


# Polish Journal of Political Science



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# **Polish Journal of Political Science**

## **Volume 1 Issue 2**

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**Paula Olearnik-Szydłowska**  
Akademie Ignatianum

Is democratic transnational sovereignty possible?  
An analysis of sovereignty in the context of EU integration.

**Abstract:**

This paper examines how the Eurozone financial crisis of 2011 impacted the possibility of the future of European integration. It examines the reactions of *Europe's political elites to the crisis through the lens of Jürgen Habermas's philosophical work on the subject of transnational democratic sovereignty. More often than not decisions made in Brussels have been made on the basis of the national interest of member states and conducted in a highly undemocratic fashion. This has provoked a backlash in many member states by people unhappy with the constant lack of consultation on crucial matters, leading to fears that the world's first transnational democracy may in fact be giving way to the first 'post-democratic' form of political union.*

**Keywords:** *Transnational democracy, EU integration, pooled sovereignty, Eurozone crisis.*

## Introduction

The EU has long been considered an unfinished endeavour, however events such as the Eurozone financial crisis of 2011 and Prime Minister David Cameron's promise to hold an in/out referendum on Britain's future membership have prompted increasing scepticism about the viability of 'pooled sovereignty'. In recent years we have seen an increased polarization of popular opinion on the possibility of democratic transnational sovereignty. Some argue that what is required is deeper integration of the federalist kind; others a restoration of powers and decision making authority to member states. What has become apparent is that the current state of the relationship is unsustainable. Cohabitation, in other words, is no longer feasible - either we get married or we break up.

In his most recent work on the subject, Jürgen Habermas draws our attention to the same phenomenon: 'Defenders of the nation state are seeing their worst fears confirmed and are now barricading themselves more than ever behind the facades of state sovereignty... on the other side, the long-mute advocates of the 'United States of Europe' have again found their voice.' (Habermas, 2012, viii-ix). The major problem, however, for those who want to retreat to state sovereignty is that they have lost the support of the business and banking community whose interests are in both the common market and the single currency. The dilemma for those calling for a federal state is that they have not yet achieved the primary task of European integration. Thus their vague federalism becomes an arbitrary self-authorization of the European Council and an intergovernmental undermining of the democracy they claim to promote.

The main problem with the current set up, according to Habermas, is that in order to achieve cohesion in the European Union and prevent a collapse of the eurozone the leaders of the 'core' nations - France and

Germany – have taken it upon themselves to make decisions in an executive and highly undemocratic fashion.<sup>1</sup> Policy-making by the people and the citizens of Europe is all but non-existent. The reactions of Europe’s political elites to the financial crisis – regardless of whether they have called for repatriation or further denationalisation – has been primarily motivated by national interest and highly undemocratic in its approach. In fact it has often provoked a backlash in the member states by people unhappy with the constant lack of consultation on these matters. Habermas rightly fears that the ‘world’s first transnational democracy’ may be giving way to the first ‘post-democratic’ form of political union (Rabinbach, 2012,1).

The question with which we task ourselves therefore is, is the kind of transnational sovereignty that was envisioned for the EU indeed possible, and if it can be reconciled with democracy or does democratic sovereignty require the vehicle of the nation state?

### **Transnational Democracy**

Habermas’ own proposition is worth extended consideration. He proposes a vision of Europe based not on the current form of ‘executive federalism’ but on ‘transnational democracy’. (Habermas, 2012, 12) He further argues that the EU of the Lisbon Treaty is closer to this model than might be assumed at first blush. And yet, he believes that the financial crisis and the problems besetting the single currency will not be resolved unless there is significant revision of the Treaty, which extends political decision-making capabilities beyond the nation state, and a significant change in mentality.

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<sup>1</sup> ‘the politicians have long become a functional elite. They are no longer prepared for a situation in which the established boundaries have shifted, one which cannot be mastered by the established administrative mechanisms and opinion polls but instead calls for a new mode of politics capable of transforming mentalities.’ (Habermas, 2012, x)

His proposal is alluring. It envisions a Europe which has enough power and legitimacy to make and enforce political decisions but one which is robustly democratic and takes seriously both its citizens and its peoples. Although you would be forgiven for not noticing them due to the typically Habermasian language, there are distinct echoes of the American Founding. The challenge for the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention was to create a government that was both energetic and limited - one that charted a course between the twin perils of ineffectiveness and tyranny.<sup>2</sup> The Europeans, in addition to balancing efficiency with freedom, must confront a further difficulty - building a union in which sovereignty is pooled or shared at the transnational level.

Transnational, at least as Habermas uses this term, ought to be distinguished from international, multinational or multicultural. Multinational or multicultural refers to people of different nationalities, ethnicities or cultures occupying the same space - i.e. city or state - but typically under a dominant mainstream culture or overarching national identity. America is a prime example of such a phenomenon. International, in this context, denotes cooperation between two or more states in a joint endeavour but without a sense of common identity. Here one may think of the United Nations or NATO. The essential feature of transnationalism however, is that it goes beyond the purview of the nation state; citizens deliberate on political decisions from a cosmopolitan standpoint or, at least, a 'europolitan' one.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For more on this see Federalist Papers No. 10, No.51 and No. 47. In the general introduction to *The Federalist* Alexander Hamilton argues that the greatest problem the new United States were facing was their lack of efficacy, so great, in fact, that it threatened the Union's existence. 'After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, [the people] are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution of the United States of America.' Hamilton (2003, 27)

<sup>3</sup> The full implications of a transnationalism are never explicitly stated by Habermas but one feature that is quite evident is that under this new political arrangement the conceptions and praxis for the distribution of state authority would be in the tradition of Kant's Federation of Free States as set out in *Perpetual Peace*. Kant (1996, 102)

Despite the financial crisis and the reactions of the political elites towards it, Habermas affirms his commitment to a cosmopolitan Europe, a democratic government that is uncoupled from the nation-state (Habermas, 2012, 14). Although it would require some significant alteration from its current form, the EU could still become a prototype for a 'constitutionally sanctioned cosmopolitan order.' (Rabinbach, 2012, 4) Moreover Habermas assures us that this is not a dream of a utopian visionary, but the credible proposal of a realist.

<sup>4</sup> But what is this cosmopolitan vision precisely?

Its most salient feature is that the order it wishes to build is based on international law, which is constructed on the foundation of universal values respecting human dignity and the upholding of human rights.<sup>5</sup> This rule of law takes priority over any other interests or attachments. What does this mean for the European Constitutional Project? Habermas is enough of an idealist to imagine the incarnation of a cosmopolitan Europe as more than just a loose confederation of states or a restrained common market, but he is also enough of a realist to appreciate that the ambitious project of a unified Europe cannot take the form of a simple federal state.<sup>6</sup> Some measure of autonomy is due to the member states, but it is afforded them quite reluctantly. According to Habermas the principle of subsidiarity would safeguard state autonomy but it would do so 'for the sake of protecting their historically shaped socio-cultural and regional distinctness' and not 'because these entities are needed as the guarantors of the equal freedom of citizens'. (Habermas, 2012, 42).

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<sup>4</sup> Habermas adds the important point that this uncoupling is not only possible, but it is increasingly necessary because of the systemic constraints on nations. In other words, issues such as finance, the environment and technology can no longer be dealt with at the level of the nation state. See Habermas (2012, 35).

<sup>5</sup> The hallmarks of Kant's *Perpetual Peace* are unmistakable here. For Habermas' most sustained discussion on the issue see Chap. *The Concept of Human Dignity*. Habermas (2012, 71-100).

<sup>6</sup> Habermas is the first to admit that member-states, and not populations, have been the drivers of the constitutional treaty. Moreover given the acute awareness of the different cultures and histories of the member states, the actualization of the cosmopolitan vision in Europe requires their continued autonomy.

Ultimately, Habermas envisions the EU as a stepping-stone, a necessary intermediate institution, to true cosmopolitanism – i.e. world citizenship. Given the ‘realistic’ nature of his utopianism, he admits that a world government would be very different from any other kind of union in that it would be necessarily non-delimitating. Its all-inclusive nature would necessarily limit the scope of its activity, but, he nevertheless assigns it with the following viable tasks: maintaining international peace and internal order within states, the enforcement of human rights and the carrying out of humanitarian interventions. (Habermas 2012, 63 and Habermas 2009, 109-129).

Practical considerations aside – and these are not insignificant – there are serious questions about the desirability of such an arrangement. The cosmopolitan vision as presented above works on the assumption of the universality of human rights. It repudiates cultural exceptionalism.<sup>7</sup> But whilst it is clear that many countries simply use the concept of national sovereignty as a shield behind which to hide their abuse of human rights, equally, one cannot deny the number of moral issues over which there is no consensus, and over which supporters on both sides have a reasonable claim to be defending human rights.<sup>8</sup> *Pace* Habermas there is a very strong reluctance amongst philosophers in defending human rights claims in terms of cross-cultural moral absolutes – more common is the Rawlsian position that there can be reasonable disagreement on the moral matters, or the Rortyan position that they are culturally contingent. However this lack of philosophical justification is coupled with an ever-growing list of rights demanding codification in the international law and its protection.<sup>9</sup>

The fact is that what counts as a human right – even the most basic ones like the right to live and to maintain the body integrity – is hugely contested.

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<sup>7</sup> For more on this issue, see Franck (2001).

<sup>8</sup> Even leaving aside more controversial cross-national differences, one can think here of the highly contentious ‘culture war’ issues that divide co-nationals such as abortion, euthanasia and gay marriage.

<sup>9</sup> For a critical analysis of this see, Mary Ann Glendon (1991).

And it is disingenuous to assume that a world parliament could straightforwardly be charged with the enforcement of these rights. Firstly, because there is significant disagreement about them. But secondly because it is difficult to imagine how the requisite public deliberation on these contentious issues could occur in a transnational context. Many rightly fear that for the sake of efficiency the democratic process would be by-passed and the matters would be solved by elites. And it is not difficult to imagine how this decision-making and enforcement could become the source of grave injustice itself. Indeed this is precisely the *modus operandi* that we see in practice in the EU at the moment and of which Habermas is so critical. This prompts the deeper question: is transnational sovereignty compatible with democracy or are the two mutually exclusive?

### **Shared National Culture Revisited**

Leaving aside the larger issue of a world parliament - is it behoves us to consider whether transnational sovereignty can be democratic even in the more limited European context. Reaching consensus in a global context, even on the most basic norms and beliefs, is fraught with difficulty. Perhaps something as basic as protecting innocent human life could be agreed, but as the number of rights and norms elevates the number of citizens engaged in democratic deliberation on them, it seems, must reduce it (unless of course we are willing to dispense with the democratic element).

To determine whether transnational democracy - rather than empire, federation or commonwealth - is possible, it requires a return to the debate taking place a decade ago. That debate focused on whether European-wide democracy presupposed a shared cultural identity, understood as a common ethnicity, religion, language, history and/or set of traditions. The debate between liberal nationalists and cosmopolitans is not confined to the European context; the issue of global justice - what we owe and are owed by those who

are not our co-nationals – is of continued global significance.<sup>10</sup> However, it was undoubtedly precipitated and intensified by practical considerations concerning European enlargement at the end of the 1990's. And whilst it is beyond our present concern to address the entirety of this debate, it befits us to respond to the following question: is the forming of a common European identity necessary for the success of the EU project, and if so, how can that task be achieved?

In 2002 Arash Abizadeh criticized four major arguments of liberal nationalists regarding the necessity of a shared national culture. He claimed that this repudiation showed that 'Europe's democratic deficit is not the inevitable concomitant of national heterogeneity' (Abizadeh, 2002, 508). Like Habermas he does not deny a democratic deficit, but it does not imply the fact that a transnational form of government can only function efficiently on a 'bureaucratic-gubernatorial model' (Habermas, 2012, 20). Or, to put it inversely, it is not the case that democratic sovereignty can only work where there is a shared national culture.

Many of Abizadeh's arguments are convincing. Examples of multi-cultural states such as Canada or Switzerland not only show that democracy can function where there are different identities – indeed even Miller is willing to concede this – but that these different identities do not need to share norms or beliefs to motivate non-strategic action. It is enough that each group has some norm or belief to motivate their actions, these do not have to be shared or overlap. What is necessary, in other words, is compatibility not consensus (Abizadeh, 2002, 500). Indeed he agrees with Habermas' notion of 'Constitutional Patriotism' according to which ethnicity and nationality can be by-passed altogether; citizens can identify with their polity thanks to what they

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<sup>10</sup> The thesis that liberal democracy is only viable against the background of a single cultural nation finds its classic statement in Miller (1995) and Barry (1991, chap. 6)

take to be the rationally defensible principles its institutions embody (Habermas, 1998).

The paradigmatic example of constitutional patriotism would seem to be the United States. And yet there are some important differences between it and the European Union:

- i) In the case of the United States there was an external enemy – Britain – which acted as a unifying force for the former colonies, and
- ii) Patriotism required its own myth-making around the Constitution. It was not just about rationally defensible principles but the employment of the traditional state-building apparatus of heraldry, holidays, hymns and heroes.

In this sense Miller is right that you cannot have a successful democratic sovereignty unless citizens do exhibit *some* of their affection for the country or political organization. It does not entail that you cannot have multi-ethnic nations or cultural diversity, but as Rabinbach puts it:

‘Citizens do not have to ‘feel’ that they belong together culturally or ethnically to act in a democratic manner and experience solidarity with their neighbours, especially beyond their borders. It is enough that they share a common set of ethical and civic values and participate in a set of institutions that enable them to communicate and debate’ (Rabinbach, 2012, 4).

Assuming he is correct, we are still left with two unanswered questions. First, do Europeans share enough of a common set of ethical and civil values; second, can they communicate and debate sufficiently well in order to participate in a common set of institutions in order for transnational sovereignty to work? Let us address the second question first. Language and communication pose a significant challenge in the European context. Abizadeh is correct that it is not insurmountable – people can and do communicate with one another successfully especially at the elite level. But, there is a high cost in terms of time and resources and much still gets lost in translation. Moreover

although all 23 official languages of the EU are accepted as working languages, in practice only three are used: English, French, and German. Of these, English is the most common (European Commission, 2006).

Although Abizadeh rightly argues that it is not unreasonable to require people to be fluent in more than one language, the fact remains that one is always most competent in his or her mother tongue – and learning 23 languages – even at a basic level of fluency is, frankly, too much to ask of anyone. The result therefore is that there are only three procedural languages in the EU, of which English is the foremost. Others are therefore required either to learn or to translate into that language. This goes to the heart of whether equal communication between citizens is possible if they do not speak the same mother tongue.

In *English: Meaning and Culture* linguist Anna Wierzbicka makes the compelling case that the English language is itself highly culturally specific and not the neutral carrier of information we often think it is. There are terms which are used universally such as ‘good’ ‘rational’ and ‘just’ whilst certain other concepts are highly culturally specific and are not even found in other European languages which after all share a similar intellectual history. For example the concepts of ‘right and wrong’, ‘reasonableness’ and ‘fairness’ – all central to contemporary liberal theory – do not appear in any language other than English! (Wierzbicka, 2006.) The ‘procedural’ languages in other words, impose their own worldview on others who do not share it and may not even fully understand it.

This is not to suggest that we should revive Esperanto, but the problem of the primacy and cultural dominance of certain languages and cultures in the EU needs to be addressed. This cannot be done solely via regulation – for example by requiring every European Member of Parliament to speak a non-core EU language in addition to the procedural ones. However both the mass

media, as well as cultural and educational institutions could do much more to facilitate public debate in the native languages of EU members and the voices of these debates could be represented in the EU Parliament and Commission.

As for the question of ethical and civic values – there is much evidence that Europeans do indeed share many of them despite other cultural differences. This is true both at the level of citizens and elites (Risse, 2010, 41-61). More precisely, Risse argues that there are two competing versions of what constitutes European ethical and civic values but these are increasingly being drawn around ideological lines – conservative and liberal – rather than national ones.<sup>11</sup> In this sense Abizadeh is justified in dismissing a simplistic version of liberal nationalism, which demands a shared culture or nationality as a prerequisite to ‘nonstrategic social action’ (Abizadeh, 2002, 499).

All political organization is ultimately regulated by the will of its participants, and as such, nothing about it is inevitable or impossible. In other words, there is no *a priori* reason why democratic sovereignty needs to be restricted to the nation state. Historically, liberal democracies have arisen in the setting of the nation state whilst transnational forms of government – empire, commonwealth, federation or totalitarian regime – have been non-democratic.<sup>12</sup> But in principle there is no reason why democratic institutions can only work successfully on the level of the nation-state. But what is also clear is that *something* is needed to bind people together. Something is needed to prompt people to organize themselves into a particular political union and to provide them with a sense of identity that can motivate civic participation.

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<sup>11</sup> Although it is worth noting that Risse’s framing of the cleavage as being between i) secular, modern, liberal Europe and ii) xenophobic and nationalist Europe is far too simplistic a division, and itself an ideologically charged one. For more on this see especially (Risse, 2010, 6-10, 50-53, and 228-242).

<sup>12</sup> One might point at the United States as an exception being from its inception a form of political organization that combined liberal democracy with federation. However the federalism of the United States is something of a misnomer (to which those familiar with the federalist-anti-federalist papers can attest). The fact is, that although there was power-sharing between the states and the federal government; there is no question that America, like other modern democratic countries fits firmly into the nation-state model.

In the final analysis the cosmopolitan-liberal nationalist debate has focused on the entirely wrong question. Instead of wondering whether democracy necessitates a shared national culture, they should have been asking what can act as a binding agent, the one that is sufficiently strong to motivate individuals to act even against their own immediate self-interest. More specifically, which factor can Europeans unify around in order to create a long-lasting, prosperous and just political order?<sup>13</sup>

### **Binding agents**

First of all it must be stated that union is not the same as integration, a distinction which both theorists and politicians often fail to recognise. Union is about creating something new, something that is not simply subsumed into one organism, but which has been enriched with new features. The best unions are the ones which do not destroy what was formally there but which raise their component parts to a higher pitch of existence. This is a challenge that faces political unions. In the case of a supranational structure like the EU the objective for the members states is to retain their sovereignty and yet be wed into a single entity. Political unions, like all human relationships, can simply be a result of mutual egoism. The parties can agree to enter the relationship as a way of receiving advantage and furthering their own material self-interest, but that kind of unity it seems has a tendency to unravel when the circumstances become difficult.

This exact mechanism can be observed in the reactions of German and Greek populations after the financial crisis – when things started to go wrong it

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<sup>13</sup> There is also the more practical question of the actual model European unification should follow. Two prominent examples examined by Jan Zielonka are i) Europe as a superstate of the Westphalian kind and ii) Europe according to a neo-medieval paradigm – polycentric government, fuzzy borders, cultural and economic heterogeneity and divided sovereignty. (Zielonka, 2006.) These cannot be considered at present, but it is worth noting that the question of identity alone does not solve the practical issue of the precise form European integration should take – although nuances in identity may indicate what should be taken into account when considering form.

was clear that the motivation for entering into the eurozone was primarily one of self-interest and the hope of comparative advantage. The harmony between the nations lasts for as long as the mutual benefit, now that it seems to be over, many are wondering whether there is anything worth saving. If they are trying to salvage the euro, it comes only out of fear that they will have more to lose without it, than out of a concern for the common good. The point is, if the overriding 'unifying' factor of EU countries is simply the promise greater economic prosperity, or even greater prominence on the world stage, then there is nothing to hold these nations together in the long run or in times of crisis. Mutual instrumentalism can be profitable, even for an extended period, but even in the most favourable of circumstances it creates an atmosphere of fear and insecurity. Weaker nations fear that they will be taken advantage of, stronger ones that they will be inconvenienced. If circumstances change, not to mention if either of the parties acts irresponsibly, each will go their separate way.

But if a stable union requires commitment, what basis can that commitment be made on? What is it about Europe that can encourage its citizens to care about the good of the other member states and the good of the whole in a non-instrumental fashion? This leads us back to the question of identity. Only once we see ourselves as parts of a greater whole – like a family or a nation – when we can commit ourselves to a union that may even call for self-renunciation. Only then we can truly speak of transnational sovereignty. What is such an identity for Europeans? Again it appears that we have to contend with two competing visions.

The first is afforded by Habermas. Political and national identities often command authority due to their alleged naturalness when in fact, he says, they are invented. A European identity, he further argues, should be constructed in the cold hard light of day. This 'construction' would then not suffer from the stigma of randomness or arbitrary choice but would be the rational and self-conscious appropriation of a multiplicity of historical experiences. (Habermas,

2003, 295). To put it simply – we can create a European identity by selecting from the array of historically available candidates. And of the potential aspirants Habermas chooses secularism and the welfare state.

Although there may be causes to regret the personal decline of faith or its privatization in other respects, Habermas maintains that the state's neutrality regarding worldviews (especially the religious ones) is not only a cause for celebration but it is also one of the factors that can consolidate European identity. Similarly, the idea of a welfare state, which guarantees social security and regulates on the basis of solidarity, is one of the most successful features of Europe. The notion of a welfare state is a response to the conflict between different social groups and an institutionalization of tolerance and a 'reciprocal acknowledgement of the Other' (Habermas, 2003 294).

A different vision of European identity is discernable in the writings of Czech dissident, playwright and politician Vaclav Havel. Havel believes that the only sensible task for Europe in the upcoming century is not to create a new identity, or to impart its culture to the rest of the world, but to 'be itself at its best, which means to revive its finest traditions' (Havel, 1996). And what are these traditions, these shared values? They are not as difficult to discern as it may appear at first: respect for the dignity of every human being, for democracy and political pluralism, for a market economy, the principles of civil society and the rule of law (Havel 1997, 128). These values, he contends, are the result of Europe's intellectual and spiritual heritage – itself it is the product of classical antiquity, Judaism and Christianity as well as 'thousands of years of coexistence, the intermingling of traditions and vast historical experience, both good and bad.' (Havel 1997, 128).

For all the surface similarities, the grounding of a European identity advocated by Habermas and Havel could not be more divergent.<sup>14</sup> Habermas approaches European history like a pick and mix out of which an identity can

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<sup>14</sup> For an argument similar to the one made by Havel see Reale (2003).

be created by selecting the most desirable elements. For Havel, European identity is already given – it is a totality comprised of both good and bad. Where Habermas speaks of rational construction, Havel prefers the notion of cultivation. Cultivation requires a certain acceptance of the ‘given’, the organic and the non-arbitrary chemistry between certain elements, but at the same time it allows ample scope for free, rational activity – nurturing the good; rooting out the bad.

The bad, according to him, is the old Herderian idea of the nation-state as the highest expression of national life. Today we don’t see that nationalism played out in the desire for territorial expansion, but the propensity for petty, self-interest – certainly. The good is ‘national autonomy within the framework of a broad civil society created by the super national community’. (Havel, 1997, 130).

## **Conclusion**

How does this relate to the question of whether transnational sovereignty is possible? It seems that both Havel and Habermas think that it is, and I am inclined to agree, but only if one very important condition is met – namely that there are strong, lasting and non-instrumental values which bind the agents – or in this case European citizens – together. This condition is very difficult to meet. More difficult than in case of building sovereign nation states. This is not to say that it is impossible, but certainly the Havelian route seems a firmer direction – to this author at least – than the Habermasian one. However until some form of consensus is reached it is difficult to imagine a successful form of transnational sovereignty in the European context. The true verification of this will come in times of crisis – financial or otherwise – to see whether Europeans wish to stay bound together in union when their national interests seem to pull them in the direction of separation.

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## Explaining China's Behavior in Keystone International Financial Institutions: Learning, Adaptation and Reshaping?

### **Abstract:**

Over the last three decades, China's participation in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the IMF has gone through three stages of: initial participation; steady development; and partnership . Over this time China has definitely become more engaged in the international financial institutions; become a great player in international affairs, and changed its role from recipient to contributor; from receiving technical assistance to sharing experience; from borrowing loans to being co-lender;. Why China has changed its attitude and behavior towards the World Bank and the IMF and will China effectively influence reconstruction of the international financial system? This paper explores to answer these questions from the perspective of three international relations theories of: structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. There will be three hypotheses tested in the process, which cover the whole process of China's engagement in the international financial institution over more than 30 years. There will be two case studies conducted to this end, the first of which regards China's protest against the 2007 IMF surveillance. The second case is about voting-power reform of the IMF and the World Bank, which attracted attention around the globe. The overview of China's engagement in the two organizations and the two cases shall fully test the three hypotheses. This paper argues that in the initial period, neoliberal institutionalism can better explain the interaction between China and the World Bank, and the IMF. In the last century, China's proactive behavior can be better explained from structural realist and constructivist positions, focusing on China's rising economic power, and redefined identity and interest. Nonetheless China will remain within the system, and will not attempt to overthrow it. In the meantime, China will probably contribute to constructing other institutions to push for the reform of international financial institutions more effectively.

**Keywords:** China, international financial institutions, reform, voting power, decision-making.

## **Introduction**

Since its opening up in 1978 China began to engage more in international organizations. In 1980, China joined the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (the IMF), two vital international organizations within international financial system, one of which is to provide loans to developing countries while the other is to stabilize the global financial situation by the means of surveillance. China began to learn and adapt to the international norms, receive technical assistance, and launch programs, which demonstrated that China was no longer that self-reliant as before. Nonetheless at that time, because of its limited level of development, China was more of a recipient, beneficiary, and observer in most international organizations.

Over the past three decades, China's economy has been developing with an unprecedented speed, especially in the 21st century. In 2010 China became the world's second largest economy, overtaking Japan. It overtook Germany as the largest exporter in 2009. China is also the world's biggest holder of foreign reserves. Even during the global financial crisis between 2007 and 2009, China still kept the GDP growth at 9.1% and 10.3% in 2009 and 2010 respectively. As the main contributor to the world GDP growth China has definitely become a driving force for the global economy. Some major powers invited China to contribute more and play a greater role in global economic governance. With its rising influence, China has been more active and playing a greater role in regional and international affairs. Moreover, its action in international system attracts more attentions nowadays.

## **I . Literature Review**

The earliest book on China and the international financial institutions is the "China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT: Toward a Global Economic Order" written by Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg in 1990. They analyzed mainly the period between China's accession into the two

institutions until 1989. The authors divided the process of interaction between China and the IMF, and the World Bank into three stages: initial participation; mutual adjustment; and mature partnership.<sup>1</sup>

For The World Bank, there are scholars doing research on different periods of China's participation in the organization. The earliest one is the abovementioned book by Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg in 1990. In 2007 Pieter Bottelier, published a paper on how the partnership was built between China and the World Bank between 1980 and mid-1990s, which argued that "Bank-supported projects served as vehicles for technical assistance and institution building".<sup>2</sup> Then, Gregory Chin elaborated upon the two-way socialization between China and the World Bank. He figured out that the process of China's "internalizing the international norms and rules of the global institution" is "the process of learning and being socialized". He also argued that China has also been substantially influencing the Bank by advancing alternative rules and norms.

A concerns the IMF, several scholars analyzed China's participation from different perspectives. Bo Qu finds that from the domestic system perspective the domestic reform had great influence on China's attitude and behavior in the IMF. When the advice, or policy, is compatible with China's domestic need, or reform orientation, China would accept the advice, or policy .<sup>3</sup> If not, then China would not accept the recommendation, or norm.

Other Chinese scholars have been mainly focusing on the reform of international financial order and the IMF. Most of them analyze the reform's influence on China, and strategies, or paths, China should choose in this process. There are also researches on China's involvement in global finance and the world economy. Gerald Chan presented a comprehensive research on

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<sup>1</sup> Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, *China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT: Toward a Global Economic Order* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 107.

<sup>2</sup> Pieter Bottelier, "China and the World Bank: How A Partnership Was Built", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 16(2007), 239-258.

<sup>3</sup> Bo Qu, "Dynamic Engagement: China's Preference to the international Monetary Cooperation", University of Princeton, 2010, [https://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/GLF/qu\\_glf.pdf](https://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/GLF/qu_glf.pdf).

the China involvement in global economic governance from the perspective of finance and trade in his co-authored book of “China Engages Global Governance”. He concluded that it is in China’s interest to support the international economic institutions, but China’s influences is still limited, and it will not take the lead. <sup>4</sup>

The researches on China’s participation in the World Bank and the IMF have been mainly focusing on the changes to the international financial system and the Chinese domestic system; and their mutual influence, mostly observed from the perspective of finance. They have not used different international relations’ theories to explore and analyze the process from the perspective of global governance, which is what this paper is intended to contribute to.

## **II. Theoretical Framework and Research Methods**

### **2.1. Research Question**

China assumed its seat in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1980, engaging in the keystone international financial institutions which provide coherence and stability to the international monetary and financial system. During these three decades, China’s role and behavior have changed substantially. This process can be divided into different stages. Undergoing transformation from beneficiary to contributor, China has gained more voice and weight in the international organizations. Actually, China has undertaken to increase its say and sway in the international financial institution.

The attitude of China to these institutions has changed. Why did it happen? Why has China become more proactive in the World Bank and the IMF in last ten years? This paper attempts to answer those questions from the perspective of three international theories. It will use structural realism, neoliberal

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<sup>4</sup> Gerald Chan, Pak K. Lee and Lai-Ha Chan, *China Engages Global Governance* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 59-78.

institutionalism and social constructivism to analyze the reasons behind the behavior. This paper will conclude by analyzing the opportunities and challenges China is facing nowadays.

## **2.2 Hypotheses**

### ***Hypothesis 1:***

(Structural Realism) China changed its attitude and behavior in the World Bank, and the IMF, because of its rising economic power and its desire to to set another system.

From the structural realist perspective, China's attitude and behavior are determined by the international system structure. The distribution of economics power changes, so the economic structure should change accordingly. As the Chinese economic potential is increasing, China wants to secure its national interest in today's world economy. Nonetheless, its influence in the IMF and the World Bank remains limited. Consequently, China wants to set another system.

### ***Hypothesis 2:***

(Neoliberal institutionalism) Changes in China's attitude and behavior arise from China's acceptance and conformation to the rules, and the fact that its interest is in line with the system. China is learning and adapting to the system, and behaving within the system.

China has adapted to the international regimes and been socialized by the international organizations. The institutions provide China with the platform and opportunities to cooperate with other states to achieve its goals. According to the neoliberal institutionalism, in the international environment China look for the opportunity to cooperate with other states through the institutions and those institutions have the ability to accommodate, and adapt to, the rising China. As a consequence China becomes more active in cooperation with other

countries and behaves within the institutions, instead of attempting to overthrow them.

***Hypothesis 3:***

(Constructivism) China changed its attitude to the World Bank and the IMF because, on the one hand, Chinese government's perception of the international financial institutions has changed, and, on the other hand, China's identity in today's world has changed and its national interest has been redefined. As a consequence, China wants to modify and reshape the system.

As Beijing government entered in the World Bank and the IMF, these institutions took impact on China's perception and recognition over the years. Moreover, with the development of its economy, China's identity has changed from beneficiary to contributor, along with changes in its diplomatic strategy. Moreover, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century China wants to be a "responsible great power" and gain other states' trust. According to social constructivism, China's behavior is shaped by its perception of its identity and interest. Thus, with the identity and interest changed, China's behavior changes and becomes more proactive in these organizations.

### **2.3 Research Methodology**

The findings of this paper are based on documentary research, and case studies.

Documentary research is a research method in social science which uses documents and other outside sources to support the argument. The documents include the following categories: official documents, public records, biographies, and the media. In this paper, the documents concerning China's participation in the two institutions are mainly the working papers published on the World Bank and the IMF official websites and the Chinese foreign policy documents like "China Foreign Affairs" (National Library). There are also reports from the media and papers from databases. Analyzing the working papers on China in the IMF and the World Bank helps to identify changes in China's attitude toward

the two institutions and the specific issues. The process of the reform of the World Bank and the IMF is also concluded on the basis of the working papers on relevant series of meetings. Moreover, academic papers written from different perspectives contribute a lot to why China has been changing its attitude and behavior through participation in the two organizations over the years.

Beside document research, this paper will benefit from two case studies. The first one is to explore why China was against the new IMF surveillance scheme. It will be a good case to analyze China's say and influence in decision-making process. The second case is the reform of the World Bank and the IMF concerning mainly changes in quota and voting powers. This case is intended to discuss how the international financial system reacts to the global economic power shift. It will show what will be China's position after the reform, and how can China influence the international financial system. These two cases will test the three abovementioned hypotheses from the point of view of three different theories..

### **III. China's Participation in the World Bank and the IMF**

#### **3.1. Overview of China's participation**

The World Bank and the IMF has made a great contribution to China's development through providing loans, know-how, and international development cooperation. China, in turn, has helped the Bank and the IMF to implement better their poverty-reduction and development aims through financial support, experience-sharing, and active participation in the Bank's reform.

The whole process of China's participation in the World Bank and the IMF can be divided into three periods: initial cooperation stage (1980s); steady development stage (1990s); and mature partnership stage (21<sup>st</sup> century).

At the initial cooperation stage (1980s), the key issue was the use of loans to support the base construction of key projects, such as infrastructure. At the steady development stage (1990s), cooperation focus gradually shifted from

loans to policy research, and system innovation, as the core content of knowledge-based cooperation; At the partner stage (21<sup>st</sup> century), focus has been to help China accomplish balanced regional development and build a resource-conserving and environment-friendly society.

### **3.2. 1980-1990: The Initial Cooperation Stage**

In the initial period of China's participation in the World Bank and the IMF, China and the two institutions adapted to each other: China learned the international norms with the institutions while the two institutions supplied technical assistance and made effort to adapt to China. China gained not only financial and technical assistance, but also the advice, or suggestion, concerning the economic development. Despite the fact that the two institutions had not been the source of the reforms, or policy initiatives, they provided nonetheless China with a new perspective on the reform progress and with more information concerning the world.

Besides, the proposition from the World Bank and the IMF was in accordance with China's domestic development. The leaders and officials agreed on the main issues which were crucial for China's growth at that time. The engagement of the World Bank and the IMF was more like cooperation and dialogue rather than enforcement and demand. Moreover, by participation in the two institutions, China changed its opinion about the World Bank and the IMF as instruments of western imperialism aimed at building the new international economic order. By gaining more international know-how and experience, China believed that the two institutions would help it to develop. Hence, China wanted to participate in the organizations and cooperate with them.

### **3.3 1990-2000: The Steady Development Stage**

The relationship between China and the World Bank was changing rapidly, and became deep and broad. With the Bank's program in China being so large, the government developed project units all over China at different

administrative levels, from central one to county one. At that time, there was about 125 project in total supported by the Bank.

The macroeconomic policy and institutional reform in early 1990s was very imperative for the whole process of China's reform seen from today's perspective. In 1990s, the World Bank supported China mainly with consultation and technical assistance. Moreover, by doing this, the World Bank has become deeply engaged into the policy-making and framework-building, which is of great significance for China's macroeconomic development. The Dalian conference in June 1993 was a key event in this respect. After the conference, top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) agreed on "the nature of the inflation problem and a program on macroeconomic stabilization aimed at a gradual reduction of the economic overheating."<sup>5</sup> This program had eventually succeeded in achieving the goal of 'soft landing' of China's economy in 1996. It was the first time when the World Bank relied on indirect policy instruments to implement macroeconomic plan.

In this period China and two institutions entered the steady development stage. The cooperation was mainly about technical assistance, economic-policy consultations and institution-building. This way China received the advice from the specialists who were doing long-term research on China for the World Bank and the IMF. Meanwhile, the specialists had opportunity to learn more about China's economy and had direct communication with Chinese officials from relevant departments. This cooperation played a very positive role in China's making of macroeconomic policies. In 1993, China has become the largest borrower from the World Bank, and one of the largest recipients of technical assistance. In late 1990s, the programs and loans have been scaled down due to China's fast development. China's economy developed well and the partnership between China and two institutions became steady and mature.

### **3.4. The 21th Century: The Partnership Stage**

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<sup>5</sup> Bottelier, "China and the World Bank", 255.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century China has become contributor to the IMF and the World Bank in terms of providing funds to the global South and sharing experience with other countries. Even though China still receives loans from the World Bank, it China has made contributions to the international development aid (IDA) and begun to offer loans to other developing countries. On one hand, China is helping the World Bank to achieve the goal of poverty reduction; while on the other hand China is posing a challenge to the World Bank's position in providing loans, which demonstrates a weakening of international hegemony, and loosening of exogenous constraints. China has signed country partnership strategy with the World Bank, and other global finance programs, which demonstrate China's determination to remain partner with the World Bank in coping with international financial crisis. In management, Lin Yifu was appointed the Chief Economist and vice-president of the Bank in 2008, which showed that the World Bank has been welcoming China's more active participation and paying more attention to China and other developing countries.

During the international financial crisis China became the first country to purchase the IMF's notes worth about 50 billion USD to help fund-raising for the member countries. Afterwards China in cooperation with other BRICS countries determined to participate in capital increase of the IMF, which was instrumental for the Fund in order to cope with the crisis. Zhu Min was appointed deputy governor in the IMF in 2011, which showed that the Fund has been willing to give more say and focus to emerging markets and developing economies, and also acknowledged China's contribution..

**Table 1: Total Loans t from the World Bank to China in 1981-2013 (Unit: Billion USD)**

Year	Hard Loan (IBRD)	Soft Loan (IDA)	Total Loan	Project Num.
1981	100.00	100.00	200.00	1
1982	0	60.00	60.00	1
1983	463.10	150.40	613.50	6
1984	616.00	423.50	1039.50	10
1985	659.60	442.30	1101.90	12

1986	687.00	450.00	1137.00	11
1987	867.40	556.20	1423.60	11
1988	1053.70	636.90	1693.60	14
1989	833.40	515.00	1348.40	12
1990	0	590.00	590.00	5
<b>1981-1990</b>	<b>5280.20</b>	<b>3924.3</b>	<b>9207.5</b>	<b>83</b>
1991	601.50	977.80	1579.30	10
1992	1577.70	948.60	2526.30	16
1993	2155.00	1017.00	3172.00	18
1994	2145.00	925.00	3070.00	14
1995	2369.50	630.00	2999.50	16
1996	2050.00	480.00	2530.00	15
1997	2490.00	325.00	2815.00	11
1998	2323.00	293.40	2616.40	16
1999	1674.40	422.60	2097.00	19
2000	1672.50	0	1672.50	8
<b>1991-2000</b>	<b>19058.60</b>	<b>6019.40</b>	<b>25078.00</b>	<b>143</b>
2001	787.50	0	787.50	8
2002	562.90	0	562.90	5
2003	1145.00	0	1145.00	6
2004	1218.27	0	1218.27	9
2005	1377.00	0	1377.00	9
2006	1474.33	0	1474.33	11
2007	1041.00	0	1041.00	10
2008	1733.40	0	1733.40	12
2009	2140.00	0	2140.00	13
2010	1774.00	0	1174.00	18
<b>2001-2010</b>	<b>12653.40</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>12653.40</b>	<b>101</b>
2011	1480.00	0	1480.00	19
2012	1160.00	0	1160.00	17
2013	2060.00	0	2060.00	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>43136.65</b>	<b>9946.71</b>	<b>53083.36</b>	<b>380</b>

Source: The World Bank website

#### IV. Case Studies.

##### 4.1. Case Study I: China against the 2007 IMF Surveillance Scheme

On 15 June 2007, the IMF's Board of Governors approved a new Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Members' Policies, substituting the 1977 Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies. The new Decision added the principle that "a member should avoid exchange rate policies that

result in external instability regardless of their purpose.”<sup>6</sup> According to the new Decision, this new principle “focuses on the outcome of the policies at issue, rather than their intent”. That means that if a member state’s exchange-rate policies cause external instability, notwithstanding whether it was their true intent or not, , such state will be in breach of the the 2007 Decision. The new Decision focused on a country’s balance of payments in order to decide by the IMF if a country uses its exchange rate to boost its exports<sup>7</sup>.

The 2007 Decision puts more pressure on, and lowers the position of, the member states with fixed foreign exchange-rate policies, especially the emerging-market countries. When encountering trade-imbalance problems, they will have to face more pressure to adjust their exchange rate, whereas the Decision has little impact on the countries with floating exchange-rate, such as highly developed countries. Due to the fact that their exchange rates are decided by the market, the other group has more autonomy. At the executive meeting, the new Decision did not achieve all the members’ approval. China explicitly objected to the new surveillance scheme, while Iran abstained, and Egypt held reservations about the reform. However, the United States strongly backed up the new Decision..

Developing countries as well as some experts regarded this as demonstration of the US strategy to make the IMF more involved in controlling member states’ exchange-rate policies by determining whether a state is manipulating its exchange-rate. This might have been perceived as a convenient way for the US to deal with the trade surplus of China by claiming that the RMB is undervalued, and consequently needs to appreciate. Since the voting power still lays in the hands of a small number of high-developed countries (with the United States alone holding more than 17% of voting rights), the 2007 Surveillance Decision was passed.

For Western countries, foreign exchange control is their tool of the

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<sup>6</sup> “IMF executive board adopts new decision.”

<sup>7</sup> “IMF executive board adopts new decision.”

implementation of their foreign economic policies. For developing countries, foreign exchange control is a defensive measure to prevent the invasion of monopoly capital, and to safeguard national economic interests. For the countries who are in favor of the new surveillance scheme, they mainly want to allow the RMB exchange rate to fluctuate, and appreciate, and thereby let the to restrict Chinese exports. At the same time, the USD trade commodities will become relatively cheaper in comparison to the RMB, thereby expanding the United States, or other developed countries', exports to China. This overlooks the fact, however, that the problem of US export is not the RMB exchange rate but the structure of US domestic economy.

China strongly opposed the 2007 Decision and openly criticized the manner in which the IMF adopted it by openly neglecting the reservations and opposition from developing countries. China claimed that the IMF was under the US pressure for to appreciate the RMB . Chinese member of the IMF Board of Governors Ge Huayong said publicly that it would weaken the Fund's supervisory role and reputation, if the Fund would insist on the policy without securing its wide acceptance. Moreover, h said that it is quite unfair to put more pressure on the emerging markets while putting little impact on the developed countries. The People's Bank of China (the PBOC) also criticized the 2007 Decision on its website<sup>8</sup>..

Even after the passing of the 2007 Surveillance Decision, China has not stopped its objection. In 2008 at the International Monetary and Financial Committee (the IMFC) annual meeting, the PBOC Deputy Governor Yi Gang pointed out that the IMF should take experience and lessons from financial crisis and suggestion from member states to improve its surveillance mechanisms. He argued that to achieve the goal of building an orderly and stable international financial system by the means of adapting to the new global economic and financial environment, the 2007 Decision ought to be reviewed and amended as

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<sup>8</sup> "IMF adopted the Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Member's Policies with China's Reservation", 20 June.

soon as possible.<sup>9</sup> In 2009, China announced that: “We call for a timely thorough review of the 2007 Decision in order to avoid a recurrence of past mistakes”<sup>10</sup>. Actually, China worries that the 2007 Decision is targeted specifically at China due to its exchange rate and trade surplus.

After the crisis, China has argued more for the new surveillance framework. At the IMF Spring Meeting in 2010, the PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan stated that the current global financial crisis is mainly due to the inappropriate financial sector in developed countries. He also figured out that the Fund should resolve the surveillance problems and amend the 2007 Decision as soon as possible. He said “What is most important at present, it is to strengthen surveillance of the fiscal policies of developed countries”.<sup>11</sup>

## 4.2. Case Study I: Analysis

### 4.2.1. Realism

From the realist point of view, the international institutions are dominated by the great power which created them which consequently has more say in them than other actors. With most voting power vested in the US and Western developed countries, the IMF reflect mainly those developed countries’ interests. Western countries want to use institutions to maximize their interest. From neorealist point of view, countries are more interested in a relative gain rather than in an absolute gain. So the US and other developed countries with flexible exchange rates probably approve the decision enabling the IMF to control more easily other member states’ exchange-rate policies in order to solve their own imbalance problems easily. The 2007 Decision is more focused on the outcome rather than the intention. So if a state’s exchange-rate policy causes external instability, it will be held responsible by the IMF no

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<sup>9</sup> IMF, Statement by Yi Gang at the 18th Meeting of the IMFC in 2008, accessed 10 May 2014, <http://www.imf.org/External/AM/2008/imfc/statement/eng/chn.pdf>.

<sup>10</sup> IMF, Statement by Yi Gang at the 20th Meeting of the IMFC in 2009, accessed 10 May 2014, <http://www.imf.org/External/AM/2009/imfc/statement/eng/chn.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup> IMF, Statement by Zhou Xiaochuan at the 21th Meeting of the IMFC in 2010, accessed 10 May 2014, <http://www.imf.org/External/spring/2010/imfc/statement/eng/chn.pdf>.

matter if it is was its true intention. Consequently the IMF will more easily make a country in question to change its exchange-rate policy, which is not good for this member state's economic development, especially in case of developing countries. China will definitely defend its national interests and reject the 2007 Decision which harms its domestic economic development.

#### **4.2.2. Liberalism**

From the liberal point of view domestic actors and structure have a strong impact on the interest of the state and the identity of its foreign policy. China was against the 2007 Decision mainly because the surveillance scheme thus established is unfavorable for China's domestic economic development. China has a fixed exchange-rate policy which makes it hard to them to adjust exchange rate when facing imbalance of trade. Nonetheless the 2007 Decision will put more pressure on the developing countries with fixed exchange rate.

China becomes more active participant in international financial institutions in order to meet the needs of its domestic economic development. Marketization of China's domestic economy pushed it further toward adopting international norms. On one hand, China will actively participate in the international financial institutions to promote cooperation with other member states. On the other hand, China will selectively accept rules which are good for its development and refuse to accept rules which are not beneficial to its development. This case shows that China wants to be more involved in the decision-making influencing the world economy due to its importance for China's domestic economic development. Nonetheless, its influence remains limited due to limited voting power.

#### **4.3. Case Study II: Voting Power Reform**

With the shift of global economic power from the West towards the emerging-market economies the IMF has to face the pressure to change its governance and voting structure by extending the share of emerging economies in decision-making powers.

In 2006, at the IMF annual meeting in Singapore the Board of Governors and the IMF member states agreed on the particular quota increase to the benefit of four “most underrepresented countries”, namely: China, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey. This move was called the first step to the realignment. China’s voting share increased from 2.9% to 3.7%. .

In 2008, when the international financial crisis raged globally, the international community strengthened their responses. At the same time, emerging-market economies became more important as the engines of the world economy. In this context, the reform of the IMF became more urgent. At the G20 summit in the UK in March 2009, China with other BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia and India, proposed that the IMF should increase the voting share assigned to emerging economies. With the aggravation of the crisis, China became more outspoken in the fund, pushing the reform process.

At the 2009 IMFC annual meeting, China proposed that the IMF should transfer at least 5% quota shares to the developing countries and emerging-market members, which aim have already been set by the G20. Moreover, the PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan at the 2010 IMF spring meeting said that: “Quota adjustment and reform is not a zero-sum game. A Fund with a more reasonable governance structure will be able to protect better global economic and financial stability, which will benefit all member countries.”<sup>12</sup>

At the G20 meeting in 2010 member countries reached an agreement on transferring more than 6% of quota shares to dynamic emerging markets and developing countries, and to under-represented countries, at the expense of overrepresented European countries and oil-producing countries, without affecting the least developed countries. Moreover, European nations were to give up two seats on executive board to the benefit of emerging-market countries.

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<sup>12</sup> IMF, Statement by Zhou Xiaochuan at the 21th Meeting of the IMFC in 2010, accessed 10 May 2014. <http://www.imf.org/External/spring/2010/imfc/statement/eng/chn.pdf>.

Once the reforms will be implemented, the four BRICS countries - as the leading emerging markets - will get 9.76% quota shares and 9.6% voting rights, becoming some of the IMF's top 10 shareholders. After the reform this group will be constituted by: the US, Japan, the BRICS countries, France, Germany, Italy and the UK.<sup>13</sup> China will become third largest shareholders, after the US and Japan, with its voting share increasing to 6.1%. China is willing to make more financial contribution to the IMF in order to get more voting rights and say, and it also calls for the reform of the selection procedure of the IMF's Managing Director.

**Table 2: Quota and Voting Shares of 10 Largest Members**

(In percent)

Rank	Pre-Singapore			Post 2 <sup>nd</sup> Round			Proposed		
	Country	Quota Shares	Voting Shares	Country	Quota Shares	Voting Shares	Country	Quota Shares	Voting Shares
1	US	17.38	17.02	US	17.67	16.73	US	17.43	16.48
2	Japan	6.23	6.11	Japan	6.56	6.23	Japan	6.47	6.14
3	Germany	2.09	5.97	Germany	6.11	5.80	<b>China</b>	<b>6.39</b>	<b>6.07</b>
4	France	5.02	4.93	France	4.50	4.29	Germany	5.59	5.31
5	UK	5.02	4.93	UK	4.50	4.29	France	4.23	4.02
6	Italy	3.30	3.24	<b>China</b>	<b>4.00</b>	<b>3.81</b>	UK	4.23	4.02
7	Saudi Arabia	3.27	3.21	Italy	3.31	3.15	Italy	3.16	3.02
8	Canada	2.98	2.93	Saudi Arabia	2.93	2.80	India	2.75	2.63
9	<b>China</b>	<b>2.98</b>	<b>2.93</b>	Canada	2.67	2.55	Russia	2.71	2.59
10	Russia	2.78	2.73	Russia	2.49	2.39	Brazil	2.32	2.22

Source: The IMF website (Quota Reform Paper)

Similarity to the IMF, the World Bank has also been facing a legitimacy crisis. In 2002, the Monterrey Consensus was made at the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development to call for a more fair

<sup>13</sup> IMF, "Quota and voting shares before and after implementation of reforms agreed in 2008 and 2010", accessed 15 May 2014, [http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota\\_tbl.pdf](http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota_tbl.pdf).

representation of developing countries in international financial institutions.<sup>14</sup> The reform began to gain substantial progress in consequence of the 2007 global financial crisis. China was invited to contribute more to the Bank in order to improve its capacity to lend and liquidity. China was willing to do in exchange for the increase in its voting power and a greater say in the decision-making process of the Bank.

At the April 2010 World Bank Spring meeting, member states reached an agreement on increasing the capital of IBRD by 86.2 billion USD, as well as rising the voting shares of developing countries and decreasing the ones of Japan and some European countries. China has gained the voting-power increase from 2.8% to 4.4%,<sup>15</sup> which ranked it the third largest shareholder after the US and Japan. Furthermore, the developing countries hoped to have introduced a system which would automatically change the voting rights in accordance with the changes of relative economic power among the developing and the developed countries. Some scholars argue that China should be given more voting power as the second largest shareholder, since China's economy has surpassed Japan's as the second-largest economy in the global economy.

**Table 4: Voting Powers of Countries at the World Bank**

Country	United States	Japan	China	Germany	France	Britain	India	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Italy
Before	15.85%	7.62%	<b>2.77%</b>	4.35%	4.17%	4.17%	<b>2.77%</b>	2.77%	2.77%	2.71%
After	15.85%	6.84%	<b>4.42%</b>	4.00%	3.75%	3.75%	<b>2.91%</b>	2.77%	2.77%	2.64%
Change	0	- 0.78%	<b>+1.65%</b>	- 0.35%	- 0.42%	-0.42%	<b>+0.14%</b>	0	0	- 0.07%

Source: The World Bank

The reform of the World Bank's Executive Board must be accepted and approved by the 85% of total voting power. By January 2014, the 15<sup>th</sup> General

<sup>14</sup> UN 2003.

<sup>15</sup> World Bank, 2010.

Review of Quotas was not completed as scheduled, so the 2010 quota and governance reform has not yet become effective. According to the latest data, by April 23, 2014, it has been accepted by 145 member countries with 76.97% of total voting power. For the quota increase, it has been consented to by the 160 members with 79.43% of total quota.<sup>16</sup> But it has not been approved yet by more than 85%.

At the 29<sup>th</sup> meeting of International Monetary and Financial Committee in April 2014, Chinese-government official Yi Gang stated that the “Failure to implement the 2010 reforms will hamper the Fund’s effectiveness, legitimacy, and credibility, as well as its capacity to respond to crisis.” China backs up the IMFC to make the appeal to the United States in order to approve and carry out the Board Reform and the 14th Review as soon as possible. Thereto, as Yi Gang stated, China would definitely uphold the completion of the 15<sup>th</sup> Review of Quota by January 2015 in order to implement the 2010 reforms, in order to make the IMF effective and strong, which is needed to help the international monetary system to take actions against the market turbulences. He also stated that China upholds the IMF as one of the important contributors to the international financial safety.<sup>17</sup>The IMF said they will “remain fully committed to pursuing the implementation of the governance that have been agreed to make the fund an even more effective and representative institution.”<sup>18</sup>

#### **4.4. Case Study II: Analysis**

##### **4.4.1. Realism**

China’s ability to play a significant role in global governance depends very much on its phenomenal economic rise and its increasing mesh with the global economy. In 2010, China has become the world’s second largest

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
<sup>16</sup> IMF, “Acceptances of the Proposed Amendment of the Articles of Agreement on Reform of the Executive Board and Consents to 2010 Quota Increase”, accessed 16 May, 2014, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/consents.htm#a1>.

<sup>17</sup> IMF, Statement by Yi Gang at the 29th Meeting of the IMFC in 2014, accessed 10 May 2014, <http://www.imf.org/External/spring/2014/imfc/statement/eng/chn.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> IMF Factsheet, “How the IMF Make Decision”, accessed 10 May 2014, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/govern.htm>.

economy, overtaking Japan. It has overtaken Germany as the largest exporter in 2009. It is the world's biggest holder of foreign reserves. China supplanted the U.S. and Japan as, respectively, the world's largest automobile market and the biggest producer in 2009.

**Figure 3: GDP growth (annual%) 2004-2013**



Source: The World Bank,

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/1W-CN-US-EU-IN?display=graph>

With economic power changes, global economy architecture has changed and undergone a great transformation. China with its rising economy stands at the center of this transformation. Moreover, especially after the global financial crisis, the world needs the engine of economic growth, which China, with its continued, relatively strong economic growth and pragmatic economic policy can play. China's attitude and behavior is determined by the structure of international financial system. Moreover, its position in the structure influences its foreign policy. China wants to gain more say in the World Bank and the IMF according to its high position in today's world economy and to protect its

economic interests. Hence, China wants to reform the economic system mainly controlled by the US before.

#### **4.4.2. Liberalism**

China's great economic development has definitely made pressures on developed countries to reform the institutions to accommodate China and other emerging powers. Furthermore, China becomes more active in international financial institution to meet its need for domestic economic development. China is accepting the international norms and rules to meet its own reform needs, which is the basis for the further pro-market reform. The opening to international economic institutions has assisted the government in implementing reform initiative throughout many aspects within China. Based on the domestic need for economic development, China wants to be more involved in the decision-making on influencing world economy, which is of great importance for China's domestic economy. China's interest is in line with the system, so China will still remain within the system.

#### **4.4.3. Constructivism**

China is not satisfied with the economic order led by the US, so it wants to push for the reform of the World Bank and the IMF to gain more say in decision-making and rule-setting.

Due to its new international position, China has collaborated with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa within the emerging-market grouping known as BRICS. The BRICS countries have agreed on the reform of the World Bank, the IMF, and global economy. They wanted more voting power in the World Bank and the IMF to reflect the emerging market countries' interest. Moreover, China also deepened the relationship with other Asian countries in last few years. China wants to play a more important role among Asian countries, and developing countries in general. As a consequence within the I G20, which emphasised more the role of new emerging markets and developing countries, China behaves much more actively in order to gain more say. Moreover, after

the economic crisis China has strengthened the cooperation with the World Bank to play a more positive role in helping the developing countries to deal with its consequences.

From the constructivist point of view, by more involvement in the regional and other multilateral groupings and organizations, China wants to enhance its profile in the international system and improve the relationship with these groupings and countries; and on the other hand it wants to reduce the suspicions of neighboring countries and other great powers, especially the United States. So in order to keep good relationship with the BRICS and represent developing countries' interests, China wants more say in the World Bank and the IMF.<sup>19</sup>

## **V. Conclusions**

### **5.1. General Conclusions**

Over the last three decades China's participation in the World Bank and the IMF has undergone through three stages: initial participation, steady development, and mature partnership. China has definitely become more engaged in the international financial institutions and become a great player in international affairs. Why China has changed its attitude and behavior towards the World Bank and the IMF, and will China reconstruct the international financial system? This paper sought for the answers from three international relations theories to test the three hypotheses by analyzing the whole process of China's engagement over the last 30 years .

In case of the initial participation and the steady development stages, neoliberal institutionalism can better explain China's interaction with the two organizations. At these two stages China mainly learned and adapted to the international norms, and adopted those rules gradually. China gained not only financial and technical assistance, but also the advice concerning the economic

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<sup>19</sup> "China wants say in World Bank choice", *Financial Times*, accessed by May 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/805a0ce2-58af-11e1-b9c6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2NRoOx4WR>.

development. Moreover, the two organizations provided platform and opportunities to China to achieve its interest. China has had an absolute gain from the institutions. So China becomes more active in the World Bank and the IMF, and will behave within the system. At the partnership stage, structural realism can better explain China's changed behavior reflecting its changed role in the global economy as a rising economic power. China gained ability to be co-donor with the World Bank, and to contribute more to the IMF, e.g. by buying bonds and increasing the IMF capital. Consequently China wants to participate more actively in two organizations to serve better its national interest. Meanwhile, constructivism can better explain the China's behavior from the point of view of its identity and strategy in the new century. With the development of its economy, China's identity has changed from beneficiary to contributor along with its changes of diplomatic strategy. China needs and should become more active to be a "responsible great power" and "global power".

Case Study I presents China against the 2007 surveillance scheme, and it shows China saying "no" to the IMF policy. The 2007 surveillance was not beneficial to China and other developing countries with fixed exchange rate. Moreover, China also suspected that the IMF was under the US to appreciate the RMB. Nonetheless the IMF still passed the 2007 surveillance scheme. China has not withdrew the objection to the 2007 Decision. This case shows that China's influence in decision-making is very and it has no ability to reconstruct the system. The system is still dominated by the US. From the neoliberal institutionalist position, China wants to be more involved in the decision-making influencing world economy, which is of great importance to its domestic economic development.

Case study II shows that China wants eagerly to gain more voting power in the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, with the global economic shift, the two organizations have to accept the governance reform to meet the needs of new global economic and financial environment, especially after the financial

crisis. In this case structural realism and constructivism are more useful. From the point of view of structural realism, China naturally wants to gain more say and push for voting power reform to reflect its rising economic position and serve its national interest better. Nonetheless, the US still holds the largest share of voting power and have the veto power. The reform proposal cannot approved without the US. So China's influence in the system is still limited. To reflect China's national interest and its rising power, China wants to build alternative system which it could influence more. This proves the Hypothesis 1 right. From the neoliberal institutionalist perspective China has an absolute gain from the institutions, so it will keep cooperate with them. The governance reform of the World Bank and the IMF reflects the fact that the institutions also have the ability to accommodate and adapt to the rising China. So China will still learn and adapt to the system, remain in the system, and improve it. Hence the Hypothesis 2 is true. From the point of view of the structuralism, China makes more effort to play its "responsible great power" and "global power" role in today's world, so it is natural for China to want more say and push for the reform. So the Hypothesis 3 is true.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> there still exists the vacuum . Constructivism explains that it is because of the contradiction of China's identity. China wants to be a responsible power and other countries want China to play a greater role in global affairs. Nonetheless, China is still a developing countries and undergoes critical economic and political transformation, with many challenges from within and abroad. China is rising, but its influence on decision-making in international institutions is still limited. China has the willingness to do more as a global power, but its ability in terms of the global governance, especially in international financial institutions, is very limited, and needs much improvement. It is because the IMF and the World Bank are still dominated by Western countries, especially the United States. China will not and cannot challenge the United States' dominance so soon. China calls for the reform of the global economic governance system but it does not mean to overthrow the

system. At this stage, overthrowing is not feasible and not really in line with the global economy.

## **5.2. BRICS setting up NDB and CRA**

Meanwhile, the BRIC countries have begun to actively explore the establishment of their own development banks and financial safety net to supplement the existing system. During the G20 summit in St. Petersburg in 2013 the leaders of the BRICS countries collectively announced that they will establish new development bank (NDB) with an initial capital of 50 billion USD and the initial 100 billion USD contingency reserve arrangements (CRA). Moreover, at the 6<sup>th</sup> BRICS Summit on July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2014, the leaders announced the creation of the New Development Bank and Contingency Reserve Arrangements.

BRICS development bank is carried out to finance for infrastructure development and sustainable development projects in emerging market countries and developing countries. Its aim is to complement the existing multilateral and regional financial institutions to promote global growth and development, and to help developing countries to respond to bottlenecks and challenges they face due to the lack of long-term financing and foreign direct investment.

Research shows that in 2010-2020, only an annual average of infrastructure investment needs of developing countries in the Asia Pacific region will reach 776 billion USD, including 747 billion USD in domestic demand. Meanwhile, the highest infrastructure investment of the World Bank was in 2010 with a total investment of only 23 billion USD, which is quite inadequate. From this point of view, if the BRICS development bank will manage to effectively mobilize financial support in emerging economies to support infrastructure investments in developing countries, its significance as the supplement to the World Bank will be self-evident.

The main objective of the BRICS emergency reserve arrangements is to help BRICS countries to cope with short-term liquidity pressures and provide them with mutual support, to further strengthen financial stability and defense, to complement existing international arrangements on foreign exchange reserves, and to strengthen the global financial safety. In comparison to the IMF as a global financial safety net, the BRICS foreign exchange reserve will have significant advantages in the regional, local and loan flexibility.

### **5.3. Reshaping the system**

China is already one of the major players in the global economic governance, its economic interests are closely bound to the existing international economic system. Even though China's economic power has increased greatly, China has no intention to overthrow the existing international economic governance system. With the rise of China's position in the world, it wants to take more responsibility, as well as power, to be "a responsible great power" and "global power". As in the BRICS Group and the G20, China has become more active. Setting up the BRICS New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Arrangements is likely to set up another system, but it is supplementing the existing international financial system. Due to its limited influence in the World Bank and the IMF, China as "global power wants to build alternative system ", including in international financial area. By this means China with other BRICS countries wants to push for the reform of the World Bank and the IMF. and moving the system towards multipolarity,.

Based on the existing basic structure of the traditional international economic organizations, Chinese government will take pragmatic approach and make a fair, efficient, inclusive and orderly as the fundamental starting point to incrementally improve the international economic governance system to adapt to the global situation and make a difference. In this process, China will behave more in the system and promote its reform to better reflect developing countries and emerging markets' interests.

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Trans-Disciplinary Strategy of Research Structure For Study  
of Civilization.

The Evolution From the City-State to the Capitalist Economy-World<sup>1</sup>.

**Abstract**

*This article is dedicated to the origin, evolution and development prospects of the global civilisation. The object of a thorough analysis is history-forming crises as a result of which qualitative changes occurred in interciviliational relations. A transdisciplinary research strategy combining the ecological, economic, political and cultural (anthropological) perspective was applied to analysis. The principal problem in researching the macrohistorical process of the global civilisation evolution is combining knowledge from several disciplines: natural sciences (climatology, ecology, evolutionary biology, physical anthropology), economics, political sciences and cultural anthropology. This is because the global civilisation needs to be analysed from four angles: ecology, economy, politics and culture. It is only after they are coherently combined, owing to the adopted theoretical perspective (inspired by F. Braudel concept), that the analysis becomes transdisciplinary.*

**Keywords:** *global civilisation, the transdisciplinary research strategy, turning points in human history, crisis regulation, the World New Deal*

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<sup>1</sup> Translation: Grzegorz Omelan

## 1 . Civilization as a dynamic whole

The history of *Homo sapiens* have been under way within the scope of different forms of social organization.<sup>1</sup> There were communities of hunters and gatherers (minisystems), tribal communities, chiefdoms, agrarian empires, and finally nation states. The path of this development has been marked by the progress of technology and energy. They were the tools of adaptation to the local ecosystems, or they allowed to shape them in order to create material basis for collective existence. This basis is produced by economy which possesses means of connecting direct manufacturer to conditions and means of production. The leader of the adaptation process has always been, and probably will be the state. After the last ice age there have been three historically significant slowdowns which may be considered turning points: creation of the manufacturing economy and the city (Neolithic Revolution), crossing the barrier of oceans (14<sup>th</sup>/15<sup>th</sup> centuries) and the Industrial Revolution. The vast majority of mankind, divided into state or ethnic communities, is now in the stage of industrial civilization in the form of global capitalism in the phase of another scientific-technological revolution (the so-called Information Civilization).

### 1.1 Eurocentrism or Eurasian convergence?

*World history*, macrohistory, macrosociology constitute the current, axiologically neutral, reflection on the genesis and structure of the wider whole – the world-system in the most developed form of connections and mutual affections, at the same time spreading to the whole ecumene. Within this global-historical perspective the territorial units possessing different political status must be connected economically (commerce, loans, manufacturing and supplying chains) and politically (tribute, conquest, strategic alliances), migrations of people and cultural properties (diffusion of ideas, religions,

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<sup>1</sup> The following serves as a presentation of the method and results of the study of world civilization, presented in the author's book in title *Geopolityka trwałego rozwoju. Ewolucja cywilizacji i państwa w trakcie dziejotwórczych kryzysów*, published in Warsaw in 2013.

technological and organizational innovations). The centres of human civilizations did not develop evenly. There was rivalry between them which sometimes led to hierarchization into the centre and outskirts (from the perspective of the whole world) and into the metropolis and province (within a given state territory). There are processes of diffusion, exchange and mutual borrowings, mixing of people and ideas between local civilizations and their systems of production, cultures and forms of social organization. It has been more or less like this throughout history. In Eurasia (according to the ideas of W. H. McNeill, Ph. Curtin, J. Goody, K. Pomerantz, J. Goldstone and other world history agents) the development was polycentric. It led to convergence, especially in the field of cultural output. The current civilization was then created within the scope of the East-West system, as the result of commerce, exchange of ideas and discoveries that were executed between them.

The starting point of this process is constituted by the great intercontinental migrations, and – later – the birth of agricultural civilizations: China, India, Middle East and its Mediterranean branch, and also African and both Americas. Out of the Mediterranean branches (Minoan Civilization and Mycenaean Greece) soon arose the Greek-Roman civilization, next the European one (9<sup>th</sup> century). Within the agrarian civilizations cities became administrative and religious centres. Traders, merchants, craftsmen, artists fulfilled their missions in the shades of the courts and temples. That's the time of the Gordon Childe's Urban Revolution. It was the first turning point in the history of societies. A new field of social activity surfaced – manufacturing economy. Its foundation was land and natural energy sources – solar one, converted into horse pulling power, as well as powers of human muscle, gravity, water and wind. Commerce in the above-mentioned states created the first central civilization in Eurasia – the Civilization of the Middle. Its centre was Mesopotamia. From there the commerce and military conquests intertwined histories of Egypt, Persia (Iran), states of Anatolya and Harappa. This civilization lasted between 3000-1500 BC until around 700-500 BC.

Enriching the resources available in the local ecosystem and complementing goods manufactured single-handedly, as well as gathering economic surplus might be regarded as the main driving force behind the creation of the Civilization of the Middle.

The next starting point was the old-world East-West system without the hegemon. It emerged thanks to the means of transport like cabotage shipping, camel transportation or porters working in rainforests. These means, throughout millennia, limited long-distance transport to a few light, long-lasting goods like silk or spices. It was characterized by constant Western deficit in commerce with the East and outflow ore, mainly of African origin. The no-hegemon system lasted for 2000 years and created 8 regional commercial networks. Its main axis was the sea route between the Red Sea via the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Its unifying force was India. The remaining one were Silk Roads. This phase was closed with the first transoceanic journeys, which was achieved thanks to caravels – they were another technological step forward, because they used the wind force in transportation better. The Europeans became the masters of the oceans. It was the next turning point. The new phase began with the change of the system's structure. Europe, which dominated militarily started controlling the world commerce – after both Americas joined – and using natural resources and manpower to extend its own wealth. The world market was created as the next phase of uniting the paths of development of local civilizations, which were distant from one another at the beginning. The then system consisted of two elements until the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century: the commerce system between Asia and Europe according to Smith's rules through the oceanic route around the Cape of Good Hope and the Atlantic system – trading Caribbean and Brazilian goods together with African slaves.

As late as at the time of English industrial revolution there was a qualitative change. Due to that there were discoveries within the field of transport and communication (steamboat, telegraph). This novum, together

with the mechanization of production and its efficiency allowed the European industrial powers to create a new whole – the capitalist economy-world. Its centre was located in Europe, from which many peripheries of various geopolitical status branched – from colonies to territories indeed dependent (free-trade imperialism). Due to the industrial revolution, which meant mastering new sources of energy and manufacturing techniques the market society emerged. The world system was molded by competing merchants, entrepreneurs, transnational businesses and financial shares holders pursuing the status of rentiers. They looked for cheap goods and resources, market outlets and investments. In short, they multiplied the civilization's wealth and technological base. We owe them the world as we know today. Fast economic growth depended on technological progress and organizational improvements, but at the same time the mechanism in which the economy functioned was subordinated to accumulating of economic surplus. Domination, and at times hegemony, was won by industrial powers: England, France, Germany, Japan, USA, Russia (Soviet Union). Some of them created impressive colonial systems.

## **1.2 The notion of world civilization**

The original structure of the social life is human as a bio-psycho-socio-cultural whole. The human organism, as a morphophysiological structure, is subjected to all metabolic processes. It is also able to symbolically control its behaviour through the reflexive consciousness. In order to satisfy its biogenic needs, a human being must be a part of the network constituting the social division of work or different social roles. With the process of socialization it inherits the possessions of the spiritual development of wider groups, of which it is a part of. Supraindividual structures create, normatively and customarily, long-term relations among individuals, for instance the ruled vs the ruling, the division of assignments and functions within a company, proprietary relations with different types of property – private, personal, common, international and human. Supraindividual structures constitute objectivized, in different cultural codes, forms of symbolic activity – national language, legal system, ideologies,

literary works, paintings, sculptures, musical works, national culture as a system of such works. They form an external symbolic-cultural world of human beings. Another type of structures are objectivized material products, being created out of discoveries, innovations and techniques such as means of work or national wealth. They constitute mankind's technical environment – the space of human world appointed by technology and energy, which humans use as extension of its arms.

Separate elements, possessing objectivized products of material and spiritual activities of its members (economy, state, legal system, family, science, religion, education, health service, social classes, professions, cities, villages) must be treated as social structures as well. Another type of social structures are nations and nation-like groups: nations organized as states, tribal communities, nationalities, social life segments: clans, lineages, etc. To his group also belong local civilizations (cultural circles). They include people living within limited spaces on earth, who are bound by various and long-lasting economic, political and cultural relations (for instance the post-Confucian civilization). Mankind is a peculiar social structure, living in certain ecosystems and divided into separate populations and local civilizations. It is connected by router of commerce, discoveries or microbes. It is also about mankind understood as all contemporary societies and conditioning relations between them. These relations cover reproducing features of previous societies, whose material and spiritual output they carry on. Mankind constitutes world civilization. As a whole it is formed of all national societies, inhabiting the global ecosystem at a certain time and it is a part of the biosphere. The biosphere is a part of even larger dynamic whole – the organic and non-organic world: geochemistry with biology, geology with climate – Gaia or Medea (depending on the interpretation of earth's history).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> S. Kozyr- Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo*, Poznań 2000, p. 120-121. On natural structures read more in P. Ward, *Hipoteza Medei. Czy życie na Ziemi zmierza do samounicestwienia?* Warszawa 2010, s. 66; S. H. Schneider, *Laboratorium Ziemia*, Warszawa 1998, p.19.

Further reflection will touch upon the largest of the social structures – the world civilization, which right now in the phase of neoliberal development of market economy. It constitutes a new social structure – a human population divided into nations. Because it exploits the global ecosystem, it might be understood as another additive macrostructure, although certain local civilizations and national communities do not have to blend into a homogenous whole. Since 19<sup>th</sup> century this whole has become the aim of research from a newly created academic discipline – social sciences. One may select from a few names for this whole. William McNeill, the co-creator of world history, ceased using the word ‘civilization’ and began using the term ‘world system’, and it seems that the latter is most widely accepted today. It is popularized by the circles inspired by Wallerstein’s conception of world-system analysis. Three terms bear similar connotations in the language of social sciences: society, civilizations and social system. In the modern interpretation a society is ‘a specific (different one at different times of human history) system of interpersonal and intergroup material and spiritual relations, necessary and sufficient for the development of the groups and units that belong there’.<sup>3</sup> As regards the term ‘society’ the emphasis falls onto objective relations among people, mainly due to division of work and being dependent on others at fulfilling his/her existential needs. Thus ‘society’ constitutes a dynamic, hierarchical and functional structure, moreover, it exists here and now, within certain conditions of time and place.

The term “nation” pertains to emotional bonds (using similar cultural symbols, sense of union of history and values, internalized in the process of socialization).<sup>4</sup> However, civilizations are societies lasting in a given ecosystem for hundreds, even thousands of years. They preserve relatively unchangeable social organization and fixed patterns of behaviour (social culture, mentality,

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<sup>3</sup> Z. Cackowski, *Filozoficzne problemy człowieka i społeczeństwa*, Warszawa 1990, p. 205.

<sup>4</sup> See A. Zajęzkowski, *Rzecz o socjologii*, Warszawa 1993, p. 90-94; E. Hobsbawm, *Narody i nacjonalizm po 1780 roku. Program, mit, rzeczywistość*, Warszawa 2010, p. 19-21; M. Waldenberg, *Kwestie narodowe w Europie Środkowo- Wschodniej*, Warszawa 1992, p. 16-17; A. D. Smith, *Kulturowe podstawy narodów*, Kraków 2009, s.29-47.

attitudes towards the world and life, value systems), which distinguishes it among neighbours – language and religion. Thus, which was stressed especially by Fernand Braudel, civilizations are ‘the longest of the long histories,’ and the history itself is ‘neither a certain economic reality, nor a certain society. It is what lasts and lives with no end in sight in the series of economic and social realities, displaying with it a significantly reduced flexibility.’<sup>5</sup> Each civilization has its own, distinguished history. Its content are dynamic stories of using different ways of organizing social work in given environmental conditions and cultural tradition. Thus civilizations do not assume either intergenerational continuity, or stability of institutions and class structure, or permanent cultural norms, concerning, for example, the position of a woman or family. Moreover, they may consist of, like the current western civilization, many national societies (Marshall Hodgson calls them supra-national societies). The term ‘civilization’ emphasizes technologies and energy used in socially permanent forms, so that next generations of a given population could co-exist in a certain ecosystem – creating ‘gardens in clouds’ like the inhabitants of the Andes, survive in the tundra, desert or on a small island in the middle of a gigantic ocean. The following generations enrich technological infrastructure, agriculture, improve organization and efficiency of labour, continue a ruling system, although within often-altering limits, etc. Using tools, energy and human labour is initiated and preserved, through a certain community. A direct manufacturer, depending on the means of manufacturing, is a next-of-kin, a serf, a slave or a hired hand. His superior acts in the role of a member of the elderly, a chief, a senior or a capitalist. He is at the same a member of different groups, segments, or social classes. Władysław Tatarkiewicz was right to emphasize that a civilization is a supplement of a man to nature surrounding him.<sup>6</sup> In the light of this only five

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<sup>5</sup> Tegoż, *Gramatyka cywilizacji*, op. cit., p. 68.

<sup>6</sup> See his *Parerga* Warszawa 1978, p. 76-79. See more in J. Szacki, *Historia myśli socjologicznej. Wydanie nowe*, Warszawa 2008, ch. 18. A survey of classical terms in T. Ellingsen, *Civilizations: Features, Structures, and Dynamism*, Paper presented at the Annual National Convention of Political Science, Trondheim, Norway, January 8-10, 2003. The author supports Braudel's concept. Some researchers understand ‘civilization’ in the same way as P. Bourdieu does by habitus, cultural capital

civilizations still exist: in the Far East the Chinese one (since 2000 BC) and the Japanese one as its variant (since 200 BC), Indian (since 2500 BC), the Middle East (Persia-Iran, since 4000 BC), Arabic-Islamic (since 7<sup>th</sup> century) and the Western (since 9<sup>th</sup> century), which at the beginning was just a periphery of the Euroasian-African centre.<sup>7</sup> For the few last decades the Latino-American civilization has been distinguishing itself as the result of biological and cultural miscegenation. It stems from overlapping of three ‘matrices:’ the matrix of the local Indian peoples, the matrix of two European nations – Portuguese and Spanish, and the matrix of African peoples, who survived the trauma of the cross-Atlantic journey in the cargo holds belonging to the leading European entrepreneurs.

We may introductorily call the world civilization a dynamic whole, which consists of all national societies and/or local civilizations, ergo an additional n+1 structure, a conglomerate whole, quasi whole. If one wants to speak about the dynamic whole, there must be affectioning and conditioning between among societies and their substructures (economies, states, national cultures). Speaking freely, the world civilization is the largest possible whole consisting of national states and interstate system, nations and local civilizations, manufacturing chains within industry and agriculture, global financial system of the economy-world, hybridization of cultures, and finally global system of economy. In its current form it was created due to the interaction between human population, mainly through technology and labour, and nature. The result of these interactions that have lasted for a thousand

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or C. Castoriadis by social *imaginarium*. It is about a group of partially or completely identical patterns of perception, thinking, evaluating and acting. Usually it stems from religion and social ethics, cultural-political programme (Sh. Eisenstadt). See his *Utopia i nowoczesność. Porównawcza analiza cywilizacji*, Warszawa 2009, p.34-46. For the author the beginning of modernity is strongly bound with the fall of the concept of God’s order and destiny of kosmos.

<sup>7</sup> M. G. Hodgson, *Rethinking World History. Essays on Europe, Islam and World History*, Cambridge 1993, p. 26. The problems of distinguishing certain civilizations are talked about by M. Melko in *The Nature of Civilizations, w: Civilizations and World Systems. Studying World-Historical Change*, Ed. by S. K. Sanderson, Walnut Creek, Lanham, New York, Oxford 1995, p. 33, also M. Hall, P. T. Jackson, *Introduction, w: Civilization and International Relations Theory*, (eds) . M.Hall, P. T. Jackson, New York, Houdmills 2007, p. 15-31. On the continuity of the Chinese civilization: R. Bin Wong, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience*, Ithaca 1997, p. 198-200; *Cywilizacje starożytne*, A. Cotterell (ed.), Łódź 1990.

years is humanized nature: technologically-environmental surroundings of human existence. This is only a fragment of a wider natural whole – system-earth.

## **2. Features of durability and change: perspectives for studies of World civilization.**

Researching the complex and dynamic social wholes, for instance civilizations, requires linking different scientific fields. In a given case it is about linking knowledge of natural sciences (history of earth, climatology, ecology, evolutionary biology, physical anthropology), economic, political sciences and anthropology of culture, whose main subject of research is global multicultural society. The world civilization, in order to understand its genesis and evolution, must be regarded together from the point of view of four perspectives: ecological, economic, politological and cultural. Only with their coherent linking, thanks to the adapted theoretical perspective, the analysis is given a macrosociological trait. The research problem, which arises here, is the problem of integrating this knowledge, of transdisciplinary strategy of researching. All researchers, whose work's subject was the evolution of the vast-in-time-and-space social whole devoted their reflection on how to link knowledge this scattered. It is Fernando Braudel's program of global history, Immanuel Wallerstein's social historical sciences, Marshall Hodgson's studies of civilization, or Andre Gunder Frank's studies of horizontally integrated macrohistory. And above all of research practice of macrohistorians – Braudel, McNeill, Wong, Pomerantz and others. It brings forth the consequence of 'being convinced of the unity of social sciences, whose value is not only a general theory or a collection of highly attractive terms, but rather creating incentive to intellectually grapple with notions of mankind's situations, in the past and today, without being forced to limit yourself with one field or method'.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> J. Goody, *Logika pisma a organizacja społeczeństwa*, Warszawa 2006, p. 25.

## 2.1 Ecological perspective: from the Malthusian catastrophe to the Meadow's trap.

Human history should be reconstructed as the history of constantly rising population, rising social metabolism, and rising pressure on local ecosystems' functioning. In short, it should be understood not only from the point of view of global-systemic point of view, but also from the perspective of human relation to nature, the ecological perspective.

In this perspective one may, for example, interpret European feudalism as developing Northern soil with a moldboard plough and an advanced rig. The counterpart for human societies' biogeography are histories of controlling local ecosystem and biomes by nations and civilizations. Various ecosystems evolved into common house of nations, local civilizations, directing their economies' and social cultures' development. These populations adopted given environments to their, mainly biogenic, needs, developing such model of economy, as if they wanted to practically actualize Bacon's directive stating, that nature might be subdued by humans only when they learn about its rules and be subjected to them. Homo sapiens settled the following ecosystems, often creating odd civilizations presented in the fine work of Felipe Fernandez-Armesto: desert, tundra and ice, non-fertile steppes ('oceans of grass'), tropical rainforests and glacial forests, alluvial soils in drying up climates, highland plateaus ('heaven's mirror'), and eventually oceans, whose domestication became historical work of nations inhabiting Atlantic coasts of Europe.<sup>9</sup> Few of them – six to be precise – are world agriculture cradles, focal points of cultivating crop, vegetables, fruit and cattle farming. Territory is a place where distinct cultural identities are formed, it is also a space of long-lasting relations within a given community with its environment, which fulfil its various needs,

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<sup>9</sup> His *Cywilizacje. Kultura, ambicje i przekształcanie natury*, Warszawa 2008, p. 35. Napoleon Wolański distinguishes analogous geoclimate environment of human existence": the Arctic, high mountains, dry areas, grassy ecosystems and tropical forests. N. Wolański, *Ekologia człowieka. Wrażliwość na czynniki środowiska i biologiczne zmiany przystosowawcze*, T.I. Warszawa 2006, p. 410-423.

for instance existential, recreational and aesthetical. A habitat, *loci*, is formed in this way.

Throughout millennia *Homo sapiens* used natural resources in a relatively sustainable way. In this phase the growth was extensive. It was based on agricultural production, gradual ameliorating of agrotechnology and efficiency of natural sources of energy – gravitational, solar or biomass recycling. Labour was carried out mainly by body (Mencius). The result was the slow population growth – around 0,1% a year. It was the Malthusian models of economy: population size, average lifespan and level of fulfilling the needs depended greatly on agricultural resources and available technologies, materials (wood) and energy. Using these until the industrial revolution increased, albeit very slowly, productivity of farmer's and craftsmen's labour. For example: population of China grew in the 18<sup>th</sup> century by 0,8% a year, namely from 120-150m (1600) to 350m (1800). In contrast population in Europe grew 16,2m between 1600-1750, and 28,5m between 1750-1800 (J. de Vries). The way out of the Malthusian catastrophe was access to new energy sources and materials to produce tools. These were hydrocarbons energy used to power machines, cheaper iron and steel. This took place in England in time of the industrial revolution. It is the second most important turning point in human relations with nature through labour. It seemed that the end of the Malthusian era came and mankind became independent of natural economy.

The industrial revolution and the beginning of the industrial society in the 19<sup>th</sup> century radically changed the landscape and environment. The rise of food supply due to agrotechnology and mechanization of farmer's labour, fall of newborns' deaths due to progress in medicine and generally growth of social product – all this led to fast growth of population on earth and reached today's levels after 200 years. Before last ice age, 10000 years ago, there were 2-3m *Homo sapiens* on our planet. There were billion new people every dozen or so years and mankind found itself in a new trap. It was named after the author of a report from 1974, who drew the public attention towards

environmental limitations of industrial civilization in its current, free market, capitalistic form – I call it the Meadows' trap. In contrast to the Malthusian one it has three new features. First, it encompasses the whole of the global ecosystem, while the preindustrial one used local ecosystems, mainly soil and wood. The current one influences all ingredients of the biosphere – atmosphere, hydrosphere and biosphere, it also reduces the biodiversity. In short – industrial economy is different in character. In order to function efficiently it requires constant accumulation. New fields of accumulation, growth of consumption demand cause the economy to leave deeper and deeper ecological marks. And third – in order to set oneself free from this trap all societies need to co-operate globally to set extreme conditions of functioning of market-capitalist economy. These conditions are among others: labour conditions (time, payment), and conditions of taking advantage of nature. Human has not subdued earth. It made itself addicted to nature and its ingredients – its climate, fertile soil riches and other resources, tropical rainforests, hydrocarbons, drinking water reserves. The nature's revenge is in civilization diseases, malnutrition and poverty within third world states, climate disorders, desertification, energy price growth. The current human being is harnessed to another type of treadmill than a farmer.

Within relations with nature one element of the world civilization is the space of the human world. Its borders are marked by technological extensions of human arms. In the current phase of industrial society it has encompassed natural environment so strongly, that now one cannot reflect on social life without referring to categories and knowledge stemming from natural sciences, and even technical. And conversely – natural sciences specialists see the necessity to include political science categories and knowledge in their analyses.<sup>10</sup> The next system without which one cannot understand how the

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<sup>10</sup> Np. S.H. Schneider, *Laboratorium Ziemia*, Warszawa 1998, p. 13; J. Diamond, *Strzelby, zarazki, maszyny*, Warszawa 2010, p. 23; H. Rogall, *Ekonomia zrównoważonego rozwoju. Teoria i praktyka*, Poznań 2010, p. 140, 541; W. H. McNeill, *The Human Condition: An Ecological and Historical View*, Princeton 1980.

world civilizations functions is the global ecosystem.<sup>11</sup> But by 'ecosystem' one understands all species interacting with one another and the physical and chemical environments, forming biological population. Within ecosystems production of biomass takes place. Exploitation of soil, oceans, grazing grounds, tropical rainforests and expanding ground for settling, which is connected to the population growth, changes local ecosystems. Economic activity of human population in the ecosystems led to fragmentation of natural environment, chemical pollution and movement of species to new ecosystems. It decreases biodiversity, the biosphere shrinks, interventions into biogeochemical cycles take place – carbon, oxygen or hydrological cycles. According to estimated numbers mankind has lost 25% of best soils since 1945 – they fell into oceans. It also consumed 1/3 of its forests, utilizing them mainly as wood to produce tools and firewood. Currently mankind is using 40% of plant production (the only autotrophs), measured on the basis of photosynthetic productivity. The ecological mark that mankind leaves on its natural environment, according to Mathis Wackernagel, has grown 80% in the last 40 years. Mankind is using 20% more resources than nature is able to recycle.<sup>12</sup> In ecological economics there is an equation where the influence on environment

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<sup>11</sup> N. Eldredge, *Życie na krawędzi. Rozwój cywilizacji i zagłada gatunków*, Warszawa 2003, p. 151; E. Wilson, *Różnorodność życia*, Warszawa 1999; C. Sagan, *Błękitna kropka - człowiek i jego przyszłość w kosmosie*, Warszawa 2001. Among social science experts there exists a reflection on the role of ecosystems in various societies' historie. See E. Burke III, K. Pomerantz, *The Environment and World History*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 2009. Introductory reflections by K. Pomerantza on pages 3-32; A. Hornberg, *The Power of the Machine: Global Inequalities of Economy, Technology, and Environment*, Walnut Creek, Lanham, 2001, p. 49-64. On the influence of climate on human history see H. H. Lamb, *Climate, History, and Modern World*, London and New York 1995, p. 272-309, a także J. Cowie, *Zmiany klimatyczne. Przyczyny, przebieg i skutki dla człowieka*, Warszawa 2009, ch. 3.

<sup>12</sup> M. Wackernagel, W. E. Rees, *Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth*, Gabriola Island, Philadelphia 1996, p. 7-27; P. Ward, *Hipoteza Medei. Czy życie na Ziemi zmierza do samounicestwienia?* Warszawa 2010, p. 21, 62-63,123; Ch-D. Schoenwiese, *Człowiek i klimat*, Warszawa 1997, ch. V; E. Kośmicki, *Teoria ekorozwoju a możliwości przewyżczenia normatywizmu*, w: *Sterowanie ekorozwojem. T.I, Teoretyczne aspekty ekorozwoju*, pod red. B. Poskrobki, Białystok 1998, p. 138-141; J. Foley, *Bilans zdrowia Ziemi*, Świat Nauki 2010, nr 5, p. 50-53; H. Meadows, D. I. Meadows, J. Randers, W. W. Berens III, *Granice wzrostu*. Warszawa 1973 and D. Meadows, *Evaluating Past Forecasts. Reflections on the One Critique of Limits to Growth, w: Sustainability or Collapse?. An Integrated History and Future People on Earth*, R. Constanza, L. Graumlich, W. Steffen (eds). The MIT Press, 2007, p. 339-416. Current data in the last WWF report Living Planet Report 2012, *Biodiversity, biopacity and better choices*, Annex 2, Ecological Footprint, p. 135-145.

is measured by multiplying the population size, per capita income and technology used (pressure on environment = population size x per capita income x technology used). In it the only unknown quantity now is the quantity of time which is left until the moment when the ecological mark imprinted on nature makes it impossible for it to save its balance.

On the basis of our knowledge of earth as a system, showing the place of the biosphere, and in it the role of human activity, we come to the field of a narrower scientifically natural discipline – ecology. It was founded at the turn of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Its subject are mutual influences between species and the environment they live in. The theory of evolution answers the question how these influences came to being and how organisms were created. There is then a tight relation between modern ecology and evolutionism.

As late as here one faces the problem of relation between natural environment (global ecosystem) and growing human population, which developed wide economic activity, utilizing vast natural resources in the process. The clash of the world civilization with nature elicited a lot of waves, which can sink it, and the last one is like a tsunami. Relations between economy and environment, from the point of view of social metabolism or the mark set on nature, is the job for ecological economics (W. Smil, H. Daly, H. T. Odum, R. Constanza, H. Bartmann, H. Rogall, M. Wackernagel). In this research perspective one sees the coevolution of the economy and environment. Human with its economic activities translates local ecosystems, and next it must adopt itself to these changes, which is achieved, on long-term basis, by boosting labour productivity thanks to better technologies. There is a thesis from this ascertainment: ‘functioning economic system is doomed to functioning ecological system’.<sup>13</sup> Because human cannot exist without nature,

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<sup>13</sup> H. Bartmann *Umweltoekonomie- Oekologische Oekonomie*, Stuttgart 1996, p. 13; R. Constanza, J. Cumberland, H. Daly, R. Goodland, R. Norgaard, *An Introduction to the Ecological Economics*, Boca Raton 1997, p. 6-7; N. Wolański, *Ekologia człowieka. Wrażliwość na czynniki środowiska i biologiczne zmiany przystosowawcze*, T.I. Warszawa 2006, cz. III, *Zróżnicowanie i geograficzne rozmieszczenie człowieka*, p. 335-363.

the primacy of economy is currently put in question. Categories of analyzing the world civilization in the ecological perspective are: limits of tolerance of nature, constant development, anthropogenic load put on the biosphere, balance of the ecosystem. They are about specifying the thesis that further development of national economies may proceed only within the limits of tolerance of nature.

**2.3 Economic perspective. As regards the analysis of a group of people's adaptation to the natural environment, there are two relatively independent aspects – the technological one and the one concerning proprietary relations.**

The aspect of technology, technique and energy utilized in the process of adaptation is decisive as regards the range of influencing the natural environment through labour. For 10000 years the only sources of energy used to multiply the effort of human arms were wind, sun and gravitational energy. Solar energy was used in the form of biomass, which domesticated animals transferred into pulling power. The breakthrough in this field was utilizing power from hydrocarbons to propel machines in 19<sup>th</sup> century in England. The new propulsion quickly enhanced labour productivity within the fields of industry, transport and military operations. This aspect of economy is among interests of evolutionism and history of technology. From this point of view in the history of human communities we have: the phase of hunters-gatherers, the phase of agricultural communities, and the industrial civilization. One important analytical category in this context is the notion of civilization as a model of common existence of people, based on the mechanism of adaptation to the natural environment. In this mechanism the most important part is the kind of economic activity which is enabled by technology (including writing or practical knowledge) and utilized energies. Disposal technological means of utilizing natural resources enable population growth, differentiation of settlement, development of labour specialization, and finally – the creation of

an institution to coordinate collaboration of masses of people. Only then a system of food distribution and wide social gaps can come into being.<sup>14</sup>

The next aspect of the process of people's adaptation to natural environment is the one concerning propriety relations, first towards land, then all natural resources, next – labour tools and social wealth, which was created out of human labour. As Polish academic, Andrzej Zajęczkowski, writes: 'the system of ruling the land and the organization of developed land and settled space are the basic conditions for human existence'.<sup>15</sup> Through millennia, up to 17/18<sup>th</sup> century, when the commodization of agriculture based on private ownership of the land came into being, first in England – land, water and resources located in a certain part of the world was owned by a nation. The object of common national ownership, apart from the land, were also material, spiritual and intellectual means, which served to adapt this certain ecosystem to the needs of human existence and to perpetuate the position of real co-owners. Necessary to achieve this adaptation were proper spiritual and physical abilities. They created labour strength, which was assisted by personal skills.<sup>16</sup> It is important to learn, as far as the human communities' history is concerned, how they organize social labour, or the way in which they utilize workforce and social wealth that is created out of it. The category we use to describe complex bonds between people who get involved in manufacturing goods and services and their redistribution is the means of production. This was introduced by Karl Marx. In this conceptualization manufacturing goods encompasses active relationship between humans and nature and rich physical and social bonds. They appear, directly and indirectly, between nature, individual labour, social labour, various activities

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<sup>14</sup> Similar definitions in Fernandez-Armesto Cite work, p. 20, as well as vast group of reearchers of human societies: G. Childe, *O rozwoju w historii*, Warszawa 1963, p.79-80, 159-160; E.P. Lanning, *Peru przed Inkami*, Kraków 1985, p. 9-10, B. Buzan, R. Little, *Systemy międzynarodowe w historii świata*, Warszawa 2011, p.236, A. Gałganek, *Historia stosunków międzynarodowych. Nierówny i połączony rozwój*, v.2, Warszawa 2013, p.944-973.

<sup>15</sup> His, *Rzecz o socjologii*. Warszawa 1993, p. 46.

<sup>16</sup> See more on appropriate concept of nation : S. Kozyr- Kowalski, op. cit., p. 24. See also J. Tittenbrun, *Gospodarka w społeczeństwie .zarys socjologii gospodarki i socjologii ekonomicznej w ujęciu strukturalizmu socjoekonomicznego*, Poznań 2012, p. 343-344.

and people within the social division of labour, as well as the state. In the combination of nature-economy-human there have been four ways of managing dominated in the history of societies: the means of production based on kinship, slave, tributary and capitalistic. The last one is created on the connection of privately owned means of factory production, utilizing scientific-based technologies and based on hired workforce.<sup>17</sup> In practical economy there are often overlaps between all ways of connecting direct manufacturer and labour conditions, currently this shows in oil-rich Arab societies. The most problematic thing seems to be understanding the modern era, which started with the industrial revolution of 18/19<sup>th</sup> centuries. The reason for these problems are analytical phenomena that are difficult to distinguish – industrialization, capitalism and modernity. Analytical problems are also present within the scope of the modern form of capital ownership, namely corporate ownership. At the starting point one must distinguish proprietary relations from relations which depend on ownership, or being the result of economic ownership, as well as in the systems of political authority, family life and relations which influence ownership. In result ownership is explained by Stanisław Kozyr-Kowalski ‘as such system of socio-economic relations, where obtaining material and spiritual goods appear – always, sometimes or only hardly ever – free, relatively or absolutely independent from own labour or generally human labour. Such obtaining of the goods is often connected to a form of practical economic and social monopoly.’<sup>18</sup> In that case ownership might be treated as special gift of nature or human history, for only in certain conditions for the development of technologies, labour tools and relations of domination of one group of people over other another it is possible to utilize that gift. It constitutes a non-labour feature of production, economy, social life and extra-social economic activities. Many modern nations are able to obtain gifts from nature. For example, according to World Bank estimates, capital assets made 9% of total Canadian wealth, but the state owes as much as 69% of

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<sup>17</sup> E. R. Wolf, *Europa i ludy bez historii*, Kraków 2009, p.337-350, P. Berger, *Rewolucja kapitalistyczna*, Warszawa 1995, p. 66-67, and G. Ingham, *Kapitalizm*, Warszawa 2011, p.23-35.

<sup>18</sup> There, p.225. See J. Tittenbrun, op. cit., p. 351-352.

its wealth to natural resources. In contrast Luxembourg has the biggest human share in creating social wealth – 83%, next places in this ranking: Japan (81%) and Germany (79%). According to R. Constanza team's estimates, the whole biosphere returns services to humans which are worth 33bln dollars (with the then GNP of 18bln dollars)<sup>19</sup>. The inclusion of electricity into production processes rapidly increased the effectiveness of human labour. In result, according to S. Albinowski's calculations, every employee hired in modern industry is assisted in his professional position by 130 'energy-related slaves'.<sup>20</sup> So the economic process is wider and deeper than monetary exchange. It encompasses the external results, both positive and negative. The analysis of functioning mechanisms of the modern economy must consist of: market mechanism, monetary system, production system, industrial conflict, or fighting for surplus, financial assets, the role of the state in economy and the cultural basis of the economic system. If one wishes to study global capitalism he/she must additionally treat national economic systems as elements of a wider whole, namely the capitalistic world economy. The structures of national economy transgress national states' borders, creating integrated economy, at least of a transnational character.

The main weakness of the mainstream economy is ignoring the historical aspect of the evolution of market-capitalistic economy. In econometric models it is usually assumed that economy is characterized by perfect competition, complete markets and symmetric information (as in the Arrow-Debreu's model). In the practice of the modern economy there are tendencies for gradual concentration and monopolization. What is still present is basic, indispensable in all phases role of the state, however temporarily weakened. Another important weakness of the classical analyses is the problem of

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<sup>19</sup> *The natural resources myth*, The Economist, 23 XII- 5I, 1995-1996 and R. Costanza, et.al. *The value of world's ecosystem service and natural capital*, Nature, 1997, No.387, 15 May, p.253-260. On methodology of respect see G. C. Daily, et. al. *The Value of Nature and the Nature of Value*, Science, New Series, 21 July 2000, Vol.289, No.5478, p. 395-396. G. Becker estimates the share of material resources, devices and natural resources in creating national income for 20%, the rest was to be created by human capital. See Tittenbrun, op. cit., p.. 245.

<sup>20</sup> His *Bogactwo i nędza narodów. Studia o gospodarce światowej u progu XXI wieku*. Warszawa 1996, p. 159.

external effects, which are not taken into account by prices (externalization of environmental costs). Still its identifying point treating natural resources as public goods such as water and atmosphere. It turned out (J. Robinson, P. Sweezy, J. K. Galbraith) that in practical capitalistic economy there exists a 'monopolistic competition' or oligopoly. Then the strategy of sustaining profit is created, which is the source of wasting of social wealth (expensive advertising campaigns, purchasing patents in order not to allow them to enter markets, limiting production to maintain monopolistic prices).<sup>21</sup>

#### **2.4 Political science perspective.**

What is important in this perspective is the analysis of particular and social interests, whom the state policies serve. It might be about its role in implementing and sustaining the neoliberal variant of modern globalization. The important thing is the analysis of strategic functions of the state, including new typology of its goals: assisting the capital on global level, protection of social order and its legitimization on national level, providing good conditions for investment and co-operating with NGOs on local level. In this phase of capitalist world economy's development it will be necessary to create new functions of states. This phase means more visible structural crisis in relations between human, economy and nature (Meadows' catastrophe). Its results and displays will be climate and food wars and old-new class wars. From the analysis of previous history-making crises there is a generalization, that in order to solve them it is necessary to step out of the previous institutional frames, strategies and conventional wisdom constituting their base. Now we have the liberal conception of "self-regulating markets' and the neoclassical economy sustaining the illusion of free competition of capital and labour and the consumer's independence.

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<sup>21</sup> More in J. A. Schumpeter, *Kapitalizm, socjalizm, demokracja*. Warszawa 2009, P. 94-98; J. K. Galbraith, *Ekonomia w perspektywie. Krytyka historyczna*. Warszawa 2011, P. 171-182; H. Rogall, op. cit., p. 85-89.

Ruling people's hearts and minds is carried out by bank economists. The alternative economics is waiting for its historical time, it is the economics of sustainable development and is the theoretical basis for new civilization – the civilization of constant development.

The solution to the new structural crisis will require changing of the neoliberal Leviathan. It is currently characterized by disciplinary social policies, expansive penal policies, individual responsibility as a motivating discourse (L. Wacquant), and above all – service for financial markets. There will be a new function for it – the function of global co-ruling, or structural (industrial), fiscal and social policies, but carried out in parallel with the remaining national economies. The goal of this new function will be to harmonize the businesses of national companies, trades and sectors with civilizational optimum. The hardest trial will be experienced by states who regulate their economies, which take most advantage of neoliberal globalization: USA, UK, China, and small countries but big 'tax havens'. Together states may win another war, this time against banking and financial sector. There appear the necessity to create institutional frames, utilizing recast international organizations, to formulate and execute boundary conditions of taking advantage of production factors on global scale. Thus one important scientific aim is to find the answer to the question why modern ruling class has become the slaves of financial markets, why the attempt to weaken the independence of central banks is now the only coup d'état, and the biggest threat is inflation. In short, it is about registering mechanisms which make politicians dependent on business. In practice it is down to pressing the administration of national states to suppress the inflation. So in order not to be caught in Meadows' catastrophe, the dynamic of accumulation, goods and services structure (mainly in the field of health service), other fields of technology and branches of economy must be different.

**The concept of hedonistic lifestyle is also out of steam.**

All this puts into question the possibility of continuing the current model of economic growth. One possible way out in the middle of the current century might be the civilization of sustained growth: World New Deal – the world ecologically, socially, politically and culturally sustainable; connecting economic efficiency with social safety and biodiversity. The next target for a political science expert is to find the answer to the question of whom the taxpayers money should serve – rentiers or general public. Another problem is the dilemma of common grazing ground in the global era, or the problem of collective goods connected with preserving the natural environment for the incoming generations. Moreover, we must solve the problem of legitimization of international organizations, which impose international regimes, often in the interest of large corporations (WTO, IMF, WB). And finally the problem of global leadership and government, or searching for institutional order being able to manage the world system (G-20, G-2, regional empires system?).

**3.4 Cultural perspective: confrontations or friendly meetings of local civilizations?**

Each of the perspectives of analyzing world civilization discussed so far requires a rich arsenal of terms and thesis. But to reach the centre of the spiritual culture of various nations, local civilizations and cultural formations requires untangling a few tissues that have been formed throughout millennia. Many academic disciplines try to organize the reflection on cultural interchange. They constitute a wide academic current called global anthropology. It blends many fields: sociology, social anthropology, ethnography, postcolonial studies, even philosophy of knowledge and politics.<sup>22</sup> In this perspective a few processes seem to attract the most attention. The first

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<sup>22</sup> K. A. Appadurai, *Nowoczesność na wolności. Kulturowe wymiary globalizacji*. Kraków 2005; W.J. Burszta, *Różnorodność i tożsamość. Antropologia jako kulturowa refleksyjność*. Poznań 2004; J. Clifford, *Kłopoty z kulturą. Dwudziestowieczna etnografia, literatura i sztuka*. Warszawa 2000; E. R. Wolf, *Europa i ludy bez historii*, Kraków 2009, S. Lukes, *Liberaltowie i kanibale. O konsekwencjach różnorodności*, Toruń 2012.

process starts at the notion that ‘modernity is created due to the presence of ‘other’ in it and in the perspective of depriving the West of the exclusiveness to depict it.’<sup>23</sup> There is the dialogue between the dominating culture of the centre, peripheral cultures and the pluralism of values that they are based on. This is the problem of universality versus particularity of certain cultures. It brings about the idea of their relativism and a paradoxical thesis, that ‘there is nothing ethnocentric, nothing more particular than pretension to universalism.’<sup>24</sup> It is mainly about rationalism and individualism (bonded with human rights and democracy), always taken for granted within the sphere of Western influence, and also treating the process of its modernization as a paradigm for the development of societies. As K. A. Appiah, one of the proponents of global anthropology writes, ‘the challenge here is to equip hearts and minds shaped throughout millennia in local groups in ideas and institutions which will allow us to live together as a global tribe, which we have become.’<sup>25</sup> There is a tension between nation and universalism, but not contradiction. Jean Ziegler, who agrees with this opinion, states that ‘nation which does not succumb to being closed within its own identity is the bearer of universal values. It accepts otherness and puts it in the awareness of belonging to a group which provides security.’<sup>26</sup> There are also meetings of different cultures and ethnic identifications within one nation. Paradoxically, it brings diversity to it, for – as E. Ionesco states – ‘the only living community is one that everyone may stay different among the same.’<sup>27</sup> But one result of the McWorld is Jihad, re-birth of nationalistic tendencies,, fundamentalisms,

<sup>23</sup> M. Turowski, *Antyeuropocentryzm i jego wrogowie*, w: J. Goody, op. cit., p. 25. His point of view on European political philosophy were brought to the multicultural discourse by postcolonial studiem. See D. Chakrabarty, *Prowincjonalizacja Europy. Myśl postkolonialna i różnica historyczna*, Poznań 2011, p.33-58 and A. Lomba, *Kolonializm/Postkolonializm*, Poznań 2011, especially p. 254-263.

<sup>24</sup> I. Wallenstein, *Europejski uniwersalizm. Retoryka władzy*, Warszawa 2007, p. 54. Steven Luces, interpretując spór między relatywizmem a uniwersalizmem, zauważa, że „uniwersalizm jest etnocentryczny, ponieważ etnocentryczność jest uniwersalna”, *Liberałowie i kanibale*, dz. cyt., p.39.

<sup>25</sup> Tegoż, *Kosmopolityzm. Etyka w świecie obcych*, Warszawa 2008, p. 11.

<sup>26</sup> Tegoż, *Nienawiść do Zachodu*, Warszawa 2010, p. 292.

<sup>27</sup> There. Steven Lukes stresses that „cultures are never ‘drawers,’ but open systems, places of protest, hybridization whose limits are blurred’. People live in cultural caleidoscope (J. Waldron). An opposite argument is called by him a ‘sociology for the poor.’ (za S. Benhabib), *Liberałowie i kanibale*, op. cit., p.51.

regional movements, separatisms. At the same time what connects people all over the world is the belonging to the community of the indebted. It is connected by common business – the rate of inflation. As Jan Toprowski states, ‘politics, culture and history – other sources of our humanity – become either private consumer options or ideas on spending free time, in the image of tv channels being watched by private units’ (...) or common consumer options, like sports events or concerts’.<sup>28</sup>

The second process, directly engaged with the first one is the process of theoretical and ideological overcoming of eurocentrism and what it was accompanied by in the era of colonial conquests – racism. There are in practice two sides of the problem. The first one touches upon the debate on the reasons of the ‘great furcation’ between the West and East. Many scholars believed the source was in the European culture, the “European miracle” which was to give birth to rationalism, modern science, modernization standards (M. Weber, E. Jones, L. Dumont, D. Landes). The position culturalism, strengthened in the age of romanticism, was based on the belief that the output of classical Greece was the foundation of Europe. Many studies done recently, especially ‘Black Athena’ by Martin Bernal, show Egyptian, Phoenician, Mesopotamian sources of Greek democracy, architecture, myths, religion and philosophical ideas.<sup>29</sup> In the wider perspective, studies of early modern economy and society which are more profound and based on familiarity with historical practice show that between European and Chinese or Indian institutions the difference is only about intensity. It concerns, among others, such determinants of development as freedom, private ownership, human rights, innovation, urbanization, family planning, democracy. They are present, with different intensity, in many civilizations. In the European academics’ research the eclectic liberalism axiology dominates. According to

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<sup>28</sup> His, *Dlaczego gospodarka światowa potrzebuje krachu finansowego*, Warszawa 2012, p. 156/157.

<sup>29</sup> M. Bernal, *Black Athena. The Afroasatic Roots of Classical Civilisation. T.I: The Fabrication of Acienc Greece 1785-1985*, New Brunswick, New Jersey 1987, p. 38-62. See J. Goody, *Logika pisma a organizacja społeczeństwa*. Warszawa 2006, p.77-80; M. Popko, *Huryci*. Warszawa 2005, especially p. 138-167. These authors point to the fact that ancient civilizations of the Middle East were superior to Greek peoples in respect to technology and culture, whose Greels were willing to accept.

Andrzej Walicki it is formed on a set of beliefs popular in academic discourse, media and colloquial thinking: 1) private ownership and free market (free market capitalism of the 'new right'), 2) human rights rhetoric (civil and political, not socio-economic), 3) believing in universal beneficialness of the political democracy (opposition against autocracy).

The third process within the cultural perspective is the communicative dimension of globalization. It developed mainly due to new technologies of sending and coding information, the machinery of mass culture (U. Hannerz, W. Burszta, V. Mosco, S. Czapnik). It is mainly cyberspace – the new empire being constructed now by popular media. The content popularized by it lead to standarization, homogenization, and even more – americanization. The omnipresence of popular culture in media endangers local cultural traditions. There is a question of evaluating cultural globalization from the point of view of systems of values, ideas, ideologies, consumption patterns, lifestyles: do the bites of information, growing rapidly in number being available to almost every human being on earth provide knowledge so that it can be the basis for wisdom? (N. Postman). Summig up the research on media cycle of cultural transmission Wojciech Burszta sees a tendency. Namely, 'the culture, which circulates around the world are not certain objects and symbolic forms, but the idea, that one can take part in this global metacultural game. This desire is not to be fulfilled by any local cultures'.<sup>30</sup> Is there, then, an era of detraditionalization ahead of us? Increased migrations forecast its coming. In result multicultural societies are created, with weakened cultural barriers and decreasing role of tradition as repository for life models, behavioral patterns, choices of life strategies. The sign of modernity seems to be – according to L.

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<sup>30</sup> W. J. Burszta, op. cit., p. 106; See U. Hannerz, *Cosmopolitans and Locals in Word Culture*, in: M. Feartherstone (Ed.) *Global Culture: Natinalism, Globalisation And Modernity*. London 1990, p. 237; His *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places*, London and New York, 1996, p. 102-111; V. Mosco, *The Political Economy of Communcatiion: Rethinking and Renewal*, London 2009, zwł. p.179-183, S. Czapnik, *Władza, media i pieniądze. Amerykańska ekonomia polityczne komunikowania*, Opole 2014. p. 95-99.

Lindstrom – ‘seeing the present in the notions of the past through depicting the past using terms of the present’.<sup>31</sup>

And finally an important level of relations between civilizations is searching for normative basis of co-operation of people of different races, national identities, local cultures, citizens of big and small countries, rich and poor societies. On the level of consciousness this basis is creating the formation of global awareness, apart from the national or local ones. At its base there are global collective goods, without which the constant development of the world civilization will not be possible. Implementation of the convention for climate protection, sustainable development, elimination of famine and poverty in the world leads to relegation of sources of everyday existence in the world market society. To incur such commitments international community is led by, on the one side, pragmatic considerations, on the other rising human solidarity, ethics of globalization. It is built on directives common to all important religious systems and ethical doctrines, they are their common denominator. A possible basis for this search is the conception of pluralism of values (I. Berlin, A. Walicki, S. Lukes, J. Waldron). It consists of such beliefs as recognition of plurality and disproportion of peoples’ goals, but at the same time each local civilization selects respected values and lifestyles from a limited pool, constrained by the manner of bio-psycho-socio-cultural existence, common to all Homo sapiens (rejection of cultural relativism).<sup>32</sup>

According to Edmund Lewandowski’s re-creation of various nations’ characters, one may get these directives to few rules. As the most important in our perspective one should regard the golden rule of ethics – reciprocity: do, ut des (I give, so you give to me, too). It is the basis for social exchange, it is

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<sup>31</sup> W. J. Burszta, op. cit., p. 113. See his *Świat jako więzienie kultury. Pomyślenia*. Warszawa 2008, p. 18-42.

<sup>32</sup> See I. Berlin, *Rzekomy relatywizm w XVIII-wiecznej myśli europejskiej*, in: *Pokrzywione drzewo człowieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2004, p.68-70, 76, A. Walicki, *Od projektu komunistycznego do neoliberalnej utopii*, Kraków 2013, p.387-402, S. Lukes, *Czy pluraliści muszą być relatywistami?*, in: *Liberałowie i kanibale*, dz. cyt., s.155-162, J. Waldron, *Minority Culture and the Cosmopolitan Alternative*, in: W. Kimlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford, New York 1995, p.99-100, Deepak Lal, *Does Modernization Requires Westernization*, The Independent Review, no.1, vol. 5, 2000, p.5-24.

present among various species, so for humans it has a genetic background. Another natural virtue is moderation, *aurea mediocritas*. Hesiod, Laozi, Confucius, Buddha, Sophocles, Aristotle – they all called to respect it in peoples' lives. In the face of diminishing natural resources it might inspire quality-oriented lifestyles. Compliance, prudence, sense of responsibility, fairness are connected to the above-mentioned. They all lead to a free-of-conflict life, they introduce reliance and boost trust and social capital. It is believed that in the world of Islam fairness is more important than freedom. Here the Islamic civilization departs from the Western one, which cherishes freedom, often understood economically. There freedom is confronted by fairness which requires that inequalities arose in the process of redistribution of goods were justified by labour and skills, and as we know from our previous deliberations, they are often of gift-like character. Another virtue is tolerance, or agreeing to attitudes other than ours. The realization of profound basis and arbitrariness of one's own culture, intellectual openness and reduction of cultural barriers among national, ethnic communities or local civilizations. The opposition of tolerance is fanaticism, or emphatic belief that one is absolutely right in his/her ways and willingness to make others behave similarly. As Amos Oz ironically writes: 'a fanatic takes great care of you, puts his arms around your neck, because he/she loves you so much, or he/she cuts your throat if you turn out to be invulnerable to salvation'.<sup>33</sup>

In this perspective the role of a scientist is to show what role might be played by the most important fields of spiritual culture influencing the consciousness of the modern man, especially regional, national, cosmopolitical awareness as well as popular or developing ideologies, such as economic neoliberalism, human rights, ecologism or religious fundamentalism.

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<sup>33</sup> Cyt. za E. Lewandowski, *Konfrontacje cywilizacyjne*. Dziś, 2007, nr 1, p. 95; P. Singer, *Jeden świat. Etyka globalizacji*, Warszawa 2006, p. 164-206, a także J. Krejci, *The Paths of Civilisations. Understanding the Currents of History*, New York 2004. For example the golden rule of Confucianism as the basic virtue in the shape of *Ai ren*, decrees friendliness towards other people. See Haesung Lee, *Kapitalizm konfucjański. Koreańska droga rozwoju*, Toruń 2011, p. 28-29 oraz *Dialogi konfucjańskie*, Wrocław 1976, XV:23.

### **3. Trans-discipline strategy of research structure for study of civilization.**

On macro level all global society, meaning humanity consisting of all nations and ethnic communities living in all corners of our planet, might be treated as a system. According to Charles Tilly one may state that a society is 'a network of plenty social relations, some of which are totally local, and others pertaining to the global scale'.<sup>34</sup> Of this network some junctions are chosen to be researched and they obtain practicability under the names of national states, social organizations or social groups. The transfer towards the social world is done through empirical indicators. They might be events in history and their sequences made of individual and collective actions, such as revolutions or adaptation strategies. Such research policy leads to specific tests based on historical records.

#### **3.1 Theoretical inspirations for trans-discipline strategy – neoclassicism.**

The immense academic output from masters of social sciences may become a heuristic structure of research going outside of basic aims, scientific questions and formulated thesis or generalizations. A condition to achieve that would be their expansion and materialization through referring to new scientific goals, phenomena and processes, in short, generalizing correspondence between previous application and new cognitive needs. Stanisław Kozyr-Kowalski states that neoclassicism is conscious employing of the classicists' output in a given field or fields.<sup>35</sup>

Sociologists developed many theories or visions from historical dynamics. However we still lack the theory for the largest structure of social life, which is the world civilization. It does not mean however, that in the rich output of the whole sociology, and in the social sciences as well, there are no

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<sup>34</sup> His *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. New York 1984, p. 25.

<sup>35</sup> Tegoż, dz. cyt., p. 27-35.

mature theoretical conceptions or conceptions materialized in research practice. Conditions for that are fulfilled by Immanuel Wallerstein's and his, to a certain extent, master and rival – Fernand Braudel's theory of world-systems. Among such vast in space and time scientific undertakings are undoubtedly Karl Marx's and Max Weber's theoretical systems. An attempt to embrace the accelerators for social change, extended to the whole of the history of human societies, was undertaken by evolutionists and neoevolutionists. But the factual reconstruction of the historical process of intertwining of destinies being far away from one another, is attempted by world historians, anthropogeography experts, anthropologists of culture, sociologists of history. They all are looking for conditions and mechanisms of development, stagnation, fall of many societies, local civilizations, different paths of development taken by peoples living in different habitats. Such presentation of human history is typical for bigger and bigger group of academics who try to overcome the cognitive and axiological limitations of national histories, and especially to overcome the understanding history from European perspective. Aspiring to overcome europocentrism may be associated mainly to Edward Said, James Blaut (geography expert), Marshall Hodgson, William McNeill (historians), Eric Wolf (anthropologist), Andre Gunder Frank (economist), Barry Buzan, Richard Little, John M. Hobson (international relations experts).<sup>36</sup> Fernandez Armesto, who belongs to this group, stresses that 'world history is about mutual relations among nations. Its most representative episodes, for certain groups, mirror strong intercultural relations: migrations, commerce, mutual influences, missions, pilgrimages, wars, forging of empires, popular social movements,

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<sup>36</sup> Zob. E. W. Said, *Orientalizm*, Poznań 2005; J. M. Blaut, *The Colonizer's Model of the World. Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History*, New York 1993; W. H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community, with a Retrospective Essay*, Chicago 1990 and his *The Rise of the West after Twenty-Five Years, w: Civilisation and World Systems*. Op. cit., p. 303-320; M. Hodgson, *Rethinking World History*, Cambridge 1993; E. R. Wolf, *Europa i ludy bez historii*, Kraków 2009; A. G. Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1998. The output of world history is presented at <http://www.h-net.org/~world>. J. Goody, *Kapitalizm i nowoczesność. Islam, Chiny, Indie a narodziny Zachodu*, Warszawa 2006, p.7-33; R. Collins, *Introduction: The Golden Age of Macro- Historical Sociology, w: Macrohistory. Essays in Sociology of the Long Run*, Stanford University Press 1999. See O. Halecki, *Historia Europy - jej granice i podziały*, Lublin 1994, p. 34-35.

technology transfers, biological species and terms.<sup>37</sup> World history adherents developed a wide sociological reflection over difficulties of researching such a complex structure: interdisciplinarity, bonding subjectivity with objective conditions, especially ecological ones, consistency and qualitative changes, distinguishing developmental cycles, the role of the state and accumulation of capital, universal tendencies and regional curiosities, synchronized integration of local civilizations' histories and their relative diachronic separation.<sup>38</sup> What is especially emphasized is the thesis that there are no historical narrations that are not history-burdened. 'Ignoring this fact leads either to bad history or bad theory,' as Randall Collins concludes.<sup>39</sup>

In this article's author's opinion, the decisive circumstance was the technological revolution of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and profound social, cultural and political change it brought with it: industrialization, urbanization, democratization, birth of modern nations and liberal-democratic states. Currently the 'modern religion of progress' is rejected more and more often. Technology – the main source of modernity – has been criticized, too. The dualism of technology and science is emphasized. One painful fact is also the

<sup>37</sup> His *Cywilizacje. Kultura, ambicje i przekształcanie natury*, Warszawa 2008, p. 28 and *Milenium. Historia ostatniego tysiąclecia*, Poznań 1999.

<sup>38</sup> See M. G. Hodgson, op. cit., p. 2-9,72-95, 245-246; G. A. Frank, *ReOrient*, op. cit., p. 230-257, 339-360; I. Wallerstein, *Analiza systemów światów. Wprowadzenie*, Warszawa 2007, p. 13-40; J. M. Hobson, *The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change*, Cambridge 1997, p. 173-22; J. Abu- Lughot, *Discontinuity and Persistence. One world system or a succession of systems*, [in]: *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?*, A.G. Frank, B. K. Gills (eds.), London, New York 1993, p. 278-291; I. Morris, *Why The West Rules – for now. The patterns of history and what they reveal about the future*, London 2010, p. 21-26, J.A. Goldstone, *Why Europe? The Rise of The West in World History, 1500-1850*, Boston 2009, p.16-33, K. Pomerantz, *The Great Divergence: Europe, China and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, New York 2000.


<sup>39</sup> His, the introduction of *The Golden Age of Macro- Historical Sociology*, University of Pennsylvania 1998. See articles of American authors: G. Stokes, *The Fates of Human Societies: A Review of Recent Macrohistories*, *The American Historical Review*, April 2001, Vol. 106, No.2., and P. Manning, *Navigating World History: A Guide for Researches and Teachers*, New York 2003. p.15. Of Polish authors see A. Chodubski, *Wyjaśnianie cywilizacyjne w poznaniu nauk humanistycznych (i społecznych)*, w: *Cywilizacje w czasie i przestrzeni*, Zeszyty Naukowe, nr.4, Uniwersytet Gdański, Toruń 1998, p. 21-33. B. Buzan, *From International to World Society*, Cambridge 2004; B. Buzan, R. Little, *Systemy międzynarodowe w historii świata*, Warszawa 2011, J. M. Hobson, *The Eastern Orgins of Western Civilisation*, New York 2004, . Rozwojowi tego kierunku badawczego towarzyszy bogata refleksja metodologiczna. See e.g. J. Hobson, G. Lawson, J. Rosenberg, *Historical Sociology*, w: *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ISA, 2010, ed. R. A. Denenmark, <http://epints.lse.ac.uk/28026/>

lack of main destination point, the project of 'kingdom of freedom' and welfare. It was replaced by a permanent and unfocused change.<sup>40</sup>

As a heuristic conception, binding all levels, the biggest heuristic virtues is presented by Fernand Braudel's concept. The French historian enumerates three levels of social reality:

1) the level of structural history. Long **waves** might be interpreted as specific historical periods, when the structure or the course of the researched processes is determined by the occurrence of the same conditions.<sup>41</sup>

**Chart 1. Block model of relations between global ekosystem, human economic activities, global government and culture.**



<sup>40</sup> See U. Beck, *Władza i przeciwładza w epoce globalnej*, Warszawa 2005; A. Giddens, *Nowoczesność i tożsamość. „Ja” i społeczeństwo w epoce późnej nowoczesności*. Warszawa 2001; Z. Bauman, *Płynna nowoczesność*. Kraków 2006; E. Wnuk-Lipiński, *Świat między epoki. Globalizacja. Demokracje. Państwo narodowe*, Kraków 2004. See also J. Delumeau, *Strach w kulturze Zachodu*, Warszawa 1986.

<sup>41</sup> Such mode of interpretation is talked about by E. Mandel, *Long Waves of Capitalists Development: A Marxist Interpretation*, London, New York 1995, p. 76-96.

In the field of logistics within far-reaching commerce it could be the phase of utilizing porters in tropical rainforests, camels in the desert or coastal shipping in the sea routes. Such available means of transport would condition far-reaching commerce through millennia. The qualitative change was brought by improvement of communication between continents thanks to steamboats and railways, which happened in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

2) the level of conjunctural history (economic, political, cultural, social, military (for instance: Kondratieff's and Juglar's cycles).

3) the level of occurrence history, for example political (nobility's or aristocracy's rule in the Second Polish Republic, or activities of democratic opposition in the 1970s in Poland). In the political reality and by using many author's research, these were waves of democratization: S. Huntington's (1828-1926; 1943-62; 1972...), P. Kennedy's hegemonial cycles (hegemony of Spain, Holland, England and the USA correlated with economic advantage).

These three relatively distant processes are activated due to a certain arrangement of social labour organized in order to utilizing the world of nature. The process of the longest wave encompasses types of relations between human population and natural environment set up with the intermediation of labour (economy). There are two phases within the history of the last 5000 years. Up to the industrial revolution world population was imprisoned in the Malthusian trap. Communities of hunters-gatherers lived in local ecosystems. Such was the fate of agricultural communities. They used different ways of uniting labour conditions with the direct manufacturer (means of production based on kinship, slavery or tribute). But with the industrial revolution and the birth of capitalistic means of production mankind found itself in the Meadow's catastrophe: a lot of people, less and less land and resources, bigger and bigger ecological mark, increase in biomass exploitation

and more and more endangered biodiversity and balance of the earth's ecosystem.

On the second level of this analysis there is the conjunctural history. It is a process of evolution of international systems' evolution, created through ecological conditions, and wider, structural (here: available material resources and means of transport). Here one distinguishes the phase of the Civilization of the Middle and its centre in Mesopotamia (3000-1500 BC – 500 BC). The next stage was the East-West system without hegemon lasting up to the geographical discoveries era. Then the world market was created organized mainly by English merchants. The West dominates militarily utilizing material resources, labour and resources of 'the peoples without histories.' As late as with the industrial revolution, which bound wage labour with industry equipped with new technologies (carbon revolution), the modern, market, capitalistic world economy is born.

The transition from one developmental phase of the researched structure or historical process (for example the role of climate and agriculture in determining the number of living people) to the next takes place in the result of a structural crisis. It then constitutes a developmental barrier, which is overcome by some societies, but by the remaining ones it becomes history, most often after the trauma of wars, epidemics, which is accompanied by religious movements deadening human consciousness.

#### **4. The structure of knowledge about the world system.**


To recognize bonds and factors explaining the process of world civilization's inception and turning points of its evolution, one must use the trans-disciplinary strategy. Its usage in research requires profound theoretical and empirical knowledge, which is a manifestation of the output of many academic disciplines. In simplified version this is shown by chart 2.

Thanks to the trans-disciplinary strategy there is an idiographic theory created. It restores an individual historical process of founding the world civilization, similarly to how natural sciences reconstruct earth's history. Yet in this process one can see the presence of some regularities of relations between nature and economical activities, type of economy and number of people in a population, level of life and the manner of redistributing national wealth – just as the regularities within the lives of various species, determined by environmental changes described in Darwin's evolution theory. For the needs of explaining a phenomenon one must use his/her general knowledge. It is necessary to understand regularities and relations between phases of the process and elements of evolving social structures. There is not one universal conception apart from assuming the knowledge of human and social structures created by subsequent generations of a given community. These structures later shape the community's life together with the local ecosystem. Although currently human is able to free himself from the local system, yet there are conditions on the level of the global ecosystem. When one wants to keep collective global goods, one needs to learn about their survival mechanisms. We gain such information from nature scientists (the element of the knowledge of nature). Next one must know what results stem from the economic activity of all mankind in the neoliberal order (the element of economic knowledge), and how inefficiencies of this order may be minimized by co-operating states (the element of political science knowledge (international relations and global government), and what kind of change as regards style of consumption, diet, value system is required from particular individual (the cultural element). This is the essence of the trans-disciplinary strategy: combining terms, categories, theses formulated within different natural and social disciplines, in order to understand theoretical and practical problems, which are created by protecting and utilizing collective global goods.

According to the above deliberations, the knowledge structure about the world civilization is as follows:

- 1) knowledge of the place of biosphere in the earth system and the role of human population in the global ecosystem; on this level a researcher gains data on social metabolism, relations between economy and nature. He/she takes under consideration natural and technological conditions for social development. He/she must follow this pattern for geographical environment determines social development, which in turn mediates mechanisms of this influence. The influence encompasses continental axis, climate type, environment type (biom), precipitation, day length, disease types, conditions for growing crops and breeding, species of wildlife; the influence of the area covered by a continent is described by the following regularity – the more communities, the more discoveries; this data is provided by earth science, ecology of systems, population ecology, human ecology, biogeography and anthropogeography (W. Smil, A. Crosby, J. Diamond, N. Eldredge, H. H. Lamb, J. Lovelock, H. T. Odum, H. Rogall, P. Ward, N. Wolański);
- 2) system conception of human as a creation of anthropogenesis and anthrorevolution, physical anthropology (T. Bielicki, D. Buss, R. Foley, T. Kocowski, S. Pinker, A. Wierciński);
- 3) homo sapiens history, population genetics, historical demography (R. Malthus, L. Cavalli Sforza, A. Landry, A.C. Renfrew);
- 4) national economy (production, circulation, division of products etc.) and theories of circulation of capital, commerce, production chains, migration, workforce, the role of the metropolis; theories of indexation and accumulation of capital in all national economies; theories of historical phases of capitalist economy development (cycles, crises, production orders – empirical-historical, idiographic theories);
- 5) Theory of operational and system functions of states, theory of global government, theories of international politics;

**Chart 2. The structure of knowledge regarding the world system: general and empirical-historical knowledge.**



6) theory of hybridization of culture (U. Hannertz); theory of international communication, intercultural (A. Appadurai, W. Burszta, J. Clifford, E. Wolf);

7) concepts binding basic levels of functioning of societies; general theories (research programmes), connecting all levels of analysis: Braudel's concept of total history (global), Wallerstein's world-system, general knowledge steering the reconstruction of history made by global historians (Ph. Curtin, Fernandez-Armesto, M. Hodgson, W. H. McNeill, I. Morris).

But theory points only to a general direction. Within social sciences theories are of sketchy character, they function in research practice 'silently.' They are merely loose group of general statements, before being used practically they need to be specified and expanded. Within the at least 5000-year-long history of world civilization the steering level consists of three systems of statements – general and of historical generalization. They are:

1. theory of species nature of humans
2. theory of the polycentric and parallel evolution of agrarian civilizations
3. theory of world-system

Theory of species nature of humans is a generalized reflection on evolutionary biology, general and physical anthropology, as well as evolutionary psychology concerning human as biocultural species. In the biocultural perspective human constitutes a bio-psycho-socio-cultural whole. In this perspective *Homo sapiens* carries out both an internal expansion, developing abilities of its brain, and an external one connected to mastering local ecosystems. Among many curiosities of human behaviour, we must refer directly to three of them: human cognitive sphere, the process of socializing of an individual, and the role of tools (technology and energy). Thanks to its species nature human may expand internally on the individual level (through gaining knowledge of nature, practical skills and its dynamics). What leads to

this is cultural creating of new needs, especially the need to learn about the world and the need to sense the goal in one's life. The far-reaching expansion may also stem from that. Groups of humans adapt better and better to the ecosystem or expands to areas taken by other groups. It might be through peaceful means using persuasive tools, or through military strength (conquest). Thanks to the external expansion of certain human populations, the habitat of the whole species widens.

The species nature of human constitutes the constants of history, it also constitutes human, or biocultural way of historical existence, which in turn goes through different types of social systems. They are born through adaptations, which constitute an answer to structural crises, and can happen thanks to utilizing the potential of the brain. Crises may have different reasons: ecological challenges, malfunctions of social life organization, employing developmental opportunities through technological and organizational improvements, etc. After the Neolithic Revolution the agrarian civilizations became such system, after the Industrial Revolution - industrial societies.

Theory of the polycentric and parallel evolution of agrarian civilizations in Eurasia (Ph. D. Curtin, K. , , R. B. Wong, J. Goody, J. Goldstone, A. G. Frank, K. N. Chaudhuri, J.M. Hobson, J. Kochanowicz, W. H. McNeil). It is a fact, that 90% of its history mankind spent in communities of hunters-gatherers (hunter-gatherer conomy). In this conditions species nature of Homo sapiens was established.

About 10000 years ago there was another qualitative breakthrough in this species' history. After the so-called Neolithic Revolution a social whole was created, which based on agriculture. Different crops grown in similar ecosystems (river valleys and 'vertical archipelagos') led to the birth of parallel structures, which were partially different as regards organization of social life (city-states, kingdoms, empires). Their base was natural economy - growing crops and animal breeding. Agriculture employed 80% of illiterate farmers

living on the edge of existence. With time and the development of taxes market and money were created. The exchange between the town and the country (village) was developed, and especially far-reaching trade of luxurious goods, and later big regional markets emerged. There were also technological means – technology for agriculture and print. The latter made it possible to convey and consolidate knowledge, as well as keep books (accounting) and deliver instructions to places located far away from the centre.<sup>42</sup>

The Neolithic Revolution marked the beginning of constant tendencies in the process of organizing social life as well as human's life strategies. As Andrzej Wierciński points out one of these tendencies was the situation in which a member of a population was bound to the land, family and village.<sup>43</sup>

In contrast to nomads, the relation with the local ecological niche became stronger. In the result of social stratifications the number of individual and intergroup conflicts grew. The opportunity of becoming wealthy thanks to the increase of the crop-growing areas created the need to hire more workers. The result of this was the birth of slavery. First slaves were recruited from prisoners of war.<sup>44</sup> This was the professionalization of social life going on, which was accompanied by the birth of social classes. Gradual growth of productivity of farmer's and craftsman's work gave birth to consumptional attitudes, first within the elites. The measure of human's value was to be a group of useful and luxurious things. Not only consumptional attitudes became common, but also autocentric. The functioning of agrarian civilizations was based on two structures: the exchange structure and the power one. They were regulated by tradition or the mechanism of redistribution. The latter was achieved by a system of taxes and forced labour. 'Higher social groups lived on wars and taxes, or redistribution.'<sup>45</sup> Jacek Kochanowicz calls this way of

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<sup>42</sup> J. Goody, *Logika pisma a organizacja społeczeństwa*, Warszawa 2006, rozdz. II i III.

<sup>43</sup> A. Wierciński, *Magia i religia. Szkice z antropologii religii*, Kraków 1997, s. 34.

<sup>44</sup> See. L. Schumacher, *Niewolnictwo antyczne. Dzień powszedni i los niewolnych*, Poznań 2005, p. 30.

<sup>45</sup> J. Kochanowicz, *Trendy cywilizacyjne*, w: *Wymiary życia społecznego. Polska na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, pod red. M. Marody. Warszawa 2002, p. 467. See also W. Kula, *Teoria ekonomiczna*

organizing social life 'social ecosystems,' because they wanted to conserve the order and hierarchy. Each person was to stay where he/she was born. The system was kept in relative homeostasis thanks to isolation and gradual introduction of innovations. Meanwhile the Malthusian mechanism played the main role. It provided balance between human and the ecosystem's capacity. When the number of individuals in a population exceeded agriculture's capacity, then epidemics, wars, natural disasters played their parts. In result the rhythm of agricultural civilizations' lives constituted cycles of lean and golden years, returning every time to the original state. Even aspirations to control governments were legitimized by referring to the 'perennial rights of the kingdom.'

With time cities developed in agrarian communities, as well as regional and far-reaching commerce. Art, science developed within the cities, there was technological progress, innovations in commerce and production organization. There was commercial exchange among civilizations, as well as cultural one, although they did not develop at the same rate. Inventions, religious movements, artistic products, pathogens were internationalized. Creative experiences of certain centres represented by science, technology, art, as well as religions, ideologies, forms of organization of social life rushed towards the world with merchants and their goods, in time becoming the output of the whole mankind. It confirms Elman Service's, a renowned anthropologist, opinion, that societies do not evolve in order to go to wars, but rather to avoid them. What might lead to that is increase in mutual bonds and taking benefit from commercial exchange, co-operations and reliable treaties.<sup>46</sup>

The third system of assertions is theory of world-system (F. Braudel, I. Wallerstein, S. Amin, G. Arrighi). It depicts a new social whole, whose

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*ustroju feudalnego*, Warszawa 1962; K. Piesowicz, *Całkiem inna historia*. Warszawa 1987; J. M. Hobson, L. Weiss, *States and Economic Development. A Comparative Historical Analysis*, Cambridge 1995; M. Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol.1, *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.d. 1760*, Cambridge 1986, ch.16, Patterns of world- historical development in agrarian societies, p. 518-543.

<sup>46</sup> E. R Service, *Origins of State and Civilisation: The Process of Cultural Evolution*, New York 1975, p. 61.

elements are old agrarian civilizations, which were previously connected only by commercial routes. It happened after the Industrial Revolution, but the beginning of the process was marked by crossing the oceans. It was then when human creativity (inventiveness) won, as well as entrepreneurship, first mainly within exploitation of resources and labour of 'savages' – who did not know Lord nor firearms. One field of the world system are relations and influences developed within it. Above all it is about economic relations, which establish hierarchical system of national societies. In the result of accumulation of wealth, innovation, military advantage, they are divided into the centre, semiperipheries and peripheries. There are, as Alain Bihr states, two phases in the process of the world system's genesis: internationalization and transnationalization.<sup>47</sup> In the former a big part in protecting and supporting national businesses is played by a state. In the latter, as a result of the birth of the world economic space, its role was diminished. There is currently a competition between regulative functions of states within the processes of protecting and facilitating reproduction of capital and big cities, regions, local governments, international organizations and global financial markets, as well as private transnational corporations.

Researcher's main tool is, within this strategy, the procedure of causative explaining. The breakthrough moments (qualitative changes) constitute the resultant of many developmental lines, many various social and natural processes. Human ideas and planes go through two main modes of history – the mechanism of the invisible hand (or the global effect) and the mechanism of planned action, usually with significant participation from a state as a leading instance. In almost every case of the qualitative change we have to do with the crucial influence of the ecosystem, controlling role of the state, human brain's creativity within the fields of technology and energy, and an open social conflict with the deficit of goods and economic crisis in the background. What is manifested there is the dialectics of chances and new developmental

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<sup>47</sup> A. Bihr, *Nowomowa neoliberalna*, Warszawa 2008, p. 153-167. About merchant diaspora see Ph. D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*, Cambridge 1984.

barriers. To beat a crisis situation requires many innovations – progress within technology and energy, political system innovations, beating ecological barriers, often an external expansion – it all requires activities from various groups of people within the current structural conditions. The conditions themselves constitute a complex structure: from external conditions to conditions present in a given political system; from ecological and economic conditions (hard) to conscious ones (soft). One needs to see any novum in the situation, for it gave birth to technological and institutional innovations and gave way to creative subjectivity. In short, one needs to look for reasons for breaking the continuity of the previous order and emerging of new strategies of the whole population's actions. In general factors and circumstances leading to the breakthrough social change create a rich mosaic. We have to simplify the picture of the researched reality in order to embrace the main developmental lines. We pass over less important factors and circumstances, in other words, we are doomed to the model explaining with strong idealization at the beginning. This introductory picture may be the benchmark for further research, where facts model interpretation, and interpretation enables getting to new facts. In this scope academic research is all about historical reconstruction of the causative processes network. According to Wesley Salmon, scientific explanation is about pointing to the place within the network where a given phenomenon belongs.<sup>48</sup> However two phenomena are causatively bound when they are bound by a chain of processes and interactions.

### **5. Civilizational convergence determinants in the last 5000 years.**

The main theses came forth as a result of confronting historiographical material with historical dynamics concepts, which encompass the whole history of mankind. The more and more efficient control over nature, at least until wider consequences of the Industrial Revolution came to light, was accompanied by the process of integration of scattered agricultural centres. There is an ongoing debate over the interpretation of this process – was the

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<sup>48</sup> W. C. Salmon, *Causality and Explanation*, Oxford University Press 1998, p. 50-67.

expansion of communities, which subdued their neighbours through military advantage, its driving power, or was the necessity of exchanging goods unavailable in certain ecosystems or not manufactured by local economies driving power the driving power. If the decisive role was played by the progress of exchanging goods, it begs the question concerning the participation of innovation and creativity of people in comparison to organizational and coordinational part of the state. Was it a gradual, cumulative process of the growth of labour's productivity, or rather new institutional and technological solutions were born beside the pain of structural crises. Did development require only a stroke of genius from humans' best weapon – the brain, or rather sweat-producing effort, and often – blood-producing one. To answer these questions, an analysis of breakthrough points of the world civilization development must be carried out, beginning from the anthropogenesis. The synthesising output must be based within the theory of fact selection and lines of explaining. According to J. Topolski, scientific steps create the following continuity: theory – selection of facts – explaining of facts with reference to the theory – explanatory narration.<sup>49</sup>

The results of systematized reflection over the genesis and evolution of the world civilization might be presented within 18 following theses.

### **Thesis 1: Who? The role of merchants and cities**

Within the polycentric interpretation of the process of overlapping of local civilizations' histories the main role was played by people living in cities, mainly merchants, later businessmen, today – financial specialists. They organized networks for exchanging goods, as well as, when the opportunity occurred, networks of ideas and (unwillingly) pathogens. Thus the starting point, at the same time the breakthrough point of the globalization process, is constituted by 'the birth of the city' and its population: merchants, members of professional groups (doctors, lawyers, teachers), shop owners, goods

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<sup>49</sup> See also: J. Topolski, *Metodologiczna struktura syntez historycznych*, in: *Nowe idee współczesnej historiografii*, Poznań 1980, p. 154.

manufacturers – craftsmen and, last but not the least – businessmen. As it turned out, evolutionary breakthrough points reside in the humans' relations with nature (technology and energy) used in production, transport and transferring information. Breakthrough points like the Neolithic Revolution, crossing the oceans and industrialization lead to tightening relations among civilizations and, in consequence, to the birth of the economy-world and world civilization. This analytical perspective is a better way to reconstruct the globalization process than the existing paradigm of development, which distinguishes such periods of evolution as antiquity, feudalism and capitalism. The developmental line is created by innovations in trading goods and its balance within the relations between the West and East. At that time there appeared many developed instruments, such as trade broking, bank deposit, transaction insurance or financial engineering. Eventually the most important innovation proved to be the system of bank loans, which allowed to credit manufacturing and consumption. Its collateral was state tax revenues. What was decisive as regards product competitiveness made in different parts of the globe were local ecosystems and their conditions, traditions of productivity and practical knowledge, as well as organizational efficiency of societies (differences in productivity potentials), taking advantage of the state power. The middle class and merchants played the main part in the industrial productivity development and political democratization. The middle class used mass media, encouraged to develop secular science and sponsored fine culture. In agrarian societies the middle class was never dominating. Its role was to trade the agrarian surplus.

### **Thesis 2: How? Sea and land trade routes**

The main sites within the network encompassing local civilizations were ports and cities located on trading routes. Currently their role is taken over by transport and informational infrastructure of the world economic space. Goods were transported via ports, especially on Indian Ocean. First factories and colonies were created. It gave a cosmopolitan character to the cities. What

accompanied the goods were innovations, religious cults, modern arts and crafts, as well as pathogens. It was a very convenient route for all. Apart from technological infrastructure, it was necessary to use intellectual means, first alphabet and writing, then money.

### **Thesis 3: The role of inventions, technology and energy**

Convergence of technology and organizational enhancements has been assisting human development for ages. Their overlapping was stimulated by the development of information carriers (paper, print) and means of transport (ships, sailing). Some local civilizations became the pioneers of innovations – and for both short and long terms – gained relative advantage (China, India, Arabic-Islamic civilization), they could also experience downturns (China and India). What mattered for Europe except for colonial conquests were alphabetical writing, printing press and paper (Chinese inventions). In this perspective two moments became momentous: the invention of agriculture and the Industrial Revolution, or utilizing new sources of energy in manufacturing processes (steam engine, combustion engine, electric motor, nuclear energy) and production mechanization. To this group of changes one may qualify the birth of a factory into the capitalist system. Innovations here encompasses: ownership relations of production factors, organization of workforce, division of labour, quality control, standardization of spare parts.

### **Thesis 4: East or West?**

This issue is subject to a big debate concentrating around the individuality of development paths of the East and West, or convergence and parallelism – the debate on the so-called ‘great furcation.’ Arguments and facts in the book as well as in the world history representatives’ works state that the concept of parallel development in Eurasia is correct. Above all the East and West share the beginning in the Neolithic Revolution, which occurred in analogous ecosystems, and which used a similar set of tools, techniques of growing different crops. They also had a common tributary system. But in

contrast to the agrarian Europe with its feudal system, cities developed quickly in the East (Bangkok, Chang'an, Damascus, Baghdad, Sukhothai, Palembang). It is important because the city delivered products that widened the frontiers of economy and technological progress. In China for example it was manufacturing books, silk, bronze and porcelain. Knowledge systems, as well as trade spread on the East-West axis. Technological diffusion in the Middle Ages went from China via India, Persia, which was also a centre for innovation. Such was the route for foundry processes, paper (Silk Road) or printing techniques (printing press, woodcut).

### **Thesis 5: Crossing the oceans**

The crucial thing connected with the birth of the world civilization was crossing the oceans. Many factors led to this: progress in shipbuilding, organizational role of the state and military advantage, financial support from merchants, poor European nations being located on the coast of the Atlantic. The result of crossing the oceans were exchange of human populations, plants, animals and pathogens, or transition from existence in local ecosystems to human population as a whole. It brought about the Western domination, utilizing resources, workforce and manufactured goods to accumulate wealth in the main cities.

### **Thesis 6: Why Europe?**

Another debate is on the source of European domination, at least within the last two centuries and the role of either capitalism, or European military advantage. The answer from world history representatives, in the light of rich factual literature, is also convincing. It was the military advantage, based on thousand-year long rivalry among European states and nations, possessing relatively stable position on the map of this big Eurasian peninsula.

### **Thesis 7: When did the 'great furcation' occur?**

The 'great furcation' occurred in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. What led to this were the achievements of the first and second Industrial Revolution: technology, energy and market, which then accomplished qualitative advantage. It was not possible without economic penetration (domination and colonialism, free-trade imperialism) which was supported militarily (europocentrism and racism). As regards China, contrary to opinions of bridling influence of Confucianism and emperor's policies since 9<sup>th</sup> century there occurred the expansion of trade towards the coast and in the south-east. Far-reaching trade developed as well, helped by technology and sea infrastructure. Up to the Tang dynasty there were foreign merchant associations. They were started by the Ming dynasty in 14<sup>th</sup> century. Since then merchants were interested in selling goods in the interior. That is why the East (first Japan – Meija modernization) absorbed the technological output of the West so quickly, integrating it with its own social culture (for example Japanese system of management).

### **Thesis 8: Capitalism vs industrialization and modernity**

While analysing the world system, its structure and genesis, it is necessary to differentiate modernity (change of lifestyle, democratization, the role of education), capitalism (profit-making production, utilizing labour and technology) and industrialization (energy, technology, mechanization of production, new model of growth). The capital belongs to an entrepreneur (merchant), which serves as means to multiply wealth. Connecting two mechanisms - the capital - not necessarily coming from merchants - and mechanized factory production brought about a transformation, or appearance of workforce which did not possess its own means of production. But the phenomenon of capital accumulation as a result of 'exploitation' of labour existed as early as the pre-industrial systems (for examples when agrarian terraces were built). According to Goody, 'economic growth itself is definitely not the product of the 18<sup>th</sup> century Europe, even if there was an increase in

speed and reach of the accumulation.<sup>50</sup> Urbanization was also not a uniquely European feature, as well as the 19<sup>th</sup> century capitalism. Thus not only in the cities of the northern Italy the liberty-seeking bourgeoisie appeared. The process was present in the whole world.

### **Thesis 9: The Industrial Revolution's genesis**

The direct reason for the Industrial Revolution to take place was the necessity to compete the oriental import, producing goods for the needs of the world market. A very important part was played by 'weapons and sails' (C. M. Cipolla). What was also necessary was technology. The Industrial Revolution required huge investments, necessary to build machines (the money came from rich entrepreneurs or partnerships among such people). Since the Bronze Revolution where existed free labour force, but the Industrial Revolution lead to dependency of a significant part of production and distribution system on labour.

### **Thesis 10: Rate**

All changes came into being gradually and were connected with alterations in production techniques. The latter were often enhanced by introduction of simple technical devices. Gradually merchants and entrepreneurs, 'the money people,' gained more importance in production processes. Transcontinental trade grew rapidly in the era of geographical discoveries, after American resources reached Europe, and after the discovery of the route to India and China, yet the expansion was additional to the trade routes that had previously existed (ancient routes for Eastern spices, silk and other fabrics. That is why great merchant fortunes appeared early in India, the Middle East and China, and Indian merchants went to the South China Sea as early as 14<sup>th</sup> century (B. Avari, I. Habib, K. Pomerantz).

### **Thesis 11: Periodization of the genesis process**

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<sup>50</sup> Tegoź, *Kapitalizm i nowoczesność*, dz. cyt., s. 183.

Consequently to the presented interpretation of the history of the last 5000 years goes the following periodization of the process of integration of different local civilizations. We use two methods of division. The first is division due to the level of economic development (energy and technology, and the way of utilizing labour). Then one can say of the pre-agrarian, the agrarian and the industrial eras. The second method is constituted by the reach and mechanisms of integration of civilizational concentrations centres which are located far from one another. We distinguish a few centres of agrarian civilizations – The Civilization of the Middle, and the East-West System, the world market and economy, and the phase of the world civilization, or the world market society after the Industrial Revolution. Neoliberal globalization is the last stage of integration of natural resources, labour and markets of the whole ecumene in order to valorize the capital. We can then distinguish the following phases of creating the world civilization:

I) from anthropogenesis to the Neolithic Revolution (pre-agrarian era): between 6-5m and 8-3k BC;

II) from the Civilization of the Middle and the East-West System to the world market (agrarian era with growing role for far-reaching trade): between 3-1,5k BC to 15<sup>th</sup>/16<sup>th</sup> century, or crossing the oceans;

III) from the world market to the capitalistic economy-world after the Industrial Revolution in England in 18<sup>th</sup>/19<sup>th</sup> century; this period encompasses phases of internationalization and of neoliberal globalization, they are differentiated by the role of state, either active in supporting national businesses on the world market, or only assisting international financial institutions in the second phase. This period also covers structural crises of the market economy (1873-86, 1933-39, 1974, 2007/8 -), and also two centuries of Western domination;

IV) structural crisis of global capitalism in the neoliberal version – towards the constant development civilization? (2007/8-?).

**Thesis 12: The role of intercepting the surplus and the role of europocentrism, racism and imperialism**

The permanent social problems in human history were: the division of economic surplus, repossessing work output of others (inventions, natural resources, eventually the problem of progressive tax, inheritance tax, capital transfers tax). Until the colonial era there also existed the equality and interdependence of merchant cultures, which overlapped one another. It's the Smith's world. As late as after crossing the oceans the military dominance of the West appeared, and with it 'plundering, piracy, kidnapping slaves and subduing peoples in colonies' (K. Marks). This is the Atlantic system. One side could use firing weapons, later – nuclear bomb, the other could not.

**Thesis 13: Imprisoned within the ecosystem**

Ecological problems are still a challenge to mankind as one of natural species. Up to the Industrial Revolution mankind stayed within the Malthusian trap. It is not true that man became the master of nature. Throughout human history the only thing that changes is the level of dependence. The Industrial Revolution, thanks to machines, enabled access to new energy sources, "energetic slaves" multiply the productivity of human labour. Yet carbon and oil, used to propel the machines, deplete, and their usage pollute the environment. The new challenge is then the necessity of shifting the economy to the alternative energy sources. Human organism is a part of nature, too – it is subjected to metabolism, division of cells. Only the development of medicine allowed the human population to grow rapidly. This growth is accompanied by the increase in economic activity, it also leaves ecological mark, exceeding the capacity of the biosphere. This is a new trap – the Meadows' trap. Again there is a need to have a strategy of permanent development and stabilizing the number of human population in order to facet these problems: famine, drinking water deficit, fertile land deficit due to excessive grazing, cutting tropical forests, greenhouse effect, climate

disturbances. Certain national societies freed themselves from the conditions of local ecosystems, yet it was achieved through becoming dependent from the global ecosystem. Thus in human history there were two traps – the Malthusian one and the Meadows one. In the agrarian community the consumption barriers were: going away from cold, famine, fertile land limitations, wood and natural disasters. In the industrial community the challenges are: barrier of demand, limited by salary income (hence the recessions and overproduction and underconsumption crises), financial crises, as well as developmental disproportions among states. Another barrier is the permanently increasing ecological mark, the necessity of departing from economy based on hydrocarbons in order to maintain balance in the global ecosystem. For human can not live without nature.

#### **Thesis 14: The mechanism for change – the role of structural crises**

Challenges of ecosystem and problems stemming from different productivity potentials of societies required answers in the shape of technological and organizational innovations, as well as changing the strategy of operation. And all this in the background of the existing social culture, consolidated mentality and lifestyle. Human as nexus of social labour uses its creative brain in searching for the strategy of adapting to the existing structural conditions (nature and existing social organization). In the process of adaptation it experiences structural crises, it goes through a narrow pipe in search for new Beringia. The constriction of biomass reached its natural barrier. The mechanism of qualitative change occurs in cases of structural crises. It's then when the dialectics of chances and new barriers of development spears. To use these chances one needs creativity within technology and energy, which attracts changes in production organization (proprietary relations and division of additional value). Union of labour and life beats one barrier, and next there is another one on the way in the form of accumulated effect of usually unexpected and far-reaching results. There are

always natural barriers to beat (for example a man who lives longer is more likely to get cancer).

### **Thesis 15: The role of the state**

Within processes of qualitative change the organization of state plays the role of a steersman of the new institutional order, beginning at the Neolithic Revolution. In the developed phase of globalization, the steersman system may be only a form of global government. The search for the institutional shape for the world government is still on. It is one of the global problems of modernity, at the same time one of main challenges to political sciences. The state is then a necessary ingredient for the qualitative change to occur. Its role divides the period of the world system into two phases: the phase of internationalization, when the state directly regulated national capital and economy, and the phase of transnationalization, where the role of the state was taken over by international organizations and corporations (global government).

### **Thesis 16: Inevitability of structural crisis of the neoliberal globalization**

Human population divided into local civilization and national communities found itself in the phase of another structural (or system) crisis: it must beat technological barriers (energy), institutional (global government) and social (adjusting mechanism of global capitalism to the needs of ageing societies of the North and poverty and global underdevelopment of the South). This problem will be resolved – if one may anticipate on the basis of knowledge of history course determinants – when climatic, food, resource wars and periods of recession and growth are over. Braudel put forward a question if the crisis of 1970s marked the beginning of another structural or system crisis. The period of open phase of the next structural crisis might be foreseen for the next 30-40 years, or in the middle of 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Thesis 17: Ecosystem and social effects of casino capitalism**

The axis of the modern economy-world is capitalism in the neoliberal globalisation phase. Correcting its functional mechanisms in the transnational scale will require co-operation and international coordination (financial, Basel III, liquidation of tax havens) and qualitative changes in relations between the state and financial market (taxation subjected to satisfy the needs of ageing population and solving existential challenges from the world civilization).

**Thesis 18: Global Keynesianism as the base for permanent civilization's development**

In the face of common long-term crisis a radical reconstruction and the change of economic strategy, as well as the change of production order or system of regulation will be allowed: from the national perspective to the global one. It will give the opportunity to create a new formula for the alliance between the financial and production capital, workforce and the state on the scale of national societies and the new world order – the global Keynesianism in the civilization of permanent development.

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**Speeches form seminar**  
***'Thinking politically' – in the debate on the deep politics***

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## The Political Theory of Political Thinking<sup>1</sup>

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The climate surrounding the study of political thought has been changing rapidly over the past twenty years. It incorporates what I would call the political turn, to rephrase a much-used recent descriptor. Some of it goes under the banner of post-structural, critical discourse and agonistic approaches, approaches that nonetheless have a clear particular take on what good politics should look like. Some of its marches under the different banner of political realism, and most of that is, disappointingly, insufficiently realist. All of those are attempts to reconfigure politics at the centre-stage of what political theory would be concerned with. In trying to illustrate what I am talking about today, you might perhaps indulge me for a couple of minutes for telling a personal story that may have wider implications. When I first arrived at Oxford over 35 years ago I brought with me a strong schooling in what was, and still is, termed the history of political thought. I entered a new world of analytical and ethical political philosophy, one in which John Rawls—himself a modest man—was just becoming almost monopolistically powerful. In trying to carve out a path for myself in that rich and somewhat overbearing world, populated mainly by philosophers, I took a number of paths that only now, in retrospection, seem to have a modicum of consistency.

My early work was devoted to two detailed studies of British liberal thought in what I saw as an underexplored gap between Mill and, say, the Beveridge report, with the odd nod to T.H. Green and L.T. Hobhouse. But it took me a while to realize how absurd what is known as the history of political thought was, based as it was on fifty or so individuals. Would any social historian ground their work on fifty individuals, often only one per generation or even century? Would a student of comparative politics investigating regime change in the Middle East do the same? It became evident that the history of political thought was a cultural invention of philosophers, who were used to a close and meticulous study of the free-floating arguments of geniuses or near-geniuses without much thought for context, broader discourse, scope or mutation. It was indeed a forceful and highly influential self-perpetuating

tradition but it was not a history of the practice of political thought at its various levels of social articulation. And it then occurred to me that in studying 19<sup>th</sup> century British liberalism we should temporarily forget about Mill if we wish to get acquainted with how a particular society thinks about politics. Mill was an abnormal liberal – far too good, too clever, too reflective, to permit us to explore the wide range of liberalism – the typical as well as the atypical; the good, the bad, and the awful. There were other crucial sources; pamphlets, newspapers, parliamentary debates, manifestos, popular books, literary works, minutes of meetings, and not least vernacular expressions, as well as the great minds of the age.

In stage two I turned to what I consider as the way in which actual political thought has always manifested itself—as particular and fluid conceptual combinations that, while contested, present themselves as uncontested or decontested, and that aim at competing over the control of public political language. That was my expansive understanding of ideologies, readings of the political and social world, both deliberate and unintentional. One central research question was: In which permutations did individuals and groups think about politics with a view to assisting or retarding change, approving or criticizing political arrangements? Even then, philosopher colleagues asked me: how can anyone produce good research based on inferior forms of political thinking? The best minds had always to engage with the best minds for high quality results to ensue.

A few years ago I moved to stage three, the product of which is my recent book *The Political Theory of Political Thinking: the Anatomy of a Practice*. It addresses a simple question: what patterns of thinking have to occur in a person's mind for us—as observers, students, and analysts—to contend that she or he is thinking politically, not artistically, sexually, or historically? I was now accused—at least by philosophers at Princeton—of being an ethnographer when I gave a talk there on the difference between political obligation, loyalty, allegiance and trust. My book, nonetheless, singles out a lacuna to which it wishes to draw attention in much of what goes under the

designation of political theory, let alone political philosophy. Political theory is not only a discipline involving the critical examination of human ends in society, or accommodating the abundance of challenging reflections on the human condition over the ages, or prescribing better ethical worlds, or even investigating the ideological patterns through which competitions occur over the control of political language. It is also—and from the perspective of scholarship should also be—about the analysis and interpretation of the rich and layered human practice referred to as political thinking, and engaged in by members of societies and partakers in cultures. By practice I mean ‘the habitual doing or carrying on of something’; ‘a habitual pattern of behaviour’, and I see no reason why not to attach the term to thinking as well. I understand ‘habitual’ not in the sense of conformity but of recurrence.

And that is not all. I feel dissatisfaction with the drifting apart of political theory from the social sciences and the actual study of political language. Political science, or political studies, is a social science – a branch of knowledge, a *Wissenschaft*, concerned with certain happenings in and across societies. It is a fact that people, at all levels of articulation, think politically and it ought to be the object of our professional curiosity. Without understanding the ubiquitous thought patterns that obtain in any society it is impossible to comprehend that society and to make sense of it. That is not an optional extra but part and parcel of obtaining social knowledge, and one of our many tasks as political theorists is to offer an account of the raw material of thinking politically: both because it reveals a lot about the practices of a society, and for other scholars such as philosophers and historians to use in their own ways so that they may understand what can, and what cannot, be extracted from that raw material.

Here is a difference between thinking about politics and thinking politically. Thinking about politics involves the formation of ideological frameworks—at different levels of sophistication—that operate within a world of essential contestability, competing over the shaping of political language through various decontesting devices that attempt to fix meaning. They

frequently appear clustered together in fluctuating family resemblance modes to which are given names such as liberalism, conservatism, or anarchism. That thinking takes place within contextualized semantic fields through which standard political concepts such as liberty, justice, or equality accrue meaning and directive force. Thinking about politics also contains strong moral and ethical elements—the desire for realizing a good or better society is a mainstay of human collective aspirations.

My current work, however, moves the object of interest on to a more elemental dimension: the practice of thinking politically itself. What are the thought-patterns to which the adjective ‘political’ can be allocated in a unique manner? Thinking politically is usually celebrated, analysed, and echoed in its general, stipulative, and occasionally bombastic registers such as ‘justice is the first virtue of political institutions’, ‘man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains’, ‘we shall fight on the beaches . . . we shall never surrender’, or ‘the only thing we have to fear is fear itself’. These too are crucial expressions of political thinking—the first two voiced by eminent philosophers, the second two by eminent statesmen—but they tend to attract too much scholarly attention and respect at the expense of the multiverse of political discourse.

None of what I am about to say is a critique of political philosophy, which performs vital roles of ethical investigation and experimentation, analytical and logical fine-tuning, and the promotion of values thought by many to be crucially desirable, such as justice, democracy and legitimacy. But some variants of political philosophy have colonized the far broader field of political thinking and they have monopolized a different take on legitimacy. They seek to determine which aspects of such thinking are considered to be legitimate and valid in the study of political thought and which should be marginalized or ignored. The space left to other genres and approaches has been constricted because a different discipline, philosophy, has crowded out other significant ways of theorizing about political thinking, often in a manner ill-suited to the study of politics and the political. I am minded of a talk I gave many years ago in North Carolina, at the end of which two senior faculty

members got up and asked me: 'Which values do you teach your students? We teach them the values of the American constitution.' I retorted apologetically that I try not to teach them any values, though I conceded that some of mine might sneak out in unguarded moments. Rather, I wanted the students to understand the range of values that are at the disposal of their society, and of other societies, to realize what work those values can do and what they fail to do, and then to make their own choices. This is to my mind part of a larger story of what I see as pressures, particularly on US academics, to produce research and teaching designed to argue the case for democracy and improve the quality of democratic practices available to their societies. They see it as their professional mission to improve the quality of democracy available to their societies. A worthy mission, to be sure, but we live on a planet with an extraordinary range of political thinking and we need to theorize about its multiple manifestations. That theorizing requires that we understand, map and decode a fuller range of political practices long before we seek to reform them: the Weberian task of *Verstehen*.

What then does thinking politically entail? I have proposed six fundamental features of the political to which correspond six features of thinking politically.

- A. Appropriating the locus of ultimate decision making in space and time, including determining, parcelling out and regulating domains and boundaries of competence among social spheres.
- B. The distribution of material and symbolic goods in and across societies.
- C. The mobilization or withholding of public support in a community.
- D. The organization of the social complexities through which social stability or conflict and disruption are manufactured.
- E. Policy-making and option-selection for collectivities.
- F. The wielding of power (which cuts across the above five categories)

To those six features correspond six forms of thinking and discourse pertaining to collectivities, and it is those forms only that can be labelled political thinking. Political thinking occurs whenever we find thinking that

- a. Affirms the exercise of ultimate control and jurisdiction in social affairs and overrides and limits the competences of other social spheres and agents by constructing a symbolic sovereign collective identity.
- b. Distributes significance by ranking social aims, demands, processes and structures in order of importance or urgency.
- c. Accepts, justifies, criticizes, or rejects collective entities, and their procedures and activities.
- d. Articulates co-operative, dissenting, competitive or conflictual conceptual and argumentative arrangements for groups.
- e. Determines policy, constructs and directs collective plans and, more ambitiously, projects collective visions
- f. Is expressed and conveyed through intensities and skills of persuasion, rhetoric, emotion or menace that pervade speech and writing and—in part—non-verbal communication; as well as being expressed through deliberate silence.

The archetypal thought-practice cutting across those features is the decision: a practice intended to secure finality in collective affairs, whether for the short or long term. Indeed, the quest for finality in social affairs is at the heart of the political, though it is always an elusive one. It invariably slips through our grasp but we reach out for such illusory finalities time and again.

When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.' 'The question is', said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 'The question is', said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master—that's all.'

That need for semantic control, sometimes arrogant, sometimes desperate, is at the heart of the political. Humpty Dumpty sought to trump the many meanings words carry by the conferral of his meaning, indicating that

human beings—and anthropomorphized eggs— like to exercise the choice to render further choice superfluous. That is one of the most prominent features of the political. Though doomed to fail, it perpetually rises from the ashes of its unattainability.

Politics, like ideology, is a word with a reputational problem, but it is nevertheless central to our lives. When people talk about anti-politics this makes as much sense as talking about anti-economics or anti-psychology. Almost every social situation has a political element, though its relative weight may be heavier or lighter from instance to instance. The Russian attempt to control parts of the Ukraine is patently political; giving a university talk such as this may be less obviously so, but it ticks many boxes of a political thought-practice: it attempts to persuade, though rarely to threaten – and it may fail to do so; it involves order and a stable situation; it establishes a temporary pecking order of whose voice should be heard. For some, politics is a technique for governing or the deeds of governors; for others the fluid activity of governance. In the past it often referred to a principled, ethical enterprise, or to what happened under the aegis of the state and in particular in the competition among political parties, or to politicking and dirty hands. French social philosophers such as Rancière distinguish between *la politique*— the policing tendencies of institutionalized government—and ‘*le politique*’, a permanent egalitarian struggle against the machinations of ‘*la politique*’. For Rancière, only disruption gains the accolade of a true, radical politics, damning any form of conciliation as apolitical. To the contrary Bernard Crick, in his famous 1962 book, *In Defence of Politics*, wrote: ‘Politics is the way in which free societies are governed. Politics is politics and other forms of rule are something else.’ For Crick politics was about ‘the activity by which government is made possible when differing interests in an area to be governed grow powerful enough to need to be conciliated ... politics is simply when they are conciliated—that solution to the problem of order which chooses conciliation rather than violence and coercion’. Both offer a very narrow and

stipulative view of the political, one that a political theory of political thinking needs to correct.

I have only time to illustrate the approach I advocate by referring to one of the six features of thinking politically, the arrogance of politics. This refers not only to the hubris associated with the political but to the second meaning of arrogance: To appropriate, assume or claim without justification. Self-assuming, self-anointing, self-privileging, self-reflexivity are fundamental characteristics of the political and they bypass rather than challenge ethical considerations. I have illustrated that with the aborted sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham because it is obedience to a command that requires no justification. That command is a pure political act that brooks no dissent or reason and it has no appeal to a higher order. Recall Napoleon grabbing the crown from the Pope and crowning himself. Or note the Islamic scholar Abul A'ala Mawdudi: 'God is the absolute sovereign and has absolute authority to issue whatever command He might will.' Crucially, it is not the wise contents of God's ordinances that demand obedience; a believer obeys 'simply because they are the ordinances of his Lord'. The analogy with the ultimate, desired logic of the political is the search for the absolute, not because of the content of any message imparted, not because of its ethical vision, but because of the indisputable finality carried in that kind of utterance. It is the 'last resort' feature of the political.

The arrogation feature of the political marks the beginning of political time, the site where the construction of the political commences. The political is that facet of human discourse that is expressed in 'fons et origo' or 'ex nihilo' terms, at least with regard to human conduct and social affairs. It is the 'big bang' of social life—not where the buck stops, as President Truman's famous sign would have it, but where the buck actually starts. It is the moment of freedom as the generalized political property of instigation. All utterances relating to collectivities of the 'because I say so' or 'because I am entitled to say so' type are fundamentally political. There is need for a fulcrum that can arrange human affairs decisively and finally – it is a myth that

requires constant renewal as a feature of the political, the temporal locus of the finality drive, the practice of instituting a temporal boundary. It is a social and architectural necessity, a pure morphological requirement, without which human beings cannot live an organized or meaningful life. If God does not exist, the very notion of finality that anchors the political would have been undermined from the earliest days of civilization. Sovereignty is part of that idea but it is a temporal sovereignty that precedes a spatial one: A 'first-subsequent' dimension, where temporality is logically prior to spatiality. Hobbes and Bossuet refer to the sovereign's quality of making the law while being free from it, and that is just another expression of temporal primacy: the absence of being bound to a preceding will. There has to be, structurally, an agency whose decisions and competence allocations are ipso fact final.

Here then are some questions that a theory of political thinking should consider. How do we navigate among different approaches to the nature of the political, in particular its quest for finality, always present and always frustrated?

How can we return to an empirically grounded investigation of political thought, including its normative manifestations as actually occurring types of such thinking and as a form of realism in politics? How can we cement the distinction between prescription and interpretation, and advocate methodologically the pursuit of decoding and Verstehen?

How can we bypass single feature, or dichotomous, characterizations of the political and political thinking: friend/enemy, justice, power, authority, antagonism, interests, patriarchy, global/local, East/West etc.? Politics is too often depicted as being about one thing. We need to move from macro to micro analysis and to investigate intermeshed arguments and conceptual arrangements.

How can we resist the near-monopolization of political theory by Anglo American political philosophers?

How can we embrace the multiple languages of politics, elitist and vernacular, in our purview?

How can we navigate among the universalist/particularist divide, eschewing essentialism yet maintaining that there are general patterns of political thinking that cash out in myriad different ways? Practice as theory-rich.

How can we convey that all human activity and communication has a political dimension, whether dense or sparse, and that all practice is theory-rich?

How can we account for the relationship between the fluidity of political thought and its containment and patterning, a task that requires us to take into account decontestation and the control over political and public language?

All this is not about the replacement of established approaches to political thought but of complementing them, allowing the kind of questions that have been muted as a result of the dominance of ethical and analytical political philosophy and that seek to recover the political as an field where crucial kinds of human thought and action occur, and which we as students of society and as political theorists must take very seriously indeed. I have only been able to scratch the surface in my talk, but much of the rest is in my book, and in the work of other scholars who are beginning to take that path.

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Reply to 'The Political Theory of Political Thinking'

Let me start by saying that, unlike many books by Oxford political philosophers, *The Political Theory of Political Thinking* is not a book one can read on the train. I suppose that even native English speakers are not able to follow all the arguments easily. Professor Michael Freeden proposes a revisionist approach to political theory against some of our deep convictions, both academic and popular, what politics is about and what it is not. He claims that political thinking, the central human thought-practices, is all over the place, while many people hope to God that it is not. Let us leave politics to politicians. After all, we pay them for making politics, don't we? Professor Freeden seems to suggest that politics is what makes the world go round, while many people tend to think it is money, rather. But now to the point, or to a couple of points I would like to make. Rather than comments, or – even less so – criticisms, they are pleas for further explanation.

First, a short note on the method. I understand that professor Freeden's intention was to do the same to political theory that the Cambridge School historians have done to studies of the history of political theory, that is to extend its scope and cover the diverse forms of expressions of political thinking by academic study. For decades, Oxford political philosophy used to focus on linguistic analysis. One couldn't study philosophy of any kind without the Oxford English Dictionary on one's desk, and political philosophers have their classics and their perennial issues, from Plato to NATO (this is actually the title of one of political theory textbooks). J.G.A Pocock and Quentin Skinner launched their revolution at the time when social sciences were obsessed with the question of the Method and introduced highly sophisticated text interpretation procedures.

The methodologies proposed by them were in my opinion of very limited assistance to historians of ideas. They simply don't need such meticulous tools of text analysis (actually Pocock and Skinner themselves discreetly rejected most of the methodological devices they had adopted from contemporary philosophy). Yet they left a legacy: the historian of ideas must study texts of secondary importance, and even those of no relevance to the philosopher, such as leaflets, booklets, newspapers etc. to find the proper context for studying political theory, which, from their perspective, was tantamount to acting by words.

Yet thinking (or thought-practices, as professor Freedon calls them) is even more elementary, less palpable and more shapeless than behaviour. It need not be written, it need not be worded, either. And professor Freedon goes so far as to include significant silence as an act of meaningful political action. Additionally, he urges the student of political thinking to pay attention to the intensity of that thinking and the emotions associated with it. But how can it be done? How can all appearances, and there are a myriad of them, professor Freedon claims, be academically approached? If we adopt the traditional methodology of political theory and confine ourselves to studying texts, we will cut the household off the domain of political thinking, because thought-practices at home are in no way recorded. (In fact, in the book political thinking has only been shown in the public sphere.) If we expand the field of study, we will end up with some sort of methodological eclecticism, such as was once adopted for the history of ideas proposed by Arthur Lovejoy. From that perspective, however, the six categories of political thinking enlisted in the book are simply six separate elementary unit-ideas which should be studied, each one separately, using a series of different methods. Thus by adopting methodological eclecticism we run a risk of disintegrating the subject. And for professor Freedon political thinking is a cluster unit.

And now let us turn to the subject itself. In the Introduction the reader is instructed to distinguish between political thinking and thinking on politics, and yet the author makes a meaningful reservation: 'It is frequently necessary to approach it through direct instances of thinking about politics, even if most forms of thinking politically are extracted through the interpretation of something less overt.' (p. 4) But can we also say that, the other way round, thinking politically is modelled on something *more* overt, modelled on thinking *on* politics, and *in* politics?

According to professor Freedman the categories of political thinking are universal or nigh-universal. Yet they are not innate. We are not born with them, we acquire them in society, indeed, we acquire them in a political system, too. Of course, a child learns what power is by obedience to his mother or father, and he can even learn the idea of division of labour by watching relations between his parents. But can he learn the notion of power limited by law except by watching institutional power? And in what language can he think of it? Is there any language except the language of institutional politics in which to express the principles of constitutional limits of power?

Once it was an ambition of Oxford political philosophy to find a language which could be a yardstick against which to measure the language of politics. From a radical perspective, ordinary language provides the political vocabulary with the correct and only meaning, in a less radical perspective it only serves to mark the ideological surplus or bias of the political language. That is why analytical philosophers regarded the Oxford English Dictionary as their Bible, the source of the true meanings, unspoiled by political strife. Yet professor Freedman looks up entries in this dictionary only to check the popular usage, not the proper one. And looking up 'politics', he finds, to his surprise, I guess, how obsolete this dictionary can be; the word 'politics' still has clear Aristotelian connotations in it.

And this is significant, I think. Ordinary language, or the vernacular, is not free from purely ideological meanings. In every vernacular we will find quite a number of evidently evaluative, judgmental concepts, and even more seemingly neutral or pseudo-neutral terms. Of course, we can say many things on politics and express our political thoughts, that is to think aloud politically, without using those words, and Professor Freedon gives a couple of telling examples, such as ‘the imprisonment of the Russian Pussy Riot women is disgraceful’, yet I would say that it would be more natural for the protester to say ‘the imprisonment of the Russian Pussy Riot women is undemocratic or is a violation of human rights’.

The said study of political thinking is supposed to encompass all forms of articulating political thought-practices, institutionalised and spontaneous, motivated by self-interest and by moral indignation. But due to the fact that vernacular and ideological languages are interwoven – the other examples given by Professor Freedon could be quoted here – all political utterances have rather rarely unambiguous meanings. They seem to be contestable, and if they are part of political argument, they are contestable by their very nature. Can we study them in the same way as we study the ordinary language? The question, I think, is all the more justified by the assumption made by the author that political thinking always involves a risk of failure. Even more. ‘Failure is the default position of prescriptive political theorizing’ (p. 255). But who is to judge that? Is then inquiry into political thinking evaluative by nature and, by the same token, contestable? No less contestable than the thought-practices themselves? Or even essentially contestable, like the interpretation of thinking *about* politics?

Following up on this topic, I would like to touch upon the question of the sphere of political thinking vis-à-vis the sphere of social activity. Professor Freedman stresses: 'Politics (...) does not occupy a separate sphere of social activity. But it is a separate *form* of social activity. What applies to politics, applies ipso facto to political thinking.' (p. 28-9) One can easily understand that there is no room in the social sphere where people do not act politically, at least occasionally. The pope reforming the curia has to act politically, and when he wants to change the doctrine of the Catholic faith he has to act politically, too, negotiating his proposals with the cardinals. A father who is going to share toys between his children will be acting politically, as he will in fact be distributing both material and symbolic goods. One can thus say that political thinking, or the need for political thinking will appear whenever a situation requires a political solution. We think politically as *animal politicum et sociale*, as Aquinas would say, rather than as *zoon politikon*, in Aristotle's words.

In this sense political thinking is indeed all over the place. Yet it can be more or less common, it may be encouraged or repressed by custom. And by the political system itself. A number of studies may be referred to as examples. The most influential ones are, of course, by de Tocqueville, the one on democracy in America and the one on the post-revolutionary regime in his native France. Living in an established democratic republic, Americans made everyday use of political reasoning, whereas Frenchmen were accustomed to a state official to think politically on their behalf. Totalitarianism is a peculiar case. As a model of social organization, it is a completely politicised society but thinking politically is reserved for a narrow power elite.

From these examples, I think, we can learn that political thinking is both an individual ability and a form of social capital. And as a form of social capital it promotes a liberal form of political system. When society can think

politically, it can afford to build self-government. *On the Representative Government* by J. S. Mill develops this idea nicely. But Mill, who strongly believed in social progress, was no less convinced that when society is not skilled in political thinking, the government's role is to enlighten the population. Should we then agree with his argument and assume that political thinking will flourish only in liberal democracy and in other forms of political regime it will only exist to a limited extent? Can all of those six features be accomplished in undemocratic and illiberal regimes?

The last point I would like to make is the question, in what way studying political thinking is, as the title of the book says, political theory. What is its ideological dimension, or ideological flavour? Professor Freedman's idea is to build a bridge between empirical and normative theories. He says that 'Good political theory is thus an act of creativity in at least two senses, reflecting our dual duty to the discipline and to the world.' (p. 13) Normative political theories differ in respect of what is political and what should be left untouched by politics. The mainstream theories of the 21<sup>st</sup> century tend to expand the sphere of the political, and we can all see how the sphere which has been traditionally enshrined as private, or intimate, is being reduced step by step. Professor Freedman's theory doesn't give any precept as to the limits of the political system. But saying that political thinking doesn't stop at the threshold of the house and penetrates the domestic sphere; doesn't it presuppose any ideological stance?

An old argument against democratisation stressed the inability of the masses, and of women in particular, to make public choices, since they spend their lives in the private sphere and do not use public reason. And now we are told that reasoning at home and reasoning in the public sphere are of the same nature as long as they concern distribution of goods, wielding of power, policy-making and the like. The only difference is that of scale. A woman with

numerous offspring who runs the household may be a teacher of political thinking to her husband, who follows the instructions of his authoritative boss at work and comes home too late to have any say in domestic affairs. Does, then, the concept of political thinking support indirectly the idea of direct or deliberative democracy, or other forms of active citizenship?

And let me conclude by telling you, Professor Freedon, and remind my fellow countrymen that in old Polish political – *polityczny* – meant reasonable, smart, tactful, polite. And nowadays Polish politicians take a pleasure in accusing one another of making politics!