


# Polish Journal of Political Science



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# **Polish Journal of Political Science**

## **Volume 1 Issue 3**

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**Piotr Kozłowski**  
University of Warsaw

Safeguarding Primacy: Redefining the American Global Leadership  
during Barack Obama's Presidency

**Abstract**

*The purpose of this article is to outline a twofold change in the American global leadership concept that has been taking place under the Obama Administration: the redefinition of its purpose and of its character. The purpose-transformation has been illustrated in a case study of the American "pivot to Asia". It means, basically, that the American world leadership, defined as the political and economic order developed by the USA, and grounded in its power and unique position after the Second World War (and/or the Cold War), has turned during Obama's administration into a instrument aiming at retaining the American privileged position that does not emanate directly from the U.S. power anymore. The character-transformation implies that the role conceptions of the American world leadership, have been modified or, as in one case, abandoned, in order to adjust to new circumstances. As a result, the US leadership has become more inclusive, international-institutions-centered, and reluctant to military engagement.*

**Keywords:** *Asia pivot, Barack Obama, global leadership, role conceptions, USA*

## Introduction

Barack Obama was elected the president of the United States amidst the worst economic crisis since 1929, and at the moment of the poorest reputation his country had in the world for decades. No surprise that he campaigned for change in domestic and foreign policy, as he put it, to “lead this country in a new direction”<sup>1</sup>. New president – who embodied the essence of the awaited change – took the office in the considerably different international circumstances than his post-cold-war predecessors faced.

Putting the financial crisis aside, the United States grappled with several challenges that were novel, although rather in scale than in nature. First, with an “imperial overstretch” in the Middle East, which was a result of a struggle to end long and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, draining resources and impairing American reputation. Second, with the group of rising powers around the world (the so-called BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), of which especially demanding were two: China (due to its power) and Russia (mainly due to its assertiveness). These two challenges, accompanied by economic crisis as well as by the ongoing trade and budget deficits, have laid foundations for the argument asserting the American decline as the world’s supreme nation. The third major challenge was the Iranian and North-Korean aspirations to acquire nuclear weapon, threatening regional balances of power and American set of alliances, as well as creating a dangerous opportunity for the terrorist groups interested in acquiring weapons of mass destruction and using them against the West. Finally, a kind of a challenge to American foreign policy was Barack Obama himself, for he lacked experience in foreign affairs. However, it was not an unusual feature among US presidents. More importantly, he was determined to bring change into the domestic politics: to overcome the financial crisis, reduce unemployment, increase American productivity, introduce healthcare reform, *etc.* In effect, he was almost

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<sup>1</sup> “Full Text: Obama’s Foreign Policy Speech”, The Guardian: US News, accessed April 23, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/16/uselections2008.barackobama>.

completely focused on the United States' domestic politics, leaving much less personal attention to the foreign policy<sup>2</sup>. All these conditions made the US foreign policy, its strategy and doctrine change. Consequently, the concept of the American global leadership had to be redefined and adapted to the new situation and context.

This article attempts to capture the scope and nature of this redefinition that affected the purpose and character of the American global leadership. Redefining the purpose means that the American world leadership, defined as the political and economic order developed by the USA, and grounded in its power and unique position after the Second World War (and/or the Cold War), has turned during Obama administration into a instrument aiming at retaining the American privileged position that does not emanate directly from the U.S. power anymore.. In other words, the USA used its world leadership structures to prolong its primacy. Redefining the leadership's character means that it was no longer entirely exclusive. The USA encouraged other states to engage, to participate in the tasks, and to carry the burden of the "shared" global leadership.

The argument put forward in this article shall be differentiated from the "coalition-based character" of American leadership, as John Ikenberry defines it. The latter notion involves "a group of advanced liberal democratic states work together and assert collective leadership"<sup>3</sup>. John Ikenberry distinguishes the current international order from its antecedents in world history, putting emphasis on coalitional character of the Pax Americana. This article, however, focuses on change *within* this coalitional character. Besides, as the following section illustrates, leadership – by definition – refers to followers and formation of a coalition as a result.

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<sup>2</sup> Colin Dueck, *The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 33.

<sup>3</sup> G. John Ikenberry, "The Logic of Order: Westphalia, Liberalism, and the Evolution of International Order in the Modern Era," in *Power, Order, and Change in World Politics*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 101.

## A Concept of the Global Leadership

In the IR literature the concept of “world” and/or “global leadership”<sup>4</sup> is not fully settled. For the needs of this article it is, therefore, necessary to briefly outline and clarify its meaning.

“Leadership” is commonly associated with an equally vague word “hegemony”. The reason for this is that the Greek original of this term (*hegemonia*) is translated as “leadership”. Thus, some authors make no distinction between both terms and use them interchangeably, while referring to preponderance of material power (military and economic) and to asymmetrical influence on others exercised by the leader or the hegemon<sup>5</sup>. Ancient Greeks, however, used to separate *hegemonia*, which meant legitimate leadership, from *arkhe*, that referred to coercive control. In this sense, to be legitimate leadership requires recognition and consent of others, while coercion rests on the material power and the use of force. “[H]egemonia is only possible within a community whose members share core values and is limited to activities that are understood to support common identities”, while *arkhe* is “based on possession of material resources [italics added – PK]”<sup>6</sup>. Such a distinction is easily noticeable in the contemporary IR literature, but these meanings are differently ascribed to various terms (i.e. “domination”, “primacy”, “leadership”, “hegemony”, or “empire”) with a mixture of attached adjectives (“liberal”, “material”, “communitarised”, “coalitional”, “structural” *etc.*)<sup>7</sup>. In other words, there is neither consensus on the meaning nor any

<sup>4</sup> Used interchangeably in this paper.

<sup>5</sup> See: Barry Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2004), 56; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 116, n. 6; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 32.

<sup>6</sup> Quote after: Martin A. Smith, *Power in the Changing Global Order: The US, Russia and China* (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2012), 29.

<sup>7</sup> See: Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 208; Bruce D. Jones, *Power & Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 34; Bruce M. Russett, *Hegemony and Democracy*, Security and Governance Series

conventional usage of the concept of “world leadership” in the IR literature. Existing definitions are at odds either in substance or in terminology.

However, there are several features of this term stemming from the overall picture that match the purpose of this article. First of all, leadership rests on power. Leader possess an asset of excessive material resources or authority, enabling him to take the initiative, stand ahead and direct the remainder. That makes him exceptional among others and indispensable for taking a collective action. As David Rapkin notes, “leading” means “being in the first place” or “to guide”. The first meaning refers to certain surpluses of resources; the second indicates that “leaders perform some task, service, or function for the group/society (...) that otherwise would not be provided as effectively, plentifully, or at all”<sup>8</sup>. Moreover the leader creates structures and instruments – a system – in which the leader and his followers operate. Since he contributes the most, he also decides about its shape, size and frames.

Second, the leader acts for the sake of the common good. He does not volunteer to sacrifice his own interest for the others, but he accepts to bear higher costs to achieve universal goals. While taking an action, he appeals to common values and interests. He attracts followers with his righteousness, potential benefits, or by serving as an example. Again David Rapkin observes that “world leaders have served as models in the narrow sense of displaying the technical ingredients of competitive success, but also in broader, more qualitative ways as well (e.g., innovative political forms and practices, cultural

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(Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011), 1; Joseph S. Nye, *The Powers to Lead* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), x; Steve Weber, *The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of Ideas* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010), 112; Rikard Bengtsson and Ole Elgström, “Reconsidering the European Union’s Roles in International Relations: Self-Conceptions, Expectations, and Performance,” in *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns Maull (New York: Routledge, 2011), 117; G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 67–75; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2001), 21; Zbigniew Brzeziński, *Wybór: dominacja czy przywództwo* (Kraków: Znak, 2004), 104, 241; Zbigniew Brzeziński, *Druga szansa* (Warszawa: Świat Książki - Bertelsmann Media, 2008), 152.

<sup>8</sup> David P. Rapkin, “Japan and World Leadership?,” in *World Leadership and Hegemony*, ed. David P. Rapkin (Boulder: L. Rienner, 1990), 193.

patterns)<sup>9</sup>. Thus, leadership generally appeals to or sets up some norms and rules that are subsequently recognized by the leader's followers.

Third, the leader has the ability to impose his will on disobedient parties. That is only another aspect of power, which touches upon the coercion issue, instead of the potential to act as in the first point. Sooner or later, and for various reasons, every leader faces defiance of one state or a group of states (but still has remaining followers). He deals with it in order to preserve community based on the set of ideas and standards as it has been indicated in the previous paragraph. He does that either by resorting to or by threatening to use force.

And last but not least, leadership does not necessarily embrace all possible areas and matters. Individual states may be either not interested or simply not powerful enough to lead in a given area (or territory). They may lead in one particular issue, while being defiant in another one. Noteworthy, as Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth observe, it does not have to affect its credibility and reputation as a leader among other states<sup>10</sup>. Such a diverse behavior, conditioned by a particular matter of concern (be it political, economic, geographical *etc.*), is particularly important while speaking about another facet of global leadership – the roles played by a leader in the international society.

States usually play more than just one role, and some are more complex than others. Being a leader, for instance, may be defined as one role, but it also entails a set of minor roles of a state, such as: the agenda setter, the coalition builder, the resources and goods provider, the decision implementer, the manager of the process *etc.* Hedley Bull identifies four roles of great powers that could easily match responsibilities of a leader: preservation of the general

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Stephen G. Brooks, *World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 159.

balance, avoidance and control of crises, limitation of war, and the unilateral exercise of local preponderance<sup>11</sup>.

As for a definition – an international role of a state embraces a system of its interactions on the international stage, determined by internal and external factors, especially by its position and identity<sup>12</sup>. Position refers to the state's relative potential, while identity depends on its perception of itself, as well as on the opinion and expectations of the others. So defined identity is equivalent to a "role conception"<sup>13</sup> – a notion employed in this article while discussing the change in character of the US leadership. Position and identity are relational and dynamic, because they are situated *vis-à-vis* other actors and thus they may change in the result of interactions with them. Further two sections will examine how both factors influenced the redefinition of the US global leadership.

## **Redefinition of the Purpose**

The United States has redefined the purpose of the American global leadership. It means that the American world leadership, defined as the political and economic order developed by the USA, and grounded in its power and unique position after the Second World War (and/or the Cold War), has turned during Obama's administration into a instrument aiming at retaining the American privileged position that was not a direct emanation of the U.S. supremacy to the extent that it used to be. In other words, the USA instrumentally exploited its world leadership (power and authority through

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<sup>11</sup> Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 201–212.

<sup>12</sup> Justyna Zając, *Role Unii Europejskiej w regionie Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2010), 26; Justyna Zając, "Teoria ról międzynarodowych," in *Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych*, ed. Ryszard Zięba, Stanisław Bieleń, and Justyna Zając (Warszawa: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych, 2015), 135.

<sup>13</sup> "Role conceptions refer to an actor's perception of his or her position *vis-à-vis* others (the ego part of a role) and the perception of the role expectations of others (the alter part of a role) as signaled through language and action". Sebastian Harnisch, "Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts," in *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns Maull (New York: Routledge, 2011), 8.

institutions, rules, structures *etc.*) to remain the leader, despite its relative decline in power.

Two caveats are necessary here. First, the United States under Obama's administration has remained the wealthiest and most productive country in the world, with the strongest military, and most advanced and renowned universities in the world (see Table 1). Therefore, the image of American decline is not a matter of the USA being simply weak, fragile or losing its ground. Nevertheless, the gap is shrinking (not that fast as the protagonists of American decline might think, though), and the unipolarity is no longer an achievable option. Second reservation is with regard to instrumental use of leadership. From the outset the American global leadership was designed to be a instrument promoting US interests in the world (as the following paragraph shows), and nothing has changed in that matter. In the first place, however, it was an offensive instrument aimed at accommodating American preponderance, and at shaping the world according to the power share. Now it is the opposite. The United States defends its privileged position, using world leadership structures to remain at the top. It is a tricky task, however, because it requires to employ both containment and accommodation strategies towards rising powers.

Table 1. US share of World GDP, military expenditures and top 100 universities (%)

	2001	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14
GDP	32	32	30	28	28	27	25	23	24	23	21	22	22	22
Military expenditures	35	37	39	41	41	40	40	41	41	42	41	39	36	34
Top 100 universities	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	53	51	47	46	45

Source: World Bank; SIPRI; Times Higher Education<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> "World Bank Group," accessed July 14, 2015, <http://www.worldbank.org/>; "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database — Wwww.sipri.org," accessed July 14, 2015, [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database); "World University Rankings 2010-11", Times Higher Education, accessed July 22, 2015, <https://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2011/world-ranking#/sort/0/direction/asc>.

The logic of the argument has its roots in the origins of the American global leadership that was established in the years following the Second World War. At that time, the United States was the most powerful country in the world and the gap in the size of economies and production between the leader and the remainder had never been (and feasibly would ever be) greater. Even then, however, cherishing almost literally hegemonic advantage, America did not manage to embrace the whole world with its *Pax Americana*, and its influence differed from region to region. Nevertheless, the system of Bretton Woods, the foundation of the International Monetary Fund and of the World Bank, and making the US dollar an international currency engendered specific political and economic structures. According to John Agnew these are their key features: “(1) stimulating economic growth *indirectly* through fiscal and monetary policies; (2) commitment to a unitary global market based on producing the greatest volume of goods most inexpensively for sale in the widest possible market by means of a global division of labor; (3) accepting the United States as the home of the world’s major reserve-currency and monetary overseer of the world economy (...); (4) unremitting hostility to »communism« (...); and (5) the assumption of the burden of intervening militarily whenever changes in government or insurgencies could be construed as threatening to the political status quo established in 1945 (the Truman Doctrine)”<sup>15</sup>. Although the Cold War is over, the aforementioned structures survive and serve the American interests (and others’ too).

The same goes for a set of regional military alliances formed in Europe and Asia during the Cold War. Creating NATO in 1949, ANZUS in 1951, SEATO in 1954, and other bilateral alliances with Japan (1960), Philippines (1951), and South Korea (1953) are the result of power distribution after the Second World War. Even though the share of power has changed over decades in all these regions, the United States strives to maintain its leading

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<sup>15</sup> John A. Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), 127.

position and to protect the *status quo*. As Lee Kuan Yew, the legendary prime minister of Singapore, has observed: “the 21st century will be a contest for supremacy in the Pacific because that's where the growth will be (...) If you do not hold your ground in the Pacific you cannot be a world leader”<sup>16</sup>. That is precisely what the famous “pivot to Asia” (now moderately called “rebalance”) represents and basically is about. That is also a reason why this section concentrates on the Asian-Pacific region as a case study of an instrumental use of the American global leadership.

One can argue that China is one of the beneficiaries of the American leadership in the Asia-Pacific region (next to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). In favor of this argument Robin Niblett asserts that “US security alliances and commitments in East Asia have provided the benign strategic context within which China’s economic rise could take place without as yet unlocking deep counter-reactions driven by its neighbours’ security fears”<sup>17</sup>. Along this “benign context” followed, managed by the United States, open-markets-oriented international trade system that allowed China to grow annually in average 10 per cent since the end of the Cold War. In terms of purchasing power parity China’s GDP overtook the US in 2014<sup>18</sup>, and is likely to surpass it in nominal GDP by 2030<sup>19</sup>. China is also the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves and US treasury securities. In 2005 Chinese military spending left France behind (second in this ranking at the time), and tripled since then<sup>20</sup>. All those changes were possible due to the American leadership structures, and as David Lampton observes “China has thus become an ardent supporter of the existing international economic order”<sup>21</sup>. On the other hand, China has engaged

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<sup>16</sup> Quote after: Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, 1st ed. (New York: WWNorton & Co, 2011), 8.

<sup>17</sup> Robin Niblett, *Ready to Lead?: Rethinking America’s Role in a Changed World*, Chatham House Report (London, England: Chatham House, 2009), 24.

<sup>18</sup> “World Bank Group.”

<sup>19</sup> Barry Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014), 94.

<sup>20</sup> It might be even more, since China does not share real numbers. Yet, high and constantly rising expenditures still do not translate into the capacity to project its military power.

<sup>21</sup> David M. Lampton, “The Faces of Chinese Power,” *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 1 (2007): 117.

in several initiatives countering the liberal American-led international system, reinforcing its position, and lowering standards of governance set by the World Bank, IMF and other international institutions. These initiatives include: the Cooperation Forums with African and Arab countries, the New Development Bank formed by BRICS countries, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership<sup>22</sup>. Hence, despite being a beneficiary of the US leadership, China remains its main challenger in the region.

After the Cold War China, in its strategy towards the United States and to the world more generally, formulated three principles mutually supporting each other: avoid confrontation, build comprehensive national power, and keep growing<sup>23</sup>. That is what David Lampton describes as a “consensus strategy” of a “nonconfrontational path in the short and medium term” aimed at eventually becoming “a major force in the world”<sup>24</sup>. Blackwill and Tellis in their most recent report on US strategy towards China enumerate eight goals set by China’s Communist Party (CCP), which are the following: “replace the United States as the primary power in Asia; weaken the U.S. alliance system in Asia; undermine the confidence of Asian nations in U.S. credibility, reliability, and staying power; use China’s economic power to pull Asian nations closer to PRC geopolitical policy preferences; increase PRC military capability to strengthen deterrence against U.S. military intervention in the region; cast doubt on the U.S. economic model; ensure U.S. democratic values do not diminish the CCP’s hold on domestic power; and avoid a major confrontation with the United States in the next decade”<sup>25</sup>.

Excluding the last point, the US strategy towards China was precisely the opposite. In the 1990s, when China was just setting off, US policymakers, according to Aaron Friedberg, made steps “intended not to »contain« China’s

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<sup>22</sup> Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, *Revising U.S. Grand Strategy toward China*, Council Special Report 72 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015), 16.

<sup>23</sup> Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy*, 144.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>25</sup> Blackwill and Tellis, *Revising*, 19.

rise, but to preserve the favorable balance of power in East Asia in spite of its growing capabilities”<sup>26</sup>. Those steps included three types of actions: bolstering military power in the Pacific, strengthening alliances and quasi-alliances, and slowing the growth of Chinese military power<sup>27</sup>. When Barack Obama assumed office, the US administration returned to that strategy. Not from the beginning, though.

The new officials accepted inevitability of China’s rise and its growing importance<sup>28</sup>, and that the period when the United States had enjoyed a degree of global dominance became history<sup>29</sup>. As a result, at first the Obama Administration was seeking China’s engagement and “win-win cooperation”<sup>30</sup>, that in fact was furthering American interests and emphasizing its leadership role. This approach concerned issues of climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, financial crisis and cybersecurity, as well as temporary blindness to the abuse of human rights for the sake of good relations. Chinese counterparts, however, remained basically unresponsive to these initiatives. They evinced little interest in reduction of carbon emissions at the Copenhagen climate change summit in 2009, offered no assistance in dealing with North Korean nuclear program, and continued cyber-theft targeted at American enterprises. Moreover, China more assertively engaged in territorial disputes in the South China Sea, that raised military tensions and mobilized opposition to China in the region. Therefore, the United States moved towards strategy mentioned before, which consists of “implicit containment, balancing, or deterrence”<sup>31</sup>.

The “pivot to Asia” was proclaimed in 2011 during Barack Obama’s trip to Indonesia for East Asia Summit. The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton,

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<sup>26</sup> Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy*, 101.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 102–112.

<sup>28</sup> George W. Bush did it too by approaching China as a “responsible stakeholder”. See: “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?,” accessed July 23, 2015, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>.

<sup>29</sup> Martin Indyk, *Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy*, Brookings Focus Book (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 65.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>31</sup> Dueck, *The Obama Doctrine*, 72.

explained very plainly the reasons for the Asian pivot. She claimed that “[a] strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to secure and sustain America's global leadership”<sup>32</sup>. As for Tom Donillon, the national security advisor, the pivot's main objective was to “sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms”<sup>33</sup>. To achieve that goal the United States had to: strengthen and adapt its alliances in the region; increase its security presence by opening new military bases and deploying US forces; finally, engage in multilateral institutions, and economic projects. Every single of these acts was directed against potential challenges imposed by China. Even the TPP was designed to eliminate China from agreement's prospective signatories<sup>34</sup>.

The US set of alliances in the region is arguably a unique asset, especially in comparison with fairly alienated China. The anchor of the US presence in Asia for the last decades has been its relationship with Japan, where approximately 50,000 American troops are stationed. In April 2015, both countries deepened their partnership by completing a revision of the Mutual Defense Guidelines (first codified in 1978 and updated in 1997), accounting for “developments in military technology, improvements in interoperability of the U.S. and Japanese militaries, and the complex nature of security threats in the 21st century”<sup>35</sup>. Additionally, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduced legislation reinterpreting the pacifist clause in Japanese constitution. The bill, if passed,

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<sup>32</sup> Hillary R. Clinton, “America's Pacific Century,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 189 (2011): 58.

<sup>33</sup> “Keynote Address: Obama in China: Preserving the Rebalance - Council on Foreign Relations,” accessed December 9, 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/china/keynote-address-obama-china-preserving-rebalance/p33778>.

<sup>34</sup> Michael Mastanduno, “Order and Change in World Politics: The Financial Crisis and the Breakdown of the US-China Grand Bargain,” in *Power, Order, and Change in World Politics*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 178.

<sup>35</sup> Emma Chanlett-Avery et al., “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress” (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2015), 20.

would allow Japan to involve in the overseas conflicts “when a close ally is attacked and the result threatens Japan's survival<sup>36</sup>”.

South Korea is another major non-NATO ally of the United States. Some analysts argue that under Obama's administration relations between two countries have been “at their best state” since the formation of the alliance<sup>37</sup>. Indeed, it was considerably upgraded in response to the North Korean nuclear threats, but resulted in little progress in improving the South Korean defense capacities. Moreover, South Korea was not that eager to taking actions that irritated China, and appeared reluctant to the expansion of Japanese military potential.

Meanwhile, a considerable progress has been made in security relations between the USA and Philippines. In 2014, accelerated by the aforementioned Chinese maritime territorial claims, the two states finalized the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Since the US forces had withdrawn from the country's military bases in 1992, the new framework agreement allowed to increase presence of “US military forces, ships, aircraft, and equipment in the Philippines on a nonpermanent basis and greater U.S. access to Philippine military bases”<sup>38</sup>.

Another long-time regional ally of the United States is Thailand. In 2012, they signed the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance fostering security cooperation, military exercises and bilateral interoperability<sup>39</sup>. However, the subsequent Thai coup d'état of 2014 disrupted and significantly slowed down the progress in strengthening the bilateral alliance – the USA suspended foreign assistance and canceled military exercises<sup>40</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup> “Japan Self-Defence Law Reform Backed by Cabinet - BBC News,” accessed July 23, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32735359>.

<sup>37</sup> Mark E. Manyin et al., “US-South Korea Relations” (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2014), 1.

<sup>38</sup> Thomas Lum and Ben Dolven, “The Republic of Philippines and U.S. Interests” (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2014), 15.

<sup>39</sup> “Defense.gov News Release: 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance,” accessed July 24, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15685>.

<sup>40</sup> Emma Chanlett - Avery and Ben Dolven, “Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations” (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2014), 2.

Eventually there is Australia, enjoying very robust bilateral relationship with the United States. Due to evolving geopolitical dynamics in the region, Australia began a major military buildup and looked forward to strengthening security ties with the USA. In November 2011, Barack Obama visited Australia and announced a deployment of 2,500 marines in Darwin.

As Hillary Clinton declared, the USA were also “building new partnerships to help solve shared problems” by outreaching other countries<sup>41</sup>. Thus, developing security relations and enhancing military presence in the region included Singapore (the deployment of coastal warships), India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and even Myanmar. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review states that by 2020 60 percent of U.S. Navy assets will be stationed in the Pacific<sup>42</sup>.

Along the consolidation of security infrastructure in the region, the “pivot” envisaged engagement in regional multilateral institutions, such as – for long neglected by the USA – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), as well as in economic initiatives, especially Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Although it did not directly relate to the exploitation of existing structures of the US leadership, there are two reasons worth mentioning: first, it follows the general US policy of branding the United States as a “Pacific nation”, which dispels its image of being just another “outside power”; second, it helps the intra-institutional balancing of China desired by the United States<sup>43</sup>. The US joined the ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as early as it was possible under the new administration (in July 2009). A year later it became the first non-ASEAN country to establish a dedicated Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta<sup>44</sup>. Strong commitment on the ASEAN forum in political, security and

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<sup>41</sup> Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” 59.

<sup>42</sup> “The Quadrennial Defense Review 2014” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2014), 34.

<sup>43</sup> Ryo Sahashi, “The Rise of China and the Transformation of Asia-Pacific Security Architecture,” in *Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation*, ed. William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2013), 155.

<sup>44</sup> “U.S. Engagement with ASEAN”, ASEAN - United States Mission, accessed July 24, 2015, <http://asean.usmission.gov/mission/participation.html>.

economic related issues as well as annual East Asia Summits (President Obama has personally attended two so far) effectively elevated the US presence in the region.

Enhancing cooperation through the APEC and opening new markets to the US products was just another aspect of intensifying diplomatic and economic ties within the region. The most notable example is TPP, a free trade agreement between twelve Pacific Rim states (excluding China at the time<sup>45</sup>), responsible for 40 percent of global GDP and a third of world trade. Beside economic benefits, the TPP had a strategic significance. As one US administration official argued, the “TPP is the avenue through which the United States, working with nearly a dozen other countries (and another half dozen waiting in the wings), is playing a leading role in writing the [trade] rules of the road for a critical region in flux”<sup>46</sup>. In this line President Obama added: “If we don’t write the rules, China will”<sup>47</sup>. What is notable, the TPP, to a certain extent, was built on the US partnership framework already in place. Six countries had free trade agreements with the USA beforehand, while four enjoyed a status of American treaty allies. States outside these groups had either very close relationship with the USA (New Zealand) or a fairly cooperative one (Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam). Hence, the TPP could as well be considered as a result of instrumental use of American leadership.

## **Redefinition of the Character**

American global leadership has also changed in terms of its character. Among other reasons stated earlier, this change was also the result of the way

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<sup>45</sup> When writing this article, the TPP was yet to be concluded. See: “Obama’s Trade Agenda Moves Passed Key Senate Hurdle - CNNPolitics.com,” accessed July 24, 2015, <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/22/politics/obama-trade-deal-congress-tpp-tpa>.

<sup>46</sup> Ian F. Fergusson, Mark A. McMinimy, and Brock R. Williams, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress” (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2015), 5.

<sup>47</sup> Gerald F. Seib, “Obama Presses Case for Asia Trade Deal, Warns Failure Would Benefit China,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 27, 2015, sec. US, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-presses-case-for-asia-trade-deal-warns-failure-would-benefit-china-1430160415>.

how the new administration perceived the role the United States played in the world. In President Obama's words, it was "ready to lead once more"<sup>48</sup> by "renewing American leadership"<sup>49</sup>. This renewal concerned redefinition of the role conceptions – broad foreign policy guidelines stemming from state's identity – introduced in the first section of the article.

The point of reference for this particular analysis is Hanns Maull's listing of central themes in the US foreign policy role conceptions for the years 2000-2010. He identifies a degree of continuity in the following five themes: "(1) an exclusive international leadership role (...) (2) the pursuit of US global power and purposes, based on broad domestic political support and the willingness to commit substantial national resources; (3) propagation of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and market economics – the »American ideology« – as a universally applicable and a morally and practically preferable social order; (4) pragmatically internationalist policies that emphasize efficiency and effectiveness, resulting in a functional rather than a principled approach to multilateralism; and finally (5) a propensity for military intervention and, if deemed necessary, unilateral action – as an enforcer of international/regional/national »order« as defined by the United States"<sup>50</sup>. Even though the list above embraces two years of the Obama Administration, neither of these points fully matches its approach, and each of them needs some clarification.

First, American world leadership under Obama's administration was no longer completely exclusive. Certainly, the US general primacy allowed for resistance not to be bound and determined by others, but at the time it was not a leading principle of its conduct in the international affairs. Having said this, there are two facets of leadership inclusiveness. One is burden-sharing, which basically stands for other states joining the USA initiatives and contributing to

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<sup>48</sup> "Barack Obama's Inaugural Address," *The New York Times*, January 20, 2009, sec. U.S. / Politics, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html>.

<sup>49</sup> Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2007): 2-16.

<sup>50</sup> Hanns Maull, "Hegemony Reconstructed? America's Role Conception and Its 'leadership' within Its Core Alliances," in *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns Maull (New York: Routledge, 2012), 170-171.

joint actions. This aspect will be expanded in the next point, while discussing American reluctance to “go it alone”. Second facet, much more important here, is about the United States doing what other states want it to do as the first among equals. Such a position (as well a leadership role) implies certain responsiveness to expectations and requests raised by others. In effect, it also occasionally entails relinquishing the initiative on their behalf, handing over agenda setting, or simply contributing to others’ endeavors.

Such an approach was adopted during the Arab Spring in 2011 in the case of Libya, when President Obama said that “American leadership (...) means shaping the conditions for the international community to act together”<sup>51</sup>. In a nutshell, the United States handed over initiative to European powers (France and Great Britain), which advocated an intervention in Libya. The so-called “shaping the conditions” included securing adoption of the UN Security Council resolution (on March 17, 2011 it authorized an international coalition to “take all necessary measures” to “protect civilians” in Libya), and handing over the mission command to NATO soon after initial intervention ended. At each stage the USA proved to be an indispensable contributor<sup>52</sup>. Later on, such policy has been labeled, not necessarily accurately, the “leading from behind”.

Within the context of leadership inclusiveness, Obama’s administration also recognized a need to adjust institutional economic arrangements. Along the promotion of the G-20 forum, during financial crisis hoisted to the main platform of economic and financial cooperation of the major advanced and emerging market economies<sup>53</sup>, there were steps taken toward reforming the IMF. Accepted by the Fund’s Board of Governors in December 2010, the reform package addressed two major problems faced by this institution:

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<sup>51</sup> “Remarks by the President on the Situation in Libya”, Whitehouse.gov, accessed July 28, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-situation-libya>.

<sup>52</sup> Bartosz Wiśniewski, “Stany Zjednoczone wobec interwencji wojskowej w Libii,” *Biuletyn PISM*, no. 35 (784) (2011): 2414–15.

<sup>53</sup> Marek Rewizorski, “G-8, G-20 i kształtowanie się globalnego zarządzania,” in *Instytucje międzynarodowe w dobie globalnego zarządzania*, ed. Marek Rewizorski (Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2015), 227.

significant decline of its resources as a share of global GDP, and underrepresentation of the emerging and developing countries in the institutional vote share, due to their increasing contribution to the world economy<sup>54</sup>. The latter proposal, more important here, included 6 per cent shift in quota, and 5 per cent in voting share to emerging countries (in particular China, India, Russia, Brazil, Mexico and South Korea), increasing their financial contributions to the IMF and their voting power in the Executive Board. The reform stroke mainly European powers (Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy), additionally due to reduction of their representatives in the Board. The United States, underrepresented in the IMF (quota share smaller than its share in global GDP), suffered minor decrease in voting power (fall from 16,72 to 16,47 per cent), but maintained its veto power for major policy decisions, where 85 per cent supermajority is required. Therefore, from the US perspective, it was both the global balance of power adjustment shift from Europe to the developing world<sup>55</sup>, and an attempt to engage emerging countries as responsible stakeholders of the American-led order, and at the same time gaining some legitimacy. However, to be concluded the reform required the consent of the US Senate, which – despite the Obama Administration’s endorsement – has not ratified the reform package yet (as for July 2015).

Second, claiming that under Obama the US global power and interests were based on broad domestic political support and on the willingness to commit substantial national resources is only partially true. It is correct about the domestic support, whether it is bipartisan consent for foreign engagement, American business’s pursuit of open markets and of cheap labor, or public opinion’s approval for taking an active part in the world affairs by the USA. On the whole, nothing has changed here. Regarding the commitment issue, however, it is mostly a matter of scale. Certainly, there is no question that the United States spends an unmatched fortune on its global posture: overseas

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<sup>54</sup> “Press Release: IMF Executive Board Approves Major Overhaul of Quotas and Governance,” accessed July 30, 2015, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10418.htm>.

<sup>55</sup> Paola Subacchi, “The Role of the US in the Post-Crisis Economic Order,” in *America and a Changed World*, ed. Robin Niblett (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 270.

military and diplomatic deployments, international institutions, or foreign aid. According to SIPRI, the US military spending during Obama's presidency was relatively high, although since 2010 it has continuously fallen. As for the share of GDP it fell from 4,7 per cent (2010) to 3,5 per cent in 2014, which was a level last seen in 2002. To some degree it was just a return to normalcy after two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, wherefrom troops were gradually withdrawn. This drop in military spending, however, was also caused by budget sequestration and doctrinal adjustment to the new security landscape. Instead of long endorsed "two-war" doctrine (being prepared for two overlapping regional conflicts), the Department of Defense put greater emphasis on special forces capabilities to conduct quick raids into enemy territory<sup>56</sup>. This shift, along with "no boots on the ground" doctrine, applied to the cases of Libya and of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (where American interventions were confined to air operations, or to training and advisory missions<sup>57</sup>), indicated that there was a limited readiness to commit national resources, especially the lives of American soldiers. Correspondingly, when in 2013 President Obama withdrew from his "red line" declaration to engage militarily, if the Assad regime utilized chemical or biological weapon<sup>58</sup>, and sought unnecessary Congress authorization for intervention instead, he explained himself by pointing to "the absence of a direct or imminent threat to our security"<sup>59</sup>. Besides, he also appealed to Congress facing little public support for the use of force in Syria<sup>60</sup>. Eventually, due to diplomatic efforts to

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<sup>56</sup> "The Obama Doctrine - Council on Foreign Relations," accessed July 28, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/elections/obama-doctrine/p27295>.

<sup>57</sup> As of June 2015 it was approximately 3100 US military personnel in Iraq. See: Christopher M. Blanchard et al., "The 'Islamic State' Crisis and U.S. Policy" (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2015), 16.

<sup>58</sup> "Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps | Whitehouse.gov," accessed July 28, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps>.

<sup>59</sup> "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria", Whitehouse.gov, accessed July 28, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria>.

<sup>60</sup> 36 per cent in favor, 51 per cent against. See: "U.S. Support for Action in Syria Is Low vs. Past Conflicts," accessed July 28, 2015, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/164282/support-syria-action-lower-past-conflicts.aspx>.

prevent the Assad regime from using chemical weapons in the future, the vote in Congress was deliberately postponed and forgotten.

Third role conception, the propagation of “American ideology”, is certainly a significant element of US global leadership, and, therefore, it is indeed the least controversial point on Hanns Maull’s list. Human rights, democracy, rule of law, free trade and open markets are constitutive elements of Woodrow Wilson’s idealism that have been long present in American foreign policy. Most recently they resurfaced vividly in George W. Bush’s agenda to democratize Arab countries by imposing liberal standards. Abysmal outcomes of such policy in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine undermined the idea, which suffered further from the Bush administration’s selective approach to idealism that neglected President Wilson’s another essential principle to empower international institutions. Obama’s administration offered different approach and reinterpreted this type of Wilsonianism.

On the one hand, it put less focus on democracy promotion. In 2009, in his speech at Cairo University President Obama stressed US commitment to democratic values, but distanced himself from the policy of his predecessor, saying that “[n]o system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other”<sup>61</sup>. Worth mentioning is the overall reaction of the US government toward massive protests against authoritarian regimes in several countries during the Arab Spring. When it came to bottom-up pursuit of democratic values in the region, the United States hesitated and gave priority to strategic considerations: events in Tunisia were underestimated, and president Ben Ali was overthrown practically without any US engagement; in Egypt US officials long backed president Hosni Mubarak, until the transfer of power was secured by the Egyptian military; in Yemen main US concern was stabilizing rather than democratizing a country, wherein Al-Qaeda of Arabian Peninsula groupings operated; in Bahrain the United States decided to sustain *status-quo* regarding its alliance with Saudi Arabia and Sunni royal family in

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<sup>61</sup> “Remarks by the President at Cairo University, 6-04-09”, Whitehouse.gov, accessed July 28, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09>.

Manama, rather than to risk with Shiite revolution and with a prospective rise of Iranian influence on this side of the Persian Gulf; finally, in case of the Syrian civil war, having taken everything into consideration, arguably there was no good and effective solution to bring an end to this conflict. Among aforementioned cases Libya could be an outstanding example of democracy and human rights promotion, because intervention of international coalition helped to defeat regime of Muammar Gaddafi. However, shortly after sectarian conflicts erupted and Libya plunged into chaos.

On the other hand, reinterpretation of Wilsonianism implied greater commitment and enhancing multilateral institutions. Not only does this remark point to the dissemination of universally applicable American order (as discussed), but also it contradicts the fourth point made by Hanss Maull about “functional rather than a principled approach to multilateralism”. Supposedly, President Obama is a very pragmatic politician. One account observes that “Obama has emphasized bureaucratic efficiency over ideology, and approached foreign policy as if it were case law, deciding his response to every threat or crisis on its own merits”<sup>62</sup>. In turn, David Rothkopf notes that when President Obama defended himself for being indecisive in the case of Syria, he declared that a guiding principle of his foreign policy was just not doing “stupid” things<sup>63</sup>. Nevertheless, his approach to multilateral institutions reveals something more than mere functional internationalism. In symbolic fashion President Obama restored the cabinet-level rank of the US ambassador to the UN and nominated his close aide, Susan Rice, to this position. He was also the first US commander-in-chief chairing the UN Security Council (in 2009 and 2014, advancing the agenda of nonproliferation and terrorist fighters respectively). The Obama Administration engaged also in advancing and supporting multilateral treaties, including signing UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, joining the UN Human Rights Council in spite of

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<sup>62</sup> Quote after: Robert Singh, *Barack Obama's Post-American Foreign Policy: The Limits of Engagement* (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012), 41.

<sup>63</sup> David J. Rothkopf, *National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear*, First edition. (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2014, 2014).

deep reservations towards its effectiveness, and declaring to “immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty”<sup>64</sup>. The latter did not happen though, to some degree due to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ratified by the end of 2010. Earlier that year, however, Obama’s administration initiated international Nuclear Security Summits aimed at containing and eliminating nuclear materials. In Libya’s case Obama postulated to enforce UN resolution with military intervention to avoid situation when “[t]he democratic values that we stand for would be overrun” and “the words of the international community would be rendered hollow”<sup>65</sup>. Together with engagement in other multilateral initiatives (i.e. climate change and carbon dioxide reductions), it was a significant change in comparison to his predecessor.

Fifth, as previous paragraphs have demonstrated, Obama’s administration demonstrated an approach contrary to a notion of propensity for military intervention and unilateralism. Although both US National Security Strategies (NSS) of 2010 and 2015 stipulate the right to act unilaterally, should American nation and its interests be threatened, the latest NSS develops this doctrine only with a caveat, that any decision to use force must “reflect a clear mandate and feasible objectives”, as well as it must be “effective, just, and consistent with the rule of law”. Furthermore, such decision “should be based on a serious appreciation for the risk to our mission, our global responsibilities, and the opportunity costs at home and abroad” (see “don’t do stupid things” principle). And finally, “[w]henver and wherever we use force, we will do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy”<sup>66</sup>. These guidelines were not particularly reflected in the counterterrorism strategy, involving drone strikes and targeted killings in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, which escalated during Obama presidency, and reached

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<sup>64</sup> “Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered”, Whitehouse.gov, accessed July 28, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> “National Security Strategy” (The White House, February 2015), 8.

an estimated number of about 2,500 kills<sup>67</sup>. Paradoxically, however, this significant rise resulted from aforementioned unwillingness to engage militarily with ground forces, and hence, the expansion of special operations missions followed. They were cheaper, less exposed to public scrutiny, and involved fewer casualties on the American side.

Except targeted killings, that were occasionally conducted without previous notification or consent of the country on which territory they took place (i.e. operation “Neptun Spear” in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden in 2011), there was no other instance of strictly unilateral use of force by the United States under President Obama. Moreover, as Libyan case demonstrated, the USA sought the broadest possible multilateral support for military intervention, engaging not only the UN and NATO allies, but – most importantly – Arab League countries. Similarly with respect to ISIL, the United States led coalition of over 60 state and non-state partners along five lines of effort: (1) providing military support to its partners; (2) impeding the flow of foreign fighters; (3) stopping ISIL's financing and funding; (4) addressing humanitarian crises in the region; and (5) exposing ISIL's true nature<sup>68</sup>. This comprehensive approach taken by the American-led coalition was a result of preferring long-term solutions from immediate but unstable outcomes. Although the deployment of American soldiers could have temporal positive results, there were legitimate concerns that enduring stabilization required strong Iraqi security forces taking responsibility for their country. In addition, once President Obama had withdrawn US troops from Iraq in 2011, he was not eager to sending them back to fight ISIL. In effect, the military support included, as for July 2015, over 5000 strikes in Iraq and Syria (launched from air and sea), as well as intelligence, training missions, and equipment supplies

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<sup>67</sup> “Almost 2,500 Now Killed by Covert US Drone Strikes since Obama Inauguration Six Years Ago”, The Bureau’s Report for January 2015, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, accessed July 29, 2015, <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/02/02/almost-2500-killed-covert-us-drone-strikes-obama-inauguration/>.

<sup>68</sup> “Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL,” accessed July 29, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/s/seci/>.

for local forces fighting on the ground. By no means it could be counted a propensity for military intervention.

## Conclusion

The United States under Obama's administration has not relinquished a leadership role. It has rather adjusted the American world leadership to new circumstances by amending foreign policy goals, and by modifying strategies and instruments accordingly. The twofold change involved redefinition of leadership's purpose and rationale, as well as modifications in role conceptions. The case study of pivot to Asia (a rapidly emerging and thus – from the perspective of global primacy – an increasingly important region) illustrated how the US institutional, political, military and economical presence there (originating in the post-War share of power) was adapted to accommodate and contain the rise of China, and to sustain the American preeminence and comprehensive leadership. The purpose-transformation of the American leadership, from advancing US preponderance (currently decreasing) to defending its privileged position by resorting to its institutional structures and alliances, has also brought change to the way how the United States has been contested. For instance, China challenged these structures by questioning American legitimacy to lead, by claiming greater share in decision making (in the IMF), or by initiating and establishing separate institutions, *inter alia*, the AIIB and BRICS's the New Development Bank. A broad international interest and participation in the AIIB – manifested also by close American allies from Europe and Asia – reveals the remarkable potential of similar challenges to the US-led economic order in the future.

The Obama Administration considerably remodeled the role conceptions of the American leadership that transformed its character. Contrary to Hanns Maull's findings, this change occurred not only *within* the role conceptions, but also included shift *of* a particular role conception. Changes *within* include:

departing from exclusiveness and allowing the increased portion of others' engagement; decreased willingness and/or ability<sup>69</sup> to commit substantial national resources abroad; reinterpreting Wilsonianism towards less ambitious promotion of democracy, as well as greater emphasis on multilateralism and on strengthening international institutions. The role conception that Obama's administration seems to have entirely abandoned is the propensity for military intervention and unilateral action. Cases of Libya and Syria (or Arab Spring in general), as well as of Ukraine and Iran (though not examined in this analysis), demonstrate clearly great reluctance rather than propensity for military engagement. On the one hand, some of these changes might be temporary, resulting from the specific political personality of the current president. On the other hand, they appear to be more structural and multifaceted, concerning – above all – shifts in global share of multilayered power, and transitions in regional institutional architecture. Therefore, in respect of redefining the American leadership, Obama's administration has been rather a catalyst than a cause.

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<sup>69</sup> Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).

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## Corruption and the “Arab spring”

As one of the main elements leading to revolutions

### **Abstract**

*Corruption in the Arab world in general and in the “Arab spring” countries in particular is one of the most important hidden elements led to revolutions and uprisings. The accumulated different types of corruption made the Arab societies hopeless and pushed them to lose faith in the capabilities of their regimes/governments to achieve the economic and social justice, as those regimes and the small category benefiting from them are the main cause of corruption.*

*Therefore, fighting corruption requires the willingness of the state with clear structural systems and regulations in the states’ institutions. In addition, is needed a comprehensive plan at the short, medium and long term.*

**Keywords:** *corruption, Arab spring, revolutions.*

## Introduction

The “Arab spring” revolutions made its effects on the already regressive economic situation in the most of the Arab countries, which caused at once, a main element to fall back the economic performance, it was as well a consequence of an economic inheritance full of chronic structural imbalances at all the economical sections, debts accumulation, an excessive increase in the budget deficits and the spread of unemployment among youth. “Also in the case of the Arab Spring, scholars and analysts have attributed a primary role to these economic causes”.<sup>1</sup>

What contributed to those difficult situations of the “Arab spring” countries in particular, the growing feeling of the people that there are small categories of rich persons, decision makers and owners of political influence, who took control on most of the economic estimators and development benefits, while the other poor and limited income categories did not get. A small percentage of these estimators and/or wealth, which does not enable them to achieve their goals of an appropriate living level, besides the bad distribution of this wealth among all categories fairly, the expected result of that was a growing feeling of social injustice, and the spread of financial and administrative corruption, there was only one way to eliminate this situation which is the change and reform with hope to achieve better future. After two years of the beginning of those evolutions, we can study now the economic motives, which were behind them, and what accompanied them of changes at the economic and social levels.

As a result of that, the motives have increased and lead to the outbreak of the “Arab spring” revolutions. Moreover, at this point, it is very important to stress that there is another important side of other reasons, which seem always in the same context and should not be oversight at the regional and

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<sup>1</sup> M. Lagi, K. Z. Bertrand, Y. Bar-Yam, *Economics of Food Prices and Crises*, New England Complex Systems Institute, Cambridge 2012

international levels. It is the increasing gap of development among the Arab countries and the developed countries during the past years.

**The aim of the essay:**

Corruption as a subject became the main concern of everyone in the “Arab spring” countries, especially after the revolutions in these countries, talking about corruption is no longer limited to a class of intellectuals, journalists, and others interested in public affairs, but became the main subject under discussion for public and private sectors alike.

For the sake of the public debate to be more positive, we try in this paper to made apparent to those interested in the issue of corruption an analytical study of the causes of the phenomenon, which may help in the development of a comprehensive vision for the prevention and fight against corruption in all sectors and at all levels, on the basis that the solutions will come are based on a deep understanding of the causes of the phenomenon, and thus be effective in combat.

**Why the “Arab spring” countries have arisen?**

The change to the sake of freedom, the economic and social justice, and the partnership in the political life with the peoples, cannot be possible without popularity movements, uprisings and revolutions beyond the limits of possible and reasonable. This fact made the economic reform opportunities unavailable in the “Arab spring” countries, but the Arabic economic situations confirm that most of political elites in those countries, were unable to realize that at some point they will be forced to go to the social and economic reform, or to abandon the power and leave it to those who are able to achieve the goals of reform to those peoples, which had suffered a lot. “An aspect that can help us to understand the social causes of the popular riots is the composition of unemployment: youth unemployment, particularly female, was very high.

Juvenile dissatisfaction has been considered as one of the most relevant causes of the Arab Spring".<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, the Arabic experiment is not different from the experiment in some of the European countries, which showed that there is no freedom without a dispute or conflict and there are no rights or social justice without a seek to achieve them. Here it became clear that the man if he wants his/her rights, s/he must snatch these rights with his heart, if he could not then with his tongue, if he could not then with his hands, as happened in the revolutions fields.

It is noticeable here that the economic part of life, is the prime motivation to all liberties' efforts. The basic principle in all conflicts among the rulers and the peoples goes over to the economic variables, which leads to this movement. These variables were serving one category without the other, and they achieved the benefits of the minority which is with money and power at the expense of the big majority of the poor peoples, and the result was an expansion in the gap among the peoples of the same country. It became those who owns everything and those who owns nothing. Poor peoples who become more poorness and rich peoples who become more richness and wealthy. At this point the economy became the axis of conflicts, because surviving in life is connected with the continues availability of the elements of a decent living to the citizen who is getting less amount of the wealth and income. If the man lost these elements, he has to seek his economic rights by all means. If there were not given to him in return to his efforts, and if he felt injustice, theoretically he has to prove and achieve to himself the right of liberty and justice with getting an appropriate share of the wealth, which he kept safe and secure at the state institutions, and might contribute to that if he could not find a job opportunity or if his income does not commensurate with the levels of common prices, or if

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<sup>2</sup> N. Sika, *The political economy of Arab uprisings*, European Institute of the Mediterranean - IEMed, 2012, paper no. 10.

there was a common sense that economic corruption infringe on his social rights.

In such case, peoples sometimes hope that there are rulers do not control the economic elements of the state when they have the power. If the ruling elite was corrupted, then the reform demand would not be enough, and that why and when the peoples resort to escalate to reach to the political reform, which will be followed by social and economic reforms and aims to a total change which guarantee the social justice purposes and an equal distribution of wealth and income, without discrimination. This is of course lead to outbreak of the revolutions.

Here the peoples will not ask any more only for the bread, or neither to raise the wages or to solve the housing problem, to reduce the amount of the basic needs, or to find a job opportunity, because all those demands become later a small part of the bigger problem, as revolutions become at this point for liberty and to provide the total economic rights, as like education, health care and an appropriate and decent life. Especially if the man did not feel the benefits of the development and the economic growth, the thing which was approved when the benefits of the economic growth did not appear spontaneously, but when the peoples felt that those benefits were focused and stopped at higher levels without reaching to them. As well, it is the opposite of what most of the traditional economic theories have predicted, therefore, there was a huge deference within the society and the common feeling with injustice, which was the cause of the emotional explosion and the strong pursuit to change, with hope to reach and achieve their overall aspirations.

### **The main reasons of corruption in the “Arab spring” countries:**

We can define six main reasons of corruption in the Arab world in general and in the “Arab spring” countries in particular as follows: reasons related to the rule of law and the punitive of deterrent, reasons related to the public administration, reasons related to public finance of the state, reasons

related to the institutional framework, reasons related to the structural relations among the authorities of the state and finally reasons related to the social culture. Each one of these reasons has its own character which is different from the others, thus it needs different solutions than the others.

### **1. Reasons related to the rule of law and the punitive of deterrent:**

Looking back at the situation in the “Arab spring” countries, we can find that the law rules haven’t been respected largely, there were laws which have been issued to serve the benefits of specific category at the expense of the public interest. In addition, the implementation of law and the judicial decisions was controlled mostly by the political influence and the financial capability of the himself. The dominant feature of the length of the trial proceedings was weaker than the strength of the legal and judicial deterrence against corrupted people. As it happened many times when some corrupted people run away from the country to abroad before the trial, especially those who were close to the power and decision makers.

These practices have led to shake and then weak the rule of law among the peoples, and they became more encouraged to break it and/or trick it. They were looking to the law as it is a kind of potential threat and not as a tool to protect them, and that the law is a tool to protect the powerful people and nothing more.

### **2. Reasons related to the public administration**

There are too many gaps in the system of the public administration in the “Arab spring” countries, which had a major role to spread the corruption widely before the revolutions, failure to determine the tasks and duties strictly in governmental agencies gave the opportunity to many people to evade the responsibility and dumping it on others. In addition, the governmental bureaucracy and the complexity of the procedures had led many to resort to bribery to facilitate their work, and gave some employees the opportunity to extort the citizens, add to that the weakness of self-censorship in governmental

agencies, which encouraged the corrupted officials to move forward to commit more serious corrupted acts with impunity.

The low salaries, wages and its poor distribution, and also not being tied to efficiency and integrity led some people to justify to themselves, unlawfully, getting bribes and profiting from their jobs until they get the appropriate income which provide them with a decent life. Unemployment and the mismatch between qualifications and 10 jobs offered are, undoubtedly, causes of dissatisfaction among young people.<sup>3</sup>

The centralization, individualism and lack of transparency in the management of public affairs, facilitated to some corrupted officials to make decisions and implement policies to serve their personal interests or the interests of the groups they belong to, in the absence of the consultation or even the involvement of the people affected by these decisions, or those policies.

### **3. Reasons related to public finance of the state**

The public finance of the state was managed in a way contributed significantly to spread the phenomenon of corruption in the state, the difficulty of understanding the public budget had weakened the popular supervision of the public money and the resources and ways to spend it.

The numerous special funds outside the public budget had led to weakening the control over the money, which is public money; the same criticism can be directed to the budgets per item, also the government expenditures tainted by extravagance.

As for the system of public bids and tenders, although they are legally well structured, and the bids and tenders are posted on the e-government portal in a transparent manner, however, the real practice revealed a significant corruption in this sector. The “Arab spring” countries have suffered

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<sup>3</sup> T. Behr, *Talking about the revolution: Narratives on the origin and future of the Arab spring*, European Institute of the Mediterranean - IEMed, 2012, paper no. 9.

from the methods of granting loans in the public banks, which was predominately personal and led those close to the former regimes to get many of large loans without guarantees and escape outside the country. In addition, the management of public sector companies and privatization were marred most of the times by corruption, because of the politicization of its administration, the decisions of selling them, and the lack of the standards of transparency, participation, efficiency and effectiveness.

#### **4. Reasons related to the social culture**

The cultural and social environment in the “Arab spring” countries has an impact to spread the corruption, the social acceptance of the small corruption, and socially being seen as an acceptable way to get the rights, and calling corruption with other terms such as gratuities, tea, and transportation, entrenches the corruption in the governmental agencies and hamper the efforts to fight against it.

There was also an influence of the class and the factional politics on the public decisions. The public policy was not before the revolutions, in many cases, seeking the public interests as much as it was seeking to satisfy some persons belonging to a particular social denominations, or belong to the dominant party at the time. A striking example of the corruption founded on the social class and the political influence is the appointments in the judiciary, the police, the diplomatic corps, and the universities, as these jobs have become, in large part of them, limited to the lucky people (unqualified most of times) of certain families, or these who have favoritism or can afford to pay large bribes. In addition, a lot of deals were held by the ruling party with specific tribes or certain powers to guarantee their support in the multiple parliamentary elections. These denominations get in return some preferential advantages more than the rest of the citizens. “Improvements in living standards have, however, been unequally distributed among groups and

individuals: all Arab countries, including those of North Africa, remain characterized by profound social and economic inequalities”.<sup>4</sup>

### **5. Reasons related to the institutional framework**

Although the “Arab spring” countries have a large arsenal of laws, the number reached to more than 250,000 legislation, but there are many gaps that did not make the legislative framework sufficiently active in the fight against corruption. The first of these gaps is the lack of an adequate protection for the witnesses and the informants in the corruption cases, which made a lot of people reluctant to report corruption crimes or to testify in fear of victimization. In addition, the lack of legal regulation allows access to information which gave the opportunity for the corrupted people to hide their crimes, and weakened the official and popular oversight them. Also the lack of a comprehensive legal framework to prevent conflicts of interest allowed a lot of officials to exploit their positions to earn and give the features that are not due to their companies to their families at the expense of the public good.

Although the “Arab spring” countries have very large number of regulatory authorities, but it did not perform its role effectively, for several reasons. First, there is a lack of awareness of approaching the relevant anti-corruption authorities, and secondly, how to resort authorities you do not know about them.

The lack of independence of these bodies and all of their subordination to the executive authority, and the weakness of its legal powers had an impact on its independence, the extension of its ability to investigate the corruption of senior officials, the overlap in the terms of reference of the regulatory authorities and the lack of coordination between them made more than one of a regulatory exercise the same control over the activity of the same kind in the same administrative units, which represents a waste of time and public money, and hinders the administrative bodies to perform their essential role and

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<sup>4</sup> D. Salehi-Isfahani , *Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa*. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Research Paper , 2010, 26.

makes them devote themselves to the preparation of reports to regulatory agencies. Another reason the inadequacy of physical and human resources to some regulatory authorities, as the number of complaints made to these bodies are larger than their human capacity, also, some workers in the regulatory authorities fall into a simple procedural errors in the content, but it has a great impact on many people. "In the modernization theory education, jointly with other economic development-related variables, assumes a central role in the process of democratization".<sup>5</sup>

And eventually, the secrecy imposed on the reports regulatory bodies deprives the civil society of an important source of information and weaken the control of the people, and this secrecy give the impression to the public opinion that the government wants to cover up economic corruption in the governmental organizations. That it is not serious against this corruption, which further leads to the lack of trust between the citizen and the government and increases instability.

## **6. Reasons related to the structural relations among the authorities of the state**

The principle of the separation of three powers is the guarantor that makes each one of the three powers of the state the legislature, the judiciary and the executive do its roles that assigned to it without any of those authorities taking over of another. This principle had led to the weakness of the parliamentary oversight and the local People's Councils in the accountability of the executive authority for many reasons. The most important one was the scandalous falsification of the elections, and bring some useless elected members, who are in fact recruited by the ruling party, the obey his command and do not exercise control over the government. There was also an interference of the executive authority in the affairs of the judiciary, by several

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<sup>5</sup> S. M. Lipset, *Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy*, "American Political Science Review", 1959, 53, p. 69-105; G. Almond, S. Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New York 1963.

means, including the intimidation of judges with judicial inspection of the Minister of Justice, and distribute certain cases to certain judges courts, and assign the judges to work in the governmental agencies, and the control of the executive authority in the greater part of the judges salaries, but these means succeeded in affecting a small number of judges. In addition, the government took control over the national media - described as the fourth estate - which made it lose its role in exposing corruption, and even make it contributes to mislead the public opinion.

### **Outline: fighting corruption**

Based on the above analysis of the causes of corruption in the “Arab spring” countries, and bearing in mind the circumstances in the “Arab spring” countries in the recent time, we can distinguish between two types of interventions that must be done to prevent and fight corruption in these states:

#### **1. At the short term:**

There are a group of interventions which do not need new laws or major structural changes in the organizational structure of the state, as much as it can be done through the decisions of the Council of Ministers, or the cabinet, each one in its place, it will be aimed to achieving three main principles: 1. respect the transparency in every decision or policy taken by any party or government official at all levels, as corruption does not grow in the transparent environment, all officials, and government institutions at different levels and nature must, 2. involve community partners who are the civil society, the private sector and citizens in general, in any new policy, or any amendment to the current policies, as the participate is the important guarantees of a deviation from the public interest, and 3. taking into consideration the needs of all components of society, the marginalized in particular.

The accountability must be activated whoever is the corrupted person and it should be done quickly, because the slow and lazy justice is not

deterrent, and justice should be done in public in order to achieve general deterrence to the community.

## **2. At the medium and long term**

Acting at the medium and long term needs, new laws and restructuring of some institutions and the integration of some of them, it may reach to the creation of new institutions. This type of policy needs the approval of the community around it. This debate takes quite long time, and it needs to be led by the public institutions, notably the parliament as a major institution able to pass laws that are reflective of the will of the people, with a condition that the composition of the board has been done in a real democracy, not in a formality.

On the other hand, there must be unpacking the dependency of the regulatory bodies to the executive power, so that it can play its role in the oversight of the executive authority neutrality, this can be achieved by making the dependency of some of these bodies to the legislative authority, and some of them to the judicial authority represented by the Supreme Judicial Council, each according to its competence, or create an autonomous situation to these bodies from all authorities.

The independence of these bodies can be also achieved by creating a new anti-corruption institution which includes under its umbrella all regulators, which achieves its independence from the executive authority, and can also achieve coordination between the works of these agencies.

A package of legislation and administrative regulations also must be issued in order to fill the legislative vacuum in several areas, most notably - access to information about conflicts of interest and provide protection to informants, witnesses and inform about corruption in the private sector, and improve the systems of appointment and promotion in the public service.

In addition to the need to reconsider, some of the existing laws and regulatory systems in the public administration and the public finances, so that

these systems are transparent and do not politicize and to activate the accountability to achieve its effectiveness and efficiency.

The curricula also must include the culture of rejection and anti-corruption, and the religious institution to play an active role in the development of the culture of integrity, as well as the national and the private media to adopt meaningful programs.

In all of these things mentioned, there is more than one way to achieve them by learning from the international successful experiences. We have to choose those most suited to the social, political and economic cultural environment of the “Arab spring” countries.

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**Culture in International Relations**  
**Defining Cultural Diplomacy**

**Abstract**

*Culture in International Relations has been a neglected issue, it has only been recently that it gained on importance in the practice and theory of politics. The article aims at defining terms and concepts associated with culture and International Politics: Cultural Diplomacy, Soft power, Public Diplomacy, Nation branding etc. Also two case studies of Cultural Diplomacy activities are presented in order to illustrate the theoretical background.*

**Keywords:** *international relations, culture, cultural diplomacy*

Culture in international relations has always been a neglected issue. Military and economic powers were the ones attracting attention not only of the professionals and politicians, but of the scholars alike. Even International Relations (IR) theories have been focused on power and resources in terms of winning the wars (realism), economy in international cooperation (liberalism) and class struggle (marxism). Constructivism as a theory explaining IR with the aid of ideas, norms and culture came into being in the late 1980s and was popularized by Alexander Wendt in 1999 with his book “Social Theory of International Politics”. Constructivists view international relations through the lenses of norms and ideas, they believe that international structure leads its actors to redefine their identities in the process of coexistence.

Culture was also usually associated with the arts – a subject of little importance to the great politics. However, when we look at the past, exchange of gifts by diplomats can be traced back to the antiquity. Cultural Diplomacy seems to have been forgotten for a long time. It has only been recently that it started to make its big ‘come back’ to the international stage. Public Diplomacy in general is today a crucial ability, as means of communication has made the people and nations stronger, what revolutions in Libya and Egypt have shown us.

In today’s world of internet and social media a government needs to speak directly to foreign audiences in order to achieve its foreign policy goals. This is why taking care of country’s image and organizing cultural events for foreign audiences gained so much attention in the last couple of years.

But how do we describe all those activities - Cultural Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy or propaganda? In the globalized world of instant culture exchange via the internet the definitions repeat themselves, the terms mix.

In this article the author wishes to present a short background of culture in international relations and then try to define the confusing notions which have lately gained on importance and are widely used in the discipline of International Relations, Communications and Politics:

- Intercultural Studies
- International Cultural Relations

- Foreign Cultural Policy
- Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy
- Soft Power
- Propaganda
- Country image
- Nation branding (country promotion)

On this basis the author will try to define the term *Cultural Diplomacy* and present two examples –one from the past – the *Family of Man* exhibition touring Europe in the late 1950s, and one contemporary – UEA *Past Forward* exhibition touring the United States (US) in the years 2014-2015.

The main research method of the article is a mixed approach of literature analysis and comparative method in order to clarify the definitions of terms associated with culture in the field of International Relations. Also two case studies are presented to illustrate the theoretic deliberations.

Definition of the term *culture* is crucial to even just begin the discussion on its presence and role in International Relations. Oxford English Dictionary defines culture as a ‘refinement of mind, taste, and manners; artistic and intellectual development. Hence: the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively’<sup>1</sup> or ‘the distinctive ideas, customs, social behavior, products, or way of life of a particular nation, society, people, or period. Hence: a society or group characterized by such customs, etc.’<sup>2</sup>

Although those definitions may seem quite broad, so is the term culture. It is our language, art, ways of behavior, priority systems and customs passed on by the consecutive generations. In the area of International Relations, dominated by the European scholars in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, often a narrower, so called ‘German approach’ has been used which limits culture

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<sup>1</sup> Oxford English Dictionary, to be found online:  
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45746?rskey=cUcHhr&result=1#eid>, retrieved on January 29<sup>th</sup>, 2015

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem

only to the human intellectual achievements – the arts. This is what we may call today the ‘high culture’ – opera, classical music, visual arts, literature.

For the purpose of this article the author will adopt a broad definition by Stefan Czarnowski, a Polish culture historian, who describes culture as ‘the shared heritage, the fruit of the creative and processed effort of countless generations’<sup>3</sup>.

Culture has begun to travel as the earliest relations between countries/states/regions appeared, thus when porto-states were created in the ancient Greece. Culture traveled with trade, with conquest and migrations.<sup>4</sup> Diplomats in those times ‘carried messages and the best of them also brought back learning’<sup>5</sup>. They also delivered their own culture to foreign lands and brought back the foreign one. This was often done with the help of a traditional exchange of gifts - a widely renown custom dating back to the ancient times, which was aimed at establishing mutual trust and understanding.

Western religious missions traveling to China bared gifts of European decent. ‘Jesuit Mateo Ricci (...) opened China to the West’<sup>6</sup>, he brought prism to teach the Chinese about the optics and the portrait of a Virgin to discuss European perspective in painting.

In the medieval period local culture was cultivated and praised, it wasn’t until the 15th century when a clash of two great civilizations and the discovery of the New World evoked new ideas, technologies and political forms, which created the need for modern day diplomats - representatives of nation states. At the same time, in Medieval and Early Modern periods art was usually harnessed to power – firstly art was funded by the church, afterwards by the powerful courts. Artists were seen as trained craftsmen and fought for their position and employment by the clergy or the court, which ensured

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<sup>3</sup> Stefan Czarnowski, *Kultura*, Warsaw 2005, p.34

<sup>4</sup> Nicholas Cull, lecture given to Cultural Diplomacy class, University of Southern California, January 20th, 2015

<sup>5</sup> Richard Arndt, *First Resort of Kings, American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington D.C., 2005)p. 16

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 20

regular orders on their artwork. Diplomats were able to carry pieces of art as gifts and were presented with magnificent artworks at the courts they visited - as proof of power and wealth.

The home of modern day Cultural Diplomacy is France. The French have always been obsessed with their heritage, language especially. In 1635 *Academy Francaise* was created by Cardinal Richelieu in order to look after the beloved tongue. It was a marking point in the institutionalization of cultural activities of the state. However it was not until the XIX century that the nation state has been brought into perspective and further institutionalization of cultural societies followed - Alliance Francaise was established in 1883 with the aim of teaching and promoting of the French language. United Kingdom established British Council in 1934 and Germany - the Goethe Institut in 1951. These institutions have been successfully promoting their countries and languages abroad for nearly a century.

Cultural relations as a term was introduced also by the French when a first separate cultural office was created in the Foreign Affairs Ministry in 1923.<sup>7</sup> This was the beginning of liaison between culture and politics, or culture in international relations, as Americans would call it. Cultural Diplomacy in the XX century has developed rapidly due to both the World War II and Cold War.

In the early 1900s private foundations were created in the US which provided scholarships for scientist and artists - Rockefeller and Rhodes among them. In the 1930s the Germans decided to use culture as propaganda when Hitler came to power, mainly towards Latin America. Those efforts evoked a response from the US and a Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations was approved in 1936 in Buenos Aires. Second ignition for propaganda and harnessing culture in the battle was the World War II and especially its aftermath - the Cold War. Till this day American and Soviet activities undertaken at that time are the best examples of Cultural Diplomacy

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<sup>7</sup> Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings. American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington D.C., 2005), p. xvii

- Jazz concerts in Eastern Block and Russian Ballet performances in New York. Both parties had an enemy, which motivated further engagement in the 'ideological war'. Culture was used as weapon, thus Cultural Diplomacy was institutionalized in the US - Fulbright exchange program came into being and United States Information Agency was created in 1953. Also the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged in organizing the Advancing American Art exhibition in 1946, which however turned out not be a fortunate liaison. After the Cold War has ended motivation for Cultural Diplomacy has fallen rapidly - there was no ideological enemy, thus funding was eventually cut both in the US and in Russia, after the fall of Soviet Union. USIA ceased to exist in 1999 and it was not until the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, that United States started to turn its thoughts back to culture as means of politics.

Let us look closely at different terms concerning culture and the International Relations environment.

### **Intercultural Relations (Studies)**

This term lies on the border of Political Science and Anthropology. Intercultural studies examine the cultural differences and similarities of nations, civilizations and people. A nation, in a word, is a "cultural system," and thus international relations are interactions among cultural systems<sup>8</sup>.

These studies focus on cultural differences between peoples and nations, and try to show how can they be overcome or even made use of in relations among states.

### **International Cultural Relations**

A term derived from the British tradition, it has become popular among Polish scholars of International Relations, especially studied by Radoslaw Zenderowski, Grazyna Michalowska and Ewa Zietek. It is a term rooted in anthropological studies applied into the IR research area.

The discipline of International Relations has parted itself from the Political Sciences in Poland, thus in order to situate the cultural activities of the

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<sup>8</sup> Akira Iriye, Culture and Power: *International Relations as Intercultural Relations*, in: *Diplomatic History*, Volume 3, Issue 2, p. 115-128

government in the IR sphere the term International Cultural Relations was adopted. It is also used, though not so frequently, by French scholars such as Frank Robert (*Les relations culturelles internationales*).

The term International Cultural Relations describes all the relations between nations and its people in regard to their cultural characteristics as also to the cultural heritage and all activities related to culture. 'The term covers processes involved in educational exchanges (formerly called "cultural relations" by the US government) and information, propaganda, and psychological warfare activities'<sup>9</sup>.

Thus the term is quite broad and may be used to describe all the notions of Cultural Diplomacy and Intercultural Relations in the American perspective. Richard Arndt sees Cultural Relations as 'literally the relations between national cultures, those aspects of intellect and education lodged in any society that tend to cross borders and connect with foreign institutions'<sup>10</sup>. What is more, Arndt points out, that Cultural Relations do happen even if no government action is taken.

International Cultural Relations in the multilateral sense focus on organizations such as UNESCO, where multiple countries cooperate in order to achieve mutual understanding and promote culture and national heritage of different regions.

German scholars use the term **Foreign Cultural Policy** (*Außenkulturpolitik*) - which narrowly describes the activities undertaken in the area of culture or the use of culture by the government towards other international actors<sup>11</sup>. Cultural Policy is a term avoided in the United States, as any liaison between the state and cultural/artistic world may seem to evoke connotations with corruption or propaganda. In Europe however, culture is

<sup>9</sup> Byron L. Fox, *International Cultural Relations*, [in:] *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Aug., 1950), pp. 489

<sup>10</sup> Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings. American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington D.C., 2005), p. 43

<sup>11</sup> Patrick Schreiner, *Außenkulturpolitik. Internationale Beziehungen und kultureller Austausch*, introduction accessible online: <https://leseprobe.buch.de/images-adb/64/ce/64ced1c8-457d-4bdd-8125-52491175eb1a.pdf> retrieved on February 20th 2015

widely funded by governments not only in international politics, but also internally and the term has no pejorative notions.

The first two presented terms are broad studies disciplines, the following terms are considered to be tools/methods of Foreign Policy and International Relations.

**Diplomacy** has a history as old as any political activity ever undertaken. Adam Watson simply calls diplomacy 'The dialogue between the states'. The word is derived from a Greek word 'δίπλωμα' literally meaning 'double' or folded paper, which was used to describe the letters of recommendations used by the travelers in the ancient times - they were the first diplomats.

'In times and places where there are several separate states and their actions affect one another, they cannot function in a vacuum of isolation, with each community considering only how to manage its internal affairs<sup>12</sup>' so diplomacy is needed - the interactions between state's messengers.

Of course there is a number of definitions describing diplomacy as 'the manner in which international relations are conducted'<sup>13</sup> or actions 'concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors.'<sup>14</sup> 'From a state perspective diplomacy is concerned with advising, shaping and implementing foreign policy'<sup>15</sup>. We commonly use the word to describe the conduct of any negotiations between representatives of states or states and other actors. Diplomacy 'may be regarded as a science or an art, as a craft, a practice, an institution, or a process'<sup>16</sup>. Richard Arndt, the author of *The First Resort of Kings. American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (2005) sees diplomacy as 'a process, a technique, (...) a culture'<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Adam Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between states*, 2004, on: [http://web.a.ebscohost.com.libproxy.usc.edu/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzExMTM2MI9fQU41?sid=73f29320-fbf5-4d41-8d14-2144460b783e@sessionmgr4003&vid=0&format=EB&lpid=lp\\_1&rid=0](http://web.a.ebscohost.com.libproxy.usc.edu/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzExMTM2MI9fQU41?sid=73f29320-fbf5-4d41-8d14-2144460b783e@sessionmgr4003&vid=0&format=EB&lpid=lp_1&rid=0), retrieved on February 13th, 2015

<sup>13</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica

<sup>14</sup> R.P. Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, (London and New York, 1997), p.1

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, p.1

<sup>16</sup> Elmer Pilgre, *Modern Diplomacy. The art and the artisans*, (Washington D.C. 1979), p. xi

<sup>17</sup> Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings. American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington D.C., 2005), p. xix

A very simple, yet broad definition is proposed by Nicholas Cull, who defines diplomacy 'as the mechanisms short of war deployed by an international actor to manage the international environment'<sup>18</sup>.

**Public Diplomacy** is a diplomacy aimed at a foreign public, that is, it describes a government's activity designed to influence foreign audiences.

The term was first coined by Dean Edmund Guillon in 1965 at Tufts University. He expressed his belief that public diplomacy 'encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy'.<sup>19</sup> Hans Tuch defines Public Diplomacy as 'a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies'<sup>20</sup>. Evan H. Potter calls Public Diplomacy 'an instrument of statecraft in which one government is trying to influence the public, and therefore, the political environment in a foreign jurisdiction'<sup>21</sup>. What is more Potter emphasizes the solemn role of a government or a state institution in conducting the Public Diplomacy - a political purpose is the key element of such activities<sup>22</sup>.

A concise definition is offered by the U.S. Department of State Dictionary of International Relations Terms: 'Public Diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television'<sup>23</sup>.

Nicholas Cull has listed five components of Public Diplomacy:

- Listening
- Advocacy

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<sup>18</sup> Nicholas Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*, [in:] CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Los Angeles 2009, p. 12

<sup>19</sup> *About U.S. Public Diplomacy* on Public Diplomacy Portal to be found online [http://pdaa.publicdiplomacy.org/?page\\_id=6](http://pdaa.publicdiplomacy.org/?page_id=6), retrieved April 2nd, 2015

<sup>20</sup> Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating with the world: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), p.3

<sup>21</sup> Evan H. Potter, *Branding Canada: Projecting Canada's Soft Power through Public Diplomacy* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), p. 33

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, p.33

<sup>23</sup> *U.S. Department of State Dictionary of International Relations Terms*, 1987, p.85

- Cultural Diplomacy
- Exchange
- International Broadcasting

Each of them is crucial in order to establish a strong Public Diplomacy towards foreign countries. In this paper we are discussing mainly the third element - Cultural Diplomacy, which however makes use of all other four components.

Nicholas Cull, as many other scholars, notes the emergence of New Diplomacy opposed to the traditional Public Diplomacy. The main characteristics of New Diplomacy are the new media, rising involvement of the non-state actors, blurring of domestic and international news sphere and horizontal structure aiming at relationship building instead of just influencing foreign audiences<sup>24</sup>.

**Soft Power** is term created by the American scholar Joseph S. Nye in 1990 in his book: *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. He developed this concept five years later in *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004).

Nye defines Soft Power as 'the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.'<sup>25</sup> The main three elements of a country's Soft Power are its culture, values and policies.<sup>26</sup> Soft power can also be described as being opposed to Hard Power - that is military threats and economic sanctions used in order to achieve the desired outcome on the international stage.

The term Soft Power became very popular in the sphere of politics and international relations, basically encompassing all the ideological and cultural assets of the country which may be appealing to foreign audiences. Great

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<sup>24</sup> Nicholas Cull, *Public Diplomacy...*, op cit., p. 14

<sup>25</sup> Joseph Nye, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Mar., 2008), p. 94

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*, p.94

examples of Soft Power are Hollywood movies, desired and accessible around the world.

As Soft Power gained on popularity and importance after the 9/11 attacks actions were taken in order to somehow measure its reach and influence. Different institutions prepare various reports and rankings (for example EY - a consulting company), the most popular of which is the annual *Soft Power Survey* conveyed by a British media company Monocle. The ranking is based on nearly 50 factors, standard of government, diplomatic infrastructure, cultural output, capacity for education and appeal to business among them. The survey for 2014/15 points to the United States of America as the country having the most soft power, followed by Germany and United Kingdom.

Lately a new term has emerged in Joseph Nye's studies - Smart Power which is a combination of Hard Power and Soft Power.

Joseph Nye explains that with Soft Power, 'the best propaganda is not propaganda [and] credibility is the scarcest resource'<sup>27</sup>. However during the World War II and Cold War it was a popular tool. **Propaganda** is the culture being produced for or used by the government. It is a term with negative connotations, even if by definition it may seem close to public diplomacy. L. John Martin sees propaganda as 'a persuasive communicative act of a government directed at a foreign audience'<sup>28</sup>. The adjective *persuasive* may be of crucial importance - propaganda is aimed at achieving strictly designed results in favor of the country which does use the method, often making use of the target audience vulnerabilities.

An example of domestic propaganda are the films and posters created on US government's orders promoting support for the American involvement in the World War II or bubble gum comics depicting the 'horrible' communism. International propaganda was broadly used in the Cold War period by both

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<sup>27</sup> Joseph Nye, *China's Soft Power Deficit To catch up, its politics must unleash the many talents of its civil society*, The Wall Street Journal, May 8th, 2008  
on:<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304451104577389923098678842>, retrieved on March 15th 2015.

<sup>28</sup> L. John Martin, *Effectiveness of International Propaganda*, in: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 398, Propaganda in International Affairs (Nov., 1971), pp. 61-70

the Soviet Union and the United States of America, each menacing the opponent's political system: capitalism and communism. All the possible media were harnessed in order to achieve more effective results - film, radio, posters and comics as the most popular.

**Country image** is simply how other nations view the given state. This is why country image is based on stereotypes and it does exist even if we do not take any actions toward its creation and shaping. Country image is defined as a representation of collective identities that refer to a set of narratives describing a nation (Evans, 1999, pp. 1-8). States produce country-images for domestic and international consumption<sup>29</sup>.

If a country decides to strengthen the image or to change it - **nation branding** (also called simply country promotion) comes into the picture. Nation branding are the actions undertaken by the government or its agencies in order to influence nation's image domestically and abroad. Melissa Aronczyk defines Nation branding as 'a result of the interpretation of commercial and public sector interests to communicate national priorities among domestic and international populations for a variety of interrelated purposes'.<sup>30</sup> She also identifies the aim of nation branding as helping 'the nation-state [to] successfully compete for international capital in areas such as tourism, foreign direct investment, import-export trade, higher education, and skilled labour'.<sup>31</sup>

Culture plays an important role in nation branding. As S. Anholt notes, 'treating the promotion of culture as a must means that one can not understand its role in the process of informing about the real spirit and essence of a country. In essence culture plays the main role in the process of enhancing the reputation of a country as it directs the perception of a country by its recipients to areas that will enable a better understanding of it and its values.'<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Cesar Villanueva Rivas, The rise and fall of Mexico's international image: Stereotypical identities, media strategies and diplomacy dilemmas, in: *Place branding and Public Diplomacy*, 2011, p. 24

<sup>30</sup> Melissa Aronczyk, *Branding the nation: The Global Business of National Identity*, Oxford 2013, p.16

<sup>31</sup> Ibidem, p. 16

<sup>32</sup> Anholt Simon, *Tożsamość konkurencyjna. Nowe spojrzenie na markę*, Warsaw 2007, p. 137.

One of the first examples of nation branding was adopting the orange color as the symbol of the Royal Dutch Family by the founder of the now ruling Orange-Nassau dynasty - William the Silent, known also as William of Orange, in 1544. Principality of Orange was a small state in the southern France, but it gave name to an enormously strong symbol branding today Netherlands. Other examples of nation branding are the big country campaigns adopting marketing-like slogans: 'Cool Britannia', 'Incredible India', 'Discover America' or 'SLOVEnia'.

Similarly to Soft Power, Nation branding is also being measured. Simon Anholt is the founder of several indexes: *Good Country Index*, *City Brands Index*, *State Brands Index* and *Nation Brands Index*. The leading three countries in the *Nation Brands Index* are the same ones as in the *Soft Power Survey* (Germany, US, UK), however top countries in the *Good Country Index* are totally different with Ireland on the top followed by Finland and Switzerland. United States of America are left far behind on the 21st position. Those discrepancies have roots in various variables taken into account while conducting the surveys - *Nation Brands Index* is more focused on prestige, economy strength and possibilities for development, as the *Good Country Index* regards what can a particular country bring to the world's common good. *The Good Country Index* is also divided into a few versions, which take different variables into account: Culture, International Peace and Security, Science and Technology<sup>33</sup>.

**Cultural Diplomacy** is a term pinned down in 1954 by an art critic Aline B. Saarinen in *The New York Times* magazine. It was first used in political terms by Robert H. Thayer, special assistant to the secretary of state in 1959.

But what exactly is Cultural Diplomacy? Many scholars treat it as a part of Public Diplomacy or one of its tools, Freeman M. Tovell puts even an equation mark between Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Cultural Policy. The

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<sup>33</sup> The Good Country Index website: [http://www.goodcountry.org/index\\_intro](http://www.goodcountry.org/index_intro)

most oft-cited definition<sup>34</sup> is the one proposed by Milton Cummings: ‘Cultural diplomacy is the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding’<sup>35</sup>.

Cultural Diplomacy definition is being tackled from many angles - many scholars, P.M. Taylor among them, apply the perspective of the media and feel that it is an invention of the French from the end of the XIX century. G. Szondi adopts the public relations viewpoint, concluding Cultural Diplomacy to be an element of the ‘pantheon of reputation management’, alongside creating the brand of a place, the brand of a country, the brand of perception and public diplomacy itself.<sup>36</sup> However the most common opinion is for the Cultural Diplomacy to be a tool, method of the Public Diplomacy or one of its types.

The basic aim of Cultural Diplomacy is mutual understanding, it is not a one-way information channel, but communication between a government and an audience. As Cultural Diplomacy is most often treated as a type of Public Diplomacy we can conclude it is aimed at a public of a foreign country.

Nicholas Cull describes four forms which Cultural Diplomacy can take: a) a form of a cultural gift b) cultural information - presenting something less popular to foreign audiences c) cultural dialogue, which leads to deepening mutual understanding and cooperation d) cultural capacity building - teaching cultural skills to promote understanding.<sup>37</sup> Practical examples of Cultural Diplomacy are the foreign exhibitions (form a and b), concerts (form a and b), publications (form b and d), exchange of scholars and artists (c and d) and workshops (c and d).

Current scholar debate focuses on Cultural Diplomacy actors – as International Relations have gained new, non-governmental subjects, can

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<sup>34</sup> Patricia M. Goff, Cultural Diplomacy, in: Cooper A., Heine J., Thakur R., (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, Oxford 2013, p. 420

<sup>35</sup> Milton Cummings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*, Center for Arts and Culture, 2003, p.1

<sup>36</sup> Szondi Gyorgy, *Filary zarzadzania reputacja; dyplomacja publiczna w Europie Wschodniej z perspektywy public relations*, [in:] Beata Ociepka (ed.) *Dyplomacja publiczna*, Wrocław 2008, p. 72.

<sup>37</sup> Nicholas Cull, an opening speech given at the *Harmony or Discord: Exploring the Impact of Music Diplomacy?* Conference organized by APDS at the University of Southern California on February 13th, 2015

Cultural Diplomacy be also conducted by a non-governmental party? Evan H. Potter (2008) argues, that absolutely not. Cultural Diplomacy, as any other diplomacy, needs a political purpose. Any activities aimed at promoting national culture, but without any government input (either financial or ideological) may not be called Cultural Diplomacy. Also Simon Mark in his doctoral thesis *A Comparative Study of the Cultural Diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India* states that cultural diplomacy is a practice 'usually involving directly or indirectly the government's foreign ministry'<sup>38</sup>. Richard Arndt notes that 'cultural relations grow naturally and organically, without government intervention...If that is correct, Cultural Diplomacy can only be said to take place when formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance national interests'<sup>39</sup>.

On the other hand, most scholars tend to broaden the definition, as the world is changing and other actors are involved in cultural exchanges. Even if we decide to be strict and use the narrow definition, there will still be discrepancies. Let us look at the case of museums. If a National Museum in Warsaw, Poland, lends its work to be shown abroad it is an example of Cultural Diplomacy (the museum is state funded), but if New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art does the same thing – it is not (this museum is funded privately).

Another question which has aroused around the Cultural Diplomacy definition is its measurement. Should a Cultural Diplomacy Index be applied? If so, which measurements, how different from the *Nation Brand Index* should be taken into consideration? Inability to measure Cultural Diplomacy effectiveness is one of its main sources of critique.

All the presented terms are used interchangeably, often by politicians and journalist not connected to the scholarly discussion. Let us compare the terms associated with culture in International Relations.

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<sup>38</sup> Simon Mark, *A Comparative Study of the Cultural Diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India*, on: <https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/2292/2943/02whole.pdf>, retrieved on March 10th 2015, p.3

<sup>39</sup> Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings. American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington D.C., 2005), p. 43

**Table 1. Author's comparison of different terms associated with culture in International Relations**

	<b>Involvement of the state</b>	<b>Target audience</b>	<b>Aim</b>	<b>Culture forms</b>	<b>Example</b>
<b>Diplomacy</b>	crucial	foreign governments and peoples	Maintaining diplomatic relations	exchange of gifts, performances	Congress of Vienna in 1815 with music and opera performances
<b>Public Diplomacy</b>	crucial	foreign audiences in general	Prestige and support among foreign audiences	all forms of 'higher culture', education and information	Exchange of scientists and scholars eg. Fulbright Comission
<b>Cultural Diplomacy</b>	crucial (not necessary according to some scholars)	foreign audiences - mainly elites	Prestige and support among foreign audiences	Mostly 'high culture' - art, classical music	An art exhibition in a foreign country organized with the state support eg. <i>The Family of Man</i>
<b>Soft Power</b>	not necessary	foreign governments and peoples - mass audience	Measurable effects: positive public opinion, country awerness and image	All forms of culture, mainly popular culture	Hollywood movies popular all over the world
<b>Propaganda</b>	crucial	foreign and domestic audiences - mass	Carefully planned outcomes - usually support	Popular culture	War posters prepared for US and USSR governments

	Involvement of the state	Target audience	Aim	Culture forms	Example
		audience	for a particular government action		during the WWII and Cold War
<b>Country image/ Nation branding</b>	not necessary	foreign mass audiences	Encouragement of tourism, foreign investment	Popular culture	“Incredible India” campaign

The first main characteristic of Cultural Diplomacy is the state involvement, either ideological or financial. Second is the use of ‘high culture’, a little neglected in other activities, as they are more goal oriented, thus aiming at mass audiences. Cultural Diplomacy still focuses more on prestige and establishing personal contacts and mutual understanding via exchanges, art and music events than on scale results as tourism attraction (one of the aims of Nation branding).

One of the first examples of Cultural Diplomacy is the *Family of Man* exhibition which toured the world in the years 1956-1963. The collection of ‘503 photographs grouped thematically around subjects pertinent to all cultures, such as love, children, and death’<sup>40</sup> was chosen by Edward Steichen, an artist and photographer himself. At the time he was the Director of the Museum of Modern Art Department of Photography, thus the exhibition was put together to be shown in MoMA. The exhibit was planned not to be historical, but to show life and its colors: births, childhood, work and also agony and death. It conveyed a universal message of American values and humanism.

<sup>40</sup> MoMA Archive highlights on: [http://www.moma.org/learn/resources/archives/archives\\_highlights\\_06\\_1955](http://www.moma.org/learn/resources/archives/archives_highlights_06_1955), retrieved on March 29th 2015

This is why it was a perfect Cultural Diplomacy 'product' - already created beforehand and successful right from the begging - *The Family of Man* opened on January 24th 1955 in New York and attracted thousands of people to visit.

United States Information Agency decided to fund the international tour of the exhibition under the auspices of the The Museum of Modern Art International Program. *Family of Man* has toured the world for over seven years. 'The collection of photographs responded so well to both local circumstances and demands from Washington that reports from Berlin to Beirut were uniformly positive'<sup>41</sup>. It was a great success for the American culture, but also for the agency itself: the exhibition 'appeared in thirty-eight countries and was seen by over 9 million people'<sup>42</sup>. However, the cost was not low, two full-size versions and two of reduced scale reached the price of \$180,000. Afterwards two smaller exhibitions 'graduated to full replicas as the success'<sup>43</sup> spread and one more version was sent out to Japan.

Family of Men exhibition is an example of a huge project adopted by the Cultural Diplomacy agency (USIA) to fit the tour in US, Europe and around the world in the times of Cold War and propaganda war between US and USSR.

The second example the author wishes to present is a project undertaken by a small country and fitted for the tour around the United States of America. The exhibition *Past Forward - Contemporary Art from the Emirates* has been organized by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Embassy in Washington D.C. along with the Meridian Foundation.

The exhibit started its 18-month tour in Washington D.C. in May 2014 and travelled to Fort Worth/Dallas in Texas, Los Angeles in California and Spokane in Washington. Exhibition comprises 50 works of 25 young Emirati artists chosen by two curators: Noor Al Suwaidi, an expert on Emirati art and

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<sup>41</sup> Eric J. Sandeen, *Picturing an Exhibition. The Family of Man and 1950s America*, Albuquerque 1995, p. 97

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 95

<sup>43</sup> *Ibidem*, p.95

Dr. Curtis Sandberg, Senior Vice President for Arts and Cultural Programs at the Meridian International Center.

*Past Forward* is a carefully planned and exercised Cultural Diplomacy project. Its idea was developed within the UAE Embassy in Washington and the exhibition itself co-created with the Meridian Foundation - and organization active in the sphere of Public and Cultural Diplomacy. Both curators and other team members were aware of the target audience and specific aims of the tour. Exhibitions title, artists, even the exhibition design was well planned and prepared. Additional events dedicated for schools have broaden the target audience so it also included children.

As Noor Al Suwaidi, one of the curators, states, the aim of the exhibition was to show how contemporary Emirati artists connect the present and the past, how their heritage influences their life and art works today<sup>44</sup>. The works were chosen carefully with the aid of American partners, so everyone would feel included, they would be able to relate to the art in some way. Also different media were chosen to present the broad spectrum of contemporary art scene in UAE.

Both exhibitions were/are a success. Surely comparing the numbers is pointless, as *The Family of Man* toured the whole world, but the *Past Forward* exhibition was much more targeted and cut especially for American audience.

*Family of Man* was adopted to form a Cultural Diplomacy project, while *Past Forward* was created as such from the very beginning. Both ways are popular in today's world Cultural Diplomacy activities, the first one presenting an American approach and latter the Euro/Asian. The direct connection between art and government was always a controversial subject in the US, whereas it is a common example of Cultural Diplomacy in European and Asian countries. Both exhibitions fulfill the Cultural Diplomacy description presented

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<sup>44</sup> A speech given by Noor Al Suwaidi to Nicholas Cull's Cultural Diplomacy class at the University of Southern California on February 24th, 2015

in the table: they were state funded, aimed at foreign audiences in order to gain prestige for the organizing states.

What differs the two projects is the art itself. *Family of Man* was a blockbuster exhibition aimed at mass audiences, thus using photography as a new, powerful medium, which would be easily understandable for all. *Past Forward* on the other hand is a quite small contemporary art exhibit aiming at elites, students and children (thanks to the educational program).

These two examples show the possible diversity of Cultural Diplomacy. Art, music or performance may be used from the popular or high culture sphere. Also methods of organizing such an event vary - US would adopt an already existing project or hire another institution to carry it out, in other countries such activities are directly steered and supervised by special government agencies.

Cultural Diplomacy has gained on importance in the last decade. Soft Power became more and more important. This is why all the notions deriving from use of culture in International Relations should be researched deeper in order to provide a wider understanding and practical usage of this terms.

The main critique of Cultural Diplomacy is its inconsistency and lack of measurement tools. Military and economic powers can be easily compared, prestige and positive image can be measured via surveys and opinion polls, but there is never proof of given Cultural Diplomacy activity having influenced particular results.

Non the less, importance of Cultural Diplomacy seems evident, as contemporary world is ruled more by peoples than by governments themselves. Appropriately communicated activities from the Cultural Diplomacy sphere influence the country image, its status on the international stage. Also it does foster mutual understanding leading to less causes for conflicts. This alone should be a crucial argument for applying Cultural Diplomacy into broader Foreign Policy strategies. It seems that P. van Ham's

prediction from 2001 that the world of geopolitics and power is being replaced by a post-modernist world of images and influence<sup>45</sup> is coming into being.

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<sup>45</sup> P. Ham, The Rise of the Brand State. The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation. Foreign Affairs, September-October 2001, Vol. 80, No.5, p. 4

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## Reports

**Jarosław Szczepański**  
**Łukasz Zamecki**  
University of Warsaw

Report: Zhuhai-Macau (China) Extramural Invited Presentations  
November 11-12, 2015

On November 11 and 12, 2015 scholars from Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, University of Warsaw Łukasz Zamecki and Jarosław Szczepański gave series of extramural invited presentations at United International College<sup>1</sup> in Zhuhai (China) and University of Macau<sup>2</sup> (Special Administrative Region of Macau). Lectures were given to undergraduate and postgraduate students of both educational institutions.



Figure 1 - Chares Chon-Han Wu



Figure 2 - Łukasz Zamecki

On November 11, 2015 at United International College in Zhuhai academics from University of Warsaw gave two speeches. Their presentation was preceded by short introduction (this basic info on abstracts and bio of speakers) gave by Charles Chong-Han Wu (DHSS, Government and International Relations). Presentations were as follow:

***EU-China: strategic partnership, without partnership?***, Łukasz Zamecki - speech referred to normative regulation of bilateral relations. But the question

<sup>1</sup> United International College (UIC), situated in Zhuhai and jointly founded by Beijing Normal University and Hong Kong Baptist University (HKBU), is the first full-scale cooperation in higher education between the Mainland and Hong Kong. Its charter has been approved by the Ministry of Education with full support from local authorities.

UIC shoulders the historical mission of advancing the internationalization of Chinese higher education and taking the lead in implementing liberal arts education in China. Since its first enrollment in 2005, UIC has grown into an international institution with innovative educational approaches. Twenty undergraduate programmes are currently being offered by three divisions: namely, the Division of Business and Management, the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, and the Division of Science and Technology. UIC has extended its enrollment of Category 1 candidates from more than 20 provinces and municipalities. There are approximately 5000 students now, including those from Hong Kong and overseas. Teaching staff from more than 20 countries and regions make it possible for UIC to use English as the medium of instruction. Graduates will be awarded Bachelor's Degrees by HKBU and Graduation Certificates by UIC.

<sup>2</sup> The University of Macau (UM) was founded in 1981. Its predecessor was the private University of East Asia. Through 34 years of development, UM has become a leading university in Macao, with marked progress in teaching, research, and community service. The only public comprehensive university in Macao, UM has produced more than 26,000 outstanding graduates for society since its founding.

The UM community currently consists of more than 9,400 students. It offers more than 130 bachelor's, master's, PhD and other programmes, through its Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Faculty of Business Administration, Faculty of Education, Faculty of Health Sciences, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Social Sciences, Faculty of Science and Technology, Institute of Chinese Medical Sciences, and Honours College. English is the main medium of instruction, with some programmes being taught in Chinese, Portuguese or Japanese.

was if this „strategic partnership” is real. Partnership presupposes equality of the parties. Author focused on what can be considered as challenges for these relations. In the presentation history of relations, structure of relations, main problems, sources of misunderstandings and areas of potential cooperation and competition were discussed.

***Kuhnian Impact on Political Theory: How to Overcome It with Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes***, Jarosław Szczepański

presented critique of khunian approach in thinking about political theory and how to apply philosophy of Imre Lakatos to this field of research. He introduced a way of thinking about eg. pluralism, elitism and institutionalism as of scientific research programmes, not paradigms or simple meta-theories. In this part of presentation the thesis on historical correctness of Imre Lakatos



Figure 3 - Jarosław Szczepański

explanation on research programmes evolution was defended. Students were



Figure 4 - audience at UIC

informed about how to use theories and apply them to their respective fields of interest in upcoming papers.

Undergraduate students from United International College in Zhuhai had an opportunity to ask questions after each of mentioned presentations.

Most of questions were connected with their projects that were currently performing at college.

On November 12, 2015 Łukasz Zamecki performed second presentation at University of Macau. It was delivered to the undergraduates as well as postgraduates. Introduction to the presentation (abstract and bio) was given by Weiqing Song (European Programme Coordinator).



Figure 5 - Weiqing Song and Łukasz Zamecki

The lecture was entitled *Role of China in institutionalizing the EU raw*

*materials policy*. In his speech Łukasz Zamecki presented key issues about role of institutionalization EU raw materials policy, the Chinese effect on it and some predictions to future of EU-China completion in the above field. After delivered lecture he had also an opportunity to answer variety of questions. It was also an opportunity for the students to ask about Easter and Central European politics.



Figure 6 - President Marques opens seminar

On November 12, 2015 Institute of European Studies, Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, University of Warsaw with co-operation with Institute of European Studies of Macau<sup>3</sup> organized seminar on *China and Central-Eastern Europe Regional Cooperation in 16+1 Formula*. Event was organized in Macau (headquarters of IEEM) and held in English. Polish delegation consist of deputy dean Wojciech Jakubowski and main speakers of seminar Łukasz Zamecki and Jarosław Szczepański.

Seminar was opened be president of IEEM José Luís de Sales Marques, who introduced topic and main speakers. The seminar was chaired by president Marques and deputy dean Jakubowski.

<sup>3</sup> The Institute of European Studies of Macau was set up on the 23<sup>rd</sup> October, 1995, and started its activities on the 6<sup>th</sup> February, 1996.

Its is part of the Government strategy which aims at promoting the Internationalization of Macau and the training of senior staff, having in view the liaison with Europe.

IEEM establishment was subsequent to the existent co-operation with the European Union achieved through the global agreement (third generation) with Macau, in 1992, and through the set up of the European Documentation Centre and the Euro-info Centre. It also makes part of the Institutes and University Centres Web recognized by the European Union. Its existence emphasizes the role played by Macau as a platform between European culture and Chinese culture.

The IEEM is a private organization endowed with legal personality, and at present its partners are public organizations: the S.A.R.Government of Macau, the University of Macau - UM; the Polytechnic Institute of Macau; Macau Foundation, Macau Trade and Investment Promotion Institute; and Macau Monetary Authority.

Its partners are active elements participating in the Institute's activities and contributing to the definition of its yearly program and the approval of its operational budget.

According to the Statutes of the IEEM, the number of partners can increase, and it is planned to enlarge progressively its scope in strategic terms.

The speech addressed the issues of genesis of Cooperation of China and Central - Eastern Europe in the formula “16+1”. Speakers grasped motivations of both sides to establishing China - CEE cooperation, institutional structure and tools of this cooperation. Speakers opinion was that “16+1 format” is not only a important tool to expand New Silk Road, but also a way in which China builds its bilateral relations with selected states of the region.

Thesis of speech were also statements that Beijing’s is using “16+1” formula to access the EU “back door” and fragmented EU on its position on China. The most important constraints of strengthened cooperation is diversification of the CEE region, limitations which comes from EU law, differences between



Figure 7 - Questions from international audience

EU and non - EU countries, lack of mutual understanding, the asymmetry of economic needs, limited willingness within the CEE region to develop cooperation (also because of critical stance of some CEE countries on China), strong ties of the CEE with US, lack of big infrastructural projects in CEE. Speakers tried to sketch a map with stance of the CEE countries on willingness to cooperate with China. In the speech were also given particular examples of Poland - China cooperation.

President Marques ended discussion and seminar with speech and in kind words He expressed his gratitude to the speakers and chairman – deputy dean of FJPS UW. As there was more questions than speakers could answer during seminar – fruitful debate was launched once again during lunch break.