's preference for institutions rather than for policies, something that may lead her to contribute more to EU bureaucratic rather than security culture.

After more than four years of functioning post of HR's, comments on the appointment of Ashton and her activity on the international stage are still vary. On the one hand, she is referred to as a weak figure because of her lack of visible experience for the post of foreign policy chief. On the other hand, her previous experience as a Commissioner

³⁷ See: <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ashton>.

³⁸ Andrew Rettman, *Ashton names EU foreign-service priorities at low-key launch event*, EUobserver, <http://euobserver.com/institutional/31413> (accessed November 11, 2012).

for Trade may change the working style in the field of the CFSP in favour of a greater consideration of the European interests, because as a member of the European Commission, she worked in the EU's supranational institution and was accustomed to advocate the European idea and European interests³⁹.

Conclusion

With regard to the EU's foreign policy, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced three major institutional innovations: the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the position of the President of the European Council and the European External Action Service. The post of the HR intends to put a "name and face" on the EU policy abroad and help the EU become a capable, coherent and strategic global actor. Thus, with the growing role of the High Representative and his exclusion from the European Council, the national foreign ministers are now uncertain of their role in relation to this institution. At an informal meeting in Finland it was mooted that they could serve as special envoys on the High Representative's behalf. This has been backed by Ashton who said that so long as the EU spoke with one voice it didn't matter who was speaking⁴⁰. These words shake

³⁹ Kateryna Koehler, *European Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as an International Actor*, „Caucasian Review of International Affairs“, no. 4(1), 2010, p. 67.

⁴⁰ Honor Mahony, *EU foreign ministers ponder their post-Lisbon role*, EUobserver, <http://euobserver.com/institutional/29676> (accessed November 15, 2013). By the contrast, while he was presenting his European Security Strategy as a High Representative Solana noted that "Une Europe plus forte dotée d'une vision stratégique commune, c'est aussi une Europe capable de consolider ses

the purpose of the reform introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. They show that the High Representative is not and in the nearest future will not be somebody that Henry Kissinger was waiting for: the one it will be possible to call to asking about the position of the European Union. It is still not a phone number to talk to Europe.

As is apparent from the above, in this area of integration Member States are united only in a theory but in practice they are still strongly divided. The differences among them are to some extent unavoidable because each Member State has its individual history that affects its interests and national foreign policy which are in these conditions repeatedly hard to reconcile with other Member States and the EU's institutions. This leads to the general conclusion: the EU will continue to be "an economic giant and at the same time a political and military dwarf"⁴¹ in international relations. Thus, even more harmonisation between national foreign policies needs to be done to have a coherent and effective EU foreign policy. Firstly, they were consistent with the objectives of protecting EU citizens and external representation. Ashton as a HR represented the EU position at several occasions, even though this position was due to manifold different opinions of the Member States not always easy to define. However concrete decisions, e.g. sanctions, lead to a minimal common position, which was represented externally.

relations à la fois avec les autres grands acteurs (...) et avec les autres grandes organisations".

⁴¹ Dariusz Milczarek, *Foreign and security policy – a challenge and a strategic choice for the European Union of the 21st Century*, in: *EUROPE – The Global Challenges*, ed. Antoni Kukliński, Krzysztof Pawłowski, Nowy Sącz: Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu National Louis University, 2005, p. 138.

Ashton is able to do so with “quiet diplomacy” in the world’s hot spots. In comparison to her activist predecessor Javier Solana, she deliberately sought a much lower profile as the EU’s first foreign policy chief. However, in diplomacy sometimes it is more important to be silent and rather manage the process. Although she might not say so much as others, people close to her say that she can sum up, synthesize and put forward ideas for the next step – all what doing a good diplomat, also on the highest level. Despite the improvements of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can still only provide mechanisms to facilitate consensus when it comes to CFSP. Eventually, the High Representative works with the mandate provided by the Member States: he can encourage them consensus, but he cannot force it on them.

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